Backpack Or Fanny Pack Searched During Arrest? This Florida Case Could Help You

October 30, 2025 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense Social Share

A top Florida court recently ruled that law enforcement unlawfully searched a handcuffed defendant’s fanny pack after it had been taken off of him at the time of his arrest. 

In Florida and throughout the U.S., the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment protects someone against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” In essence, this means that law enforcement must have a legally valid reason to arrest someone or go through their belongings before doing so.

Simply because the police have a “hunch” that someone is engaged in criminal activity, does not mean that they have permission to search a person or their belongings, or arrest that individual. Even if law enforcement is executing an arrest warrant, the subject of that warrant (the suspect) retains some Fourth Amendment rights.

One of the most intriguing aspects of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is how far the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extends when someone is actively being arrested by police. For example, law enforcement typically cannot go through someone’s entire home at the time they are arrested to try to find additional evidence of a crime. 

However, police can search someone at the time of their arrest or the area within the immediate reach of a suspect – this is called a “search incident to arrest.” Though even this was previously disputed, as many argued such searches were violative of the Fourth Amendment (if performed without a warrant), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld this practice as constitutional.

But what about the “edge cases” on this topic? Though we know police do not have unlimited authority to conduct searches and seize a defendant’s property, even if that defendant is being lawfully arrested, they do retain some authority. How far that extends is a key question that has been frequently addressed by Florida’s courts.

If law enforcement “messes this up” (by searching or seizing an item in violation of a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights), this will often lead to its suppression at trial. In other words, this evidence becomes unusable in a court of law – which can seriously undermine the State’s case. 

As a result, there is a lot of pressure on the police to “get it right,” and only search or seize evidence that is permitted to be obtained in this manner under the Fourth Amendment. But given the complexity of the case law on this issue, the limits of law enforcement’s authority are not totally clear.

One of the seminal issues courts have grappled with is when the police can search a suspect’s property, such as containers or backpacks on or near the suspect, at the time of an arrest. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that if “apparently incriminating” evidence is in plain view at the time an arrest is being performed, police may seize it without a warrant (plain view doctrine). 

But what if the police suspect there may be incriminating evidence in a container or another item (e.g. a backpack or bag) on or near a suspect, yet don’t have definitive proof? Can this item be searched on scene without a warrant incident to a defendant’s arrest – or does this require the police to seize (impound) the item and obtain a search warrant to go through it?

This question was directly addressed by Florida’s 6th District Court of Appeal in a major case: Jean v. State, 369 So. 3d 1235 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023). Let’s discuss Jean and its significant impact on how a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights apply during police investigations in Florida.

MAJOR CASE: Jean v. State, 369 So. 3d 1235 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023)

In Jean v. State, 369 So. 3d 1235 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023), the defendant (Jean) had an outstanding warrant for arrest on charges of aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated assault with a firearm. Law enforcement went to Jean’s home in an attempt to arrest him. Jean was not present initially, so officers waited outside in a cruiser.

Later, Jean rode up to his house on a bicycle and dismounted. At that point, officers emerged from their vehicle and saw Jean standing in front of his garage in the driveway. Jean retreated into his garage, and officers followed him before grabbing him and placing him in handcuffs.

At the time, Jean was wearing a fanny pack with a lock on it. One of the officers took the fanny pack off of Jean’s person and began to feel its surface for potentially illegal items. After doing so, the officer began to suspect there was a firearm inside – so asked for the key to open it.

When this occurred, the officer had already moved the fanny pack out of reach of Jean and onto the hood of the car in the driveway. The other officer, who was holding Jean, retrieved the key off of Jean’s person. A firearm was discovered inside. 

As Jean was a convicted felon at the time, he was also charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (second-degree felony). Before trial, Jean moved to suppress the firearm, which would render it inadmissible in court. 

Jean argued that law enforcement improperly searched his fanny pack, as it had been removed from his person and was outside his immediate reach at the time it was unlocked. Jean argued that because it was not part of a proper search incident to arrest, police had to obtain a warrant if they wished to search his bag.

The trial judge ultimately denied Jean’s motion, and he was convicted. But on appeal, the 6th DCA agreed with Jean and ruled that the judge erroneously denied his motion to suppress the firearm. Because the search of Jean’s fanny pack violated his Fourth Amendment rights, the court reversed Jean’s conviction (since the evidence was used against him at trial).

The 6th DCA noted that the trial judge correctly concluded the search of Jean’s fanny pack could not be characterized as a lawful search incident to arrest. But it disagreed with the trial judge’s conclusion that the evidence was admissible on another basis – that officers had a “reasonable belief” that evidence relevant to the crime was contained within the pack. The 6th DCA wrote:

“The trial court found… that the search of the fanny pack was justified because the officers had a reasonable basis to believe that the search of the fanny pack would reveal evidence relevant to the crime for which Jean was arrested. This was error.”

“As explained above, the ‘evidence relevant to the crime of arrest’ exception or ‘vehicle of the arrestee exception,’ as the Third District Court of Appeal called it, applies only to vehicles and any containers therein.”

“Assuming Jean’s bicycle qualified as a vehicle (which we do not decide), Jean’s fanny pack was not at any point stored on or in the bicycle. Instead, the fanny pack was worn by Jean on his person after he dismounted his bicycle. Because the fanny pack was never stored on or in a vehicle, the officers were not permitted to search the fanny pack pursuant to the ‘evidence relevant to the crime of arrest’ exception established in Gant.”

In essence, the 6th DCA applied a test from the U.S. Supreme Court in a major 2009 ruling, Arizona v. Gant. There, the Court concluded there were some circumstances that allowed the search of items (including backpacks and fanny packs) incident to arrest, even when they were not within a suspect’s immediate reach.

One of these exceptions is the “vehicle exception” to the exclusionary rule. The trial court ruled that since Jean was carrying the fanny pack in a “vehicle” (on a bicycle) and officers reasonably believed they would find evidence related to a crime inside, the search was permissible.

But the 6th DCA rejected this logic, noting that even if the bicycle qualified as a vehicle under Florida law, the fanny pack had been removed from the “vehicle” (when Jean dismounted) and was on Jean’s person at the time it was taken and searched. As a result, law enforcement needed a warrant to go through it.  

Noting that the search of the locked fanny pack did not satisfy any other exceptions to the exclusionary rule, which requires evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights to not be admitted in court, the 6th DCA wrote:

“‘[T]he exclusionary rule makes evidence obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion inadmissible.’ … There are three exceptions to the exclusionary rule: (1) an independent source existed for the discovery of the evidence; (2) the evidence would have inevitably been discovered in the course of a legitimate investigation; or (3) sufficient attenuation existed between the challenged evidence and the illegal conduct.”

“In its Answer Brief, the State argues that even if the search of Jean’s fanny pack was illegal, we should affirm the trial court’s order based on the second exception to the exclusionary rule, the inevitable discovery doctrine. However, the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress did not establish the applicability of the inevitable discovery doctrine.”

Though the State attempted to argue that the pack would have been “inevitably” searched and seized anyway in line with normal law enforcement protocols, the 6th DCA found that the State did not prove this at the pretrial hearing.  

Because “inevitable discovery” did not apply in Jean’s case (nor did any other exception to the exclusionary rule), the evidence was wrongly admitted, requiring reversal of Jean’s conviction.

In sum, Jean v. State, 369 So. 3d 1235 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023) is a major development in Florida’s corpus of case law surrounding the Fourth Amendment rights of suspects when they are arrested and searched.

If a closed container or bag is taken off someone’s person (no longer within their immediate reach) and searched without a warrant, this is considered unlawful unless one or more of the following is true:

• The bag or item was in a vehicle at the time of its seizure, and officers reasonably believe it contains evidence relevant to the underlying crime(s)
• The evidence is in plain sight and apparently incriminating (plain view doctrine), such as drugs sticking out of the bag
• The State proves another applicable exception to the exclusionary rule (e.g. inevitable discovery) applies

If a container, bag or other item was seized on or near a person and searched by police at the scene without a warrant, Jean v. State, 369 So. 3d 1235 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023) provides strong grounds for a motion to suppress that evidence (preventing it from being used in court). This can fundamentally change the direction of a Florida criminal case.

If someone is arrested and formally charged in Florida with an offense involving evidence seized from a vehicle, it is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting drug charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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