Major Florida Court: “I Think I Should Have a Lawyer” Did Not Require Police to End Questioning

October 23, 2025 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense Social Share

A top Florida court ruled that a suspect saying “I think I should have a lawyer” is not an “unequivocal” invocation of their right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona. Here’s why.

In Florida, someone must be read their Miranda rights by law enforcement before they are subject to custodial interrogation. According to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ruling, police must notify someone of:

• The right to remain silent
• The fact that anything they say can and will be used against them in court
• The right to an attorney, including during police questioning
• The fact that if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for them

If someone is read their Miranda rights, the smart move is to exercise them. Tell the police you will be remaining silent and request an attorney. Actually communicate this, as if you simply sit there quietly and say nothing, law enforcement can continue questioning you in an effort to get you to speak. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010)

After being read these rights, some still decide to “waive” them and agree to speak with police without an attorney present. Often, suspects decide to do so because they think they can “outwit” the police or avoid incriminating themselves. In reality, officers are trained to elicit details from people that they think won’t hurt them, but may significantly undermine their case at trial.

If someone waives their Miranda rights knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, their statements following this waiver to police may be used against them in court. For a waiver to be considered knowing, intelligent, and voluntary (legally valid), someone must understand all of their rights as well as the potential consequences of not exercising them.

It is important to note that, as the Miranda warning says, any post-Miranda statements someone makes after a valid waiver can be used against them in court. This includes confessions to the crime, which can “seal the deal” in many cases (or at least, make it more likely an unfavorable verdict will be returned).

At the start of interrogation or during interrogation itself, someone may invoke their Miranda rights – requiring law enforcement to terminate questioning. 

But what does someone have to say to validly invoke (exercise) their rights? And by what standard do courts evaluate whether someone truly invoked their right(s), when this was not entirely clear?

These are key questions that were addressed in a major case by Florida’s 3rd District Court of Appeal, State v. Myers, 394 So. 3d 727 (Fla. 3d. DCA 2024). Let’s break it down.

Major New Case: State v. Myers, 394 So. 3d 727 (Fla. 3d. DCA 2024)

In Myers, the defendant (Myers) was arrested and charged with murder. Myers was taken into custody and interrogated by law enforcement. Before officers began questioning Myers, who “appeared emotional” at the time, they read him his Miranda rights. He confirmed he understood them.

Upon the start of the interrogation, Myers said to officers, “I think I should have a lawyer.” An officer replied to him by saying that Myers would “want to explain some things,” but added that he could stop at any time (“If at any point you think we’re being mean to you or anything like that, then you can just tell us you don’t want to talk to us anymore, okay?”).

Myers then asked the officer whether he could have a lawyer “later on” if he wanted one. The officer answered in the affirmative (yes). Myers then formally agreed to waive his Miranda rights by signing a written waiver. He was questioned for approximately 45 minutes, during which he did not attempt to invoke his rights or end questioning.

Myers moved to suppress his statements (prevent them from being used in court), arguing that his statement – “I think I should have a lawyer” – was a clear invocation of his right to counsel, requiring law enforcement to end interrogation immediately. The trial court granted the motion, finding that Myers expressed “clearly enough” that he wanted a lawyer through the statement.

On appeal, the 3rd District Court of Appeal (Miami area) reversed the trial court’s finding and allowed Myers’s statements to be used against him at trial (including his confession). The 3rd DCA argued that just because the trial court thought Myers was likely invoking his rights, this did not mean the proper remedy was automatic suppression: 

“[T]he main issue before the trial court wasn’t a factual determination, credibility determination, weighing of the evidence, or the like. Instead, the trial court was asked to determine whether a statement made during a recorded interrogation constituted an unequivocal request invoking the right to counsel.”

“Therefore, the trial court was asked to perform a legal function, not a fact-finding function, and apply the law to the facts as presented on the video interrogation. Thus, the officers were not required to terminate the interrogation, and Myers’ motion to suppress should’ve been denied.”

In essence, the court reasoned that because Myers’s waiver of his rights was “equivocal” in nature (not a straightforward request for an attorney at that moment), the trial court erred by denying the admission of Myers’s subsequent incriminating statements. 

One of the most intriguing aspects of Myers is an informative concurring opinion by Judge Scales of the 3rd DCA, who clarified the “standard of review” the court used in analyzing the propriety of the trial judge’s suppression order. Judge Scales wrote:

“The standard for determining whether a defendant’s invocation of Miranda is equivocal is an objective one: whether a reasonable police officer under the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.”

“If a suspect makes a statement referencing an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal such that a reasonable police officer would understand only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, questioning need not cease.”

Echoing the majority, Judge Scales wrote that the trial judge had incorrectly made his decision about whether it appeared to him from the interrogation tape that Myers intended to invoke his right to counsel. Instead, the judge should have asked whether a reasonable officer would have understood the statement as a clear invocation. Judge Scales noted:

“The trial court made no factual findings regarding why or how such circumstances would cause a reasonable police officer to have understood Myers’s statements as an unequivocal invocation of Myers’s right to counsel.”

“In fact, it appears as though the trial court focused its inquiry not upon whether the interrogating officer understood Myers’s statement to be an unequivocal invocation of right to counsel, but rather, on Myers’s intentions in making the statement.”

Judge Scales’s concurring opinion concluded by advising trial courts to apply the “reasonable officer” standard in future Miranda suppression hearings:

“In sum, while the trial court’s suppression order contained conclusory observations regarding Myers’s demeanor, manner of expression, etc., to the extent that those observations constitute findings of fact, the trial court did not relate those findings to the relevant inquiry. The relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable police officer would understand Myers’s statement – ‘I think I should have a lawyer’ – as an unequivocal invocation of right to counsel.”

Though the opinion (including Judge Scales’s concurrence) applied existing law surrounding Miranda waivers in Florida, Myers is a significant new decision for two reasons:

• It ruled that “I think I want a lawyer” does not constitute an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel
• It clarified then when evaluating whether a suspect attempted to invoke their Miranda rights, the question is whether a reasonable officer would have viewed the statement as a clear invocation rather than an “equivocal” (ambiguous) one

As noted in Myers, officers were not required to cease questioning if they reasonably believed Myers was not asking for an attorney at that time AND did not ask a question pertaining to the nature of his rights (e.g. “Can I have a lawyer right now?”). Such a query would have required that officers clarify Myers’s rights to ensure he understood them (pursuant to Almeida).

But the court noted that Myers’s next statement, a question about if he could have an attorney later on if he requested one, was answered honestly by officers. They told him he could.

Because of this, the 3rd DCA found that neither Myers’s “equivocal” invocation, nor the officer’s “honest and straightforward” reply to Myers’s question about his right to an attorney “later on” in interrogation, could serve as grounds to suppress Myers’s confession on the basis of an invalid Miranda waiver.

Critics of Myers are likely to argue that “I think I want a lawyer,” in context, was a very obvious invocation of Myers’s right to counsel. They would further argue that officers should’ve stopped questioning Myers at that point, rather than essentially “talking him out of” getting an attorney.

In sum, Myers is likely to go down as a key case in Florida on the issue of Miranda rights (and how to exercise them). The 3rd District Court of Appeal held that “I think I want a lawyer” is not so clear of an invocation of the right to counsel, that police must immediately stop questioning.

Moreover, the decision (and particularly, Judge Scales’s concurrence) clarified that the court is to use a “reasonable officer” standard in assessing whether someone’s invocation of Miranda rights was ambiguous or not. If a reasonable officer would not see someone’s statement as a clear effort to exercise their Miranda rights, interrogation is not required to cease. 

If someone is arrested and formally charged in Florida in a case involving a Miranda waiver that was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary, it is CRITICAL to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This decision could make the difference in whether someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting drug charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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