Major FL Court REVERSES Vehicular Homicide Conviction: Speeding Is “Not Enough”

April 20, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense, Violent Crimes Social Share

Florida’s 3rd District Court of Appeal found a defendant who was speeding on a largely empty highway when he hit the vehicle of the victim, who turned directly in front of him while he had the right of way, was not guilty of vehicular homicide as a matter of law.

CASE: Luzardo v. State, 147 So.3d 1083 (Fla. 3d. DCA 2014)

Charge(s): Vehicular Homicide

Outcome: Conviction REVERSED, as the defendant was not driving his vehicle recklessly as a matter of law before he was involved in a fatal collision.

Vehicular Homicide in Florida

In Florida, vehicular homicide (Fla. Stat. 782.071) is a very serious felony offense. Vehicular homicide is typically punishable by up to 15 years in prison and a $10,000 fine. However, it is considered a first-degree felony (up to 30 years in prison and a $10,000 fine) if either (or both) of the following are true:

• The defendant has a prior conviction for DUI manslaughter, BUI manslaughter, vehicular homicide or vessel homicide (Trenton’s Law, 2025)
• The defendant fails to give information to authorities, render aid to the victim(s), or leaves the scene of the accident (e.g. fails to stop)

For someone to be guilty of vehicular homicide, the State must prove all of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

• The defendant operated a vehicle
• The defendant’s operation of the vehicle caused the death(s) of one or more other people
• The defendant’s operation of the vehicle (which caused the death) was reckless

In a vehicular homicide case, it is RARE that operation is disputed. The two most debated legal issues are typically whether the defendant was reckless as a matter of law in how they drove the vehicle, and whether they were the cause of the victim’s death.

On the issue of causation – unlike Florida’s DUI manslaughter law, its vehicular homicide law requires that the defendant have been the proximate (but-for) cause of the victim’s deaths. Mere “contribution” to this (e.g. the fact of being involved in a fatal collision) does not make a person guilty of vehicular homicide. For more on this, click here.

Cases in which Florida courts have found NO causation as a matter of law – requiring reversal of the defendant’s vehicular homicide conviction – include:

• The victim grabbing the steering wheel from the defendant and causing the vehicle to lose control, resulting in a crash that caused their death ((J.A.C. v. State, 374 So.2d 606 (Fla. 3d. DCA 1979))
• The victim was consensually involved in a street race with the defendant – and in the process lost control of their own vehicle and crashed (Velazquez v. State, 561 So.2d 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990))

However, as a matter of law, it is not “easy” for a defendant to show a lack of causation. This is because the decedent’s (e.g. the dead person’s) conduct can only be used to refute causation if the victim’s conduct was the SOLE CAUSE of their death. Reaves v. State, 979 So.2d 1066 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)

There is a similar, but not identical, rule for when the defendant alleges that a “third party” (e.g. someone other than the defendant and the decedent) was the cause. 

For that third party’s conduct to have been the only proximate cause of a vehicular homicide as a matter of law, this must have been an “unnatural and unforeseeable response” to the defendant’s conduct, given the circumstances (Reaves). 

Note: Though this makes it difficult for a pretrial dismissal motion due to lack of causation the State still must prove causation beyond a reasonable doubt. For more, click here.

The most commonly debated element in a vehicular homicide case is RECKLESSNESS (or the lack thereof). For a driver to have been reckless, both of the following must have been true:

• The defendant operated their vehicle in a manner they knew or should have known was likely to cause death or great bodily harm (House v. State, 831 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002))
• The defendant did more than simply exceed the speed limit, as this is negligence – not recklessness 

Though speeding alone cannot establish that the defendant was reckless for purposes of vehicular homicide, speeding can be considered alongside other factors used to evaluate recklessness. Per House v. State, 831 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), these include:

• Whether visibility was good or poor at the time of the accident
• Whether the defendant was staying “in their lane” or swerving out of it
• Whether there was signage indicating drivers should pay particular attention or slow down (e.g. school zones)
• Whether the defendant exercised “any degree of care” to avoid collision
• Whether the defendant was traveling in an area with heavy foot traffic (e.g. residential)
• Whether the defendant was familiar with the area in which they were traveling
• Whether the cause of the death (e.g. the hazard that caused it) was foreseeable/perceived by others 

It is an “oft-cited” maxim in Florida vehicular homicide law that speed alone is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a vehicular homicide conviction. The same is true for vessel homicide. For more on the similarities between Florida’s vehicular and vessel homicide law, click here.

This principle was reinforced by a major case heard by Florida’s 3rd District Court of Appeal (Miami’s highest court). In that case, the defendant was driving approximately 84 miles per hour on a largely empty highway. The speed limit was 55.

As he approached another vehicle that was in the other lane, that vehicle turned into his lane – seemingly without awareness that he was approaching at an excessive speed. The car stopped in the middle of his lane, and despite attempts to maneuver around it, the vehicles collided. 

The “speeding” driver was charged with vehicular homicide (Fla. Stat. 782.071), as a passenger in the turning car died in the crash. He was convicted after the trial judge denied his motions to dismiss and motions for judgment of acquittal on the grounds that he wasn’t reckless behind the wheel as a matter of law.

On appeal to the 3rd DCA, the defendant reiterated his argument that “speed alone” (e.g. 84 in a 55) was insufficient as a matter of law to make him guilty of vehicular homicide – as the rest of his actions were “by the book.” The 3rd DCA AGREED and REVERSED his conviction, ruling that he did not recklessly drive – and thus, could not permissibly be convicted.

Let’s take a look at that seminal case – Luzardo v. State, 147 So.3d 1083 (Fla. 3d. DCA 2014) – and discuss what it means for defendants charged with vehicular or vessel homicide in Florida.

KEY CASE: Luzardo v. State, 147 So.3d 1083 (Fla. 3d. DCA 2014)

In Luzardo, the defendant (Luzardo) was charged with and convicted of vehicular homicide after a crash on a two-lane highway (one lane in each direction). At trial, the following was revealed:

• Luzardo was driving in the middle of the day, on a largely empty road 
• He was going approximately 84 miles per hour, but the speed limit was 55
• The weather was good and his visibility was unobstructed
• The driver of the vehicle in the opposite lane attempted to turn left to enter a parking lot
• While she was doing so, her passenger alerted her to Luzardo’s oncoming vehicle
• The driver STOPPED in the middle of Luzardo’s lane in a panic
• Luzardo attempted to swerve to avoid the crash, but this failed, and he hit the side of the turning car
• The passenger in that car died, resulting in Luzardo being tried for vehicular homicide

Luzardo moved to dismiss the charges before trial and for a motion for judgment of acquittal at trial on the charge. Luzardo argued that because he was simply speeding and did everything else “right” before the crash, he only drove carelessly, NOT RECKLESSLY, as a matter of law.

The judge denied these motions, and Luzardo was convicted of vehicular homicide. On appeal to the 3rd DCA, he reiterated his claim that “speed alone” was insufficient for a vehicular homicide conviction.

The 3rd DCA agreed with Luzardo and REVERSED his conviction, releasing him from custody. The 3rd DCA wrote:

“Neither carelessness nor ordinary negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle are sufficient to sustain a conviction for vehicular homicide. By definition, the crime of vehicular homicide requires proof of the elements of reckless driving. See State v. Lebron, 954 So.2d 52 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); see also D.E. v. State, 904 So.2d 558 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); State v. Del Rio, 854 So.2d 692 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Reckless driving, in turn, is defined as driving “… in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property ….” § 316.192(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012). “Willful” means “intentional, knowing and purposeful” and “wanton” means “with a conscious and intentional indifference to consequences and with the knowledge that damage is likely to be done to persons or property.” See W.E.B. v. State, 553 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). In our view, the facts of this case, as unfortunate as they are, do not present a prima facie case of reckless driving either.”

Explaining why it believed Luzardo’s driving was simply “careless” (e.g. negligent) rather than reckless as a matter of law, the 3rd DCA wrote:

“The determination of a prima facie case of recklessness in a vehicular homicide case is a fact intensive, ad hoc inquiry. The focus is on the actions of the defendant and, considering the circumstances, whether it was reasonably foreseeable that death or great bodily harm could result. D.E. v. State, 904 So.2d 558, 562 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). Most of the cases we have found that uphold a vehicular homicide conviction consist of facts much more egregious than ours….”

“The case before us is devoid of aggravating factors analogous to those found in either Hamilton or Gensler. Unlike Hamilton, the accident in our case did not occur in a residential area congested with children, there was no “SLOW–TOURIST ATTRACTION” sign on the road where Luzardo was travelling, and, unlike the driver in the Hamilton case, Luzardo did attempt to avoid the collision. And, unlike Gensler, the accident in our case occurred on a rural, dry road, in broad daylight, where it is not usual for automobiles to be entering or leaving the highway. Lastly, the facts of this case are less compelling for a recklessness finding than any that our electronically assisted research has located that have either granted a motion to dismiss a vehicular homicide information or the evidence after trial was determined to be insufficient. … The facts of our case—speeding on a straight road in sunny weather with clear visibility in combination with the attempt to avoid a vehicle which inexplicably turned and braked in the defendant’s path—are no more compelling than the facts of these exemplars.”

Put simply, since Luzardo was essentially a “victim of circumstance” rather than someone who was speeding under circumstances that made such behavior likely to kill or injure others, he was NOT guilty of vehicular homicide as a matter of law (as he did not drive recklessly).

In sum, Luzardo v. State, 147 So.3d 1083 (Fla. 3d. DCA 2014) marks a significant development in Florida’s case law on vehicular homicide. The 3rd DCA (Miami’s highest court) held that:

• Luzardo was violating no other rule of the road other than the speed limit
• It was sunny outside, there was no traffic, and he could clearly see ahead of him
• Without “aggravating factors,” his speeding was simply careless, not reckless
• Because he did not drive recklessly as a matter of law, REVERSAL of his conviction was required

Florida’s criminal defense community should take note of Luzardo v. State, 147 So.3d 1083 (Fla. 3d. DCA 2014), as it is key, defendant-friendly case law in vehicular and vessel homicide cases when recklessness is disputed.

It is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible if someone is charged with vehicular homicide, DUI manslaughter, BUI manslaughter or vessel homicide. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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