North FL’s Highest Court Discusses Williams Rule Evidence in Sexual Battery Cases

April 16, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense, Sex Crimes Social Share

A divided 1st District Court of Appeal affirmed a defendant’s sexual battery conviction after evidence of an uncharged sexual battery he allegedly performed on another victim was admitted at trial.

CASE: Donton v. State, 1 So.3d 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)

Charge(s): Sexual Battery on a Victim with a Mental Defect

Outcome: Conviction AFFIRMED, as “Williams Rule” (e.g. collateral crime) evidence was admissible at the defendant’s trial.

Sexual Battery in Florida

In Florida, sexual battery is a very serious offense, colloquially referred to as rape. For someone to be guilty, the  State must prove all of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

• The defendant orally, anally, or vaginally penetrated the victim using an object or their sexual organ, or had the victim do any of this to them
• The victim did not consent to this (either due to being unable to legally consent or the act being done against the victim’s will)

Consent occurs when someone 18 or older voluntarily engages in a sexual act of their own free will, without coercion of force. It is important to note that:

• Someone does not have to physically resist for a lack of consent to be established
• Someone who is unconscious, asleep, or otherwise unable to physically communicate an unwillingness to engage in a sexual act cannot consent (Coley v. State, 616 So.2d 1017 (Fla. 3d. DCA 1993))
• Minors (under the age of 18) cannot consent to sex

Sexual battery is one of the most serious felonies in the state of Florida. Because of this, prison sentences and hefty fines are very likely if someone is convicted. Per Fla. Stat. 794.011:

• Victim under 12, defendant 18 or older: Also known as capital sexual battery, this is punishable by the death or a mandatory minimum of life in prison. Though the Florida and U.S. Supreme Courts have held the death penalty unconstitutional for rape that does not result in death, Florida law authorizes it. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981)
• Victim 12 or older but under 18, defendant 18+: Sexual battery is a first-degree felony punishable by up to 30 years in prison and a $10,000 fine, or up to LIFE IN PRISON if there was a threat of violence or the use of a weapon.
• Victim under 18, defendant 18+ and in a position of familial or custodial authority: A first-degree felony punishable by life (PBL) in prison.
• Victim 18+, defendant 18+: Sexual battery is a second-degree felony punishable by up to 15 years in prison and a $10,000 fine (enhanceable to more severe penalties if actual force or a weapon was used).

A conviction for sexual battery requires registry as a sex offender in Florida. This is an onerous requirement that places various restrictions upon those convicted of sex offenses in the state. For more on registration as a sex offender/predator in Florida, click here.

Moreover, someone is not eligible to avoid the sex offender registry under Florida’s Romeo and Juliet law if they are found guilty of sexual battery. This is only the case if the defendant is found guilty of a lewd/lascivious offense and all of the following are true:

• The alleged victim was 14 to 17 years old
• The defendant was less than 1,460 days older than the victim at the time of the offense (4 years)
• The alleged victim “consented” to the sexual activity (no force or coercion was used, no resistance was offered, and the victim wanted the act to occur)
• The defendant does not have a criminal history

Note: To learn more about Florida’s Romeo and Juliet law, which is much “narrower” than most believe, click here.

A common issue in sexual battery prosecutions, especially those involving minors, is admission of “Williams Rule” evidence (also known as collateral crime evidence). The legal standard for admitting that evidence is outlined by Fla. Stat. 90.404, which provides:

• Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue 
• This includes, but is not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident
• However, that evidence is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity

In sexual battery prosecutions that involve the alleged victimization of a child (under the age of 18), Fla. Stat. 90.404(2) provides that “Williams Rule” evidence (e.g. evidence of a defendant’s commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts) is admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant. This is broader than the “usual” rule.

Before going any further, it is important to explain what collateral crime evidence is. Collateral crime evidence includes evidence or testimony of a defendant’s previous, uncharged conduct that is so similar to the charged conduct, that admitting evidence of that uncharged conduct is more “probative” than unfairly prejudicial. Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959)

Though in most cases, there must be nearly “one-to-one” similarity between uncharged conduct and charged conduct for Williams Rule evidence to come in, Fla. Stat. 90.404(2) broadened this in child sexual battery/molestation cases. 

Since Fla. Stat. 90.404(2) codified (in the early 2000s), Florida’s courts have heard various cases involving the admission of Williams Rule sexual battery/molestation evidence in cases where the defendant strongly protested this. McLean v. State, 934 So.2d 1248 (Fla. 2006)

If the State seeks to introduce Williams Rule evidence (Fla. Stat. 90.404(2)) in a child sexual battery case, an experienced and aggressive Florida defense attorney will argue against this by asserting that the “uncharged conduct” is being introduced solely to prove bad character or propensity – not for any of the “authorized” purposes (e.g. motive, intent) under the statute.

As collateral crime evidence (Williams Rule evidence) can be extremely powerful in “bolstering” the credibility of the victim’s claim against a defendant, a judge’s decision to admit evidence or testimony as to a defendant’s similar past (yet uncharged) conduct is likely to strongly influence the outcome of the trial (e.g. whether the defendant is found guilty).

If a defendant believes the judge erred as a matter of law by admitting Williams Rule evidence at trial, they are likely to appeal their conviction (if found guilty) to the District Court of Appeal that has jurisdiction over the trial court. The DCA, upon reviewing the case, has three options:

• Affirm the defendant’s conviction(s), finding that the trial judge did not err by allowing the collateral crime evidence to be heard by the jury under Fla. Stat. 90.404(2)
• Affirm, finding error in admitting the collateral crime evidence but concluding this was harmless (very unlikely, especially when the victim’s testimony is the sole/a large part of the evidence against the defendant)
• Reverse the defendant’s conviction(s), finding that the trial judge erred as a matter of law in admitting the collateral crime evidence (e.g. it was not similar enough to the charged conduct and was brought in for bad character/propensity purposes) – requiring that the defendant receive a NEW TRIAL

A common question for those facing these charges in Tallahassee and North Florida is – how do appellate courts evaluate the admission of Williams Rule evidence in child sexual battery cases? This question was directly answered by Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal.

In that case, the defendant was charged with Sexual Battery on a Victim with a Mental Defect after allegedly committing this act upon a fifteen-year-old inmate at the Leon County Juvenile Detention Center.

At the defendant’s trial, the State wished to offer testimony from a 5-year-old girl divulging that two years earlier, the defendant sexually battered her while he was babysitting her. There were witnesses to this incident, including the victim’s brother. 

Over objections from the defense, the trial judge ultimately ruled to admit the victim’s testimony, finding that the “uncharged conduct” (under Fla. Stat. 90.404(2)) was sufficiently similar to the charged act and was being offered for a non-bad character/propensity (e.g. relevant) purpose. The defendant was ultimately convicted.

On appeal to the 1st DCA, the defendant argued that the trial judge erred as a matter of law in admitting the testimony from the 5-year-old girl. A divided 1st DCA disagreed and AFFIRMED the sexual battery conviction. 

Let’s take a look at that case – Donton v. State, 1 So.3d 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) – and discuss what it means for those charged with (or who know someone charged with) sexual battery (or a related offense, such as lewd molestation) upon a minor.

KEY CASE: Donton v. State, 1 So.3d 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)

In Donton, the defendant (Donton) was convicted of Sexual Battery on a Victim with a Mental Defect. At trial, the following was revealed:

• Donton allegedly committed sexually battery upon a 15-year-old, mentally disabled male teenager in the shower area of the Leon County Juvenile Detention Center
• The victim (R.M.) could not testify due to his intellectual disability
• Seeing vulnerability in the case (due to R.M.’s lack of testimony), the State attempted to introduce testimony from a now-5-year-old girl (P.K.) who Donton allegedly committed a sexual battery upon while babysitting her two years earlier under Fla. Stat. 90.404(2)
• DNA evidence of the offense was found on panties from P.K.
• Donton was allegedly like a “big brother” to P.K. and her brother (L.S.) at the time of the event, creating a “family member or custodian”-like dynamic
• The case was handled in juvenile court, where Donton entered a plea after he initially denied the allegations
• Donton strongly objected to the admission of this Williams Rule evidence, arguing that the offenses were dissimilar (e.g. male versus female victim, age difference) and that the probative value of admitting P.K.’s testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice it would create (Fla. Stat. 90.403)
• The trial judge ruled against Donton and ALLOWED P.K. to testify
• Donton was ultimately convicted of the Sexual Battery on a Victim with a Mental Defect upon R.M. 

On appeal to the 1st DCA, Donton argued that the trial judge erred as a matter of law in allowing P.K. to testify. Again highlighting the dissimilarities between the alleged sexual batteries of P.K. and the charged sexual battery upon R.M., Donton argued that the evidence was truly admitted to prove bad character/propensity, and was not covered by the Williams Rule (Fla. Stat. 90.404(2)).

However, the 1st DCA majority DISAGREED and AFFIRMED Donton’s conviction. Outlining the trial judge’s reasons for finding the offenses sufficiently similar to admit pursuant to Fla. Stat. 90.404(2), the 1st DCA wrote:

“The court assessed the similarity of the prior act to the charged act, in that Appellant engaged in non-consensual sex with one very young victim and another victim whose mental status rendered him child-like and unable to take care of and protect himself. The prior act occurred in a bedroom when the female victim was left without adequate adult supervision and Appellant apparently believed no one was watching him. The charged act occurred in the shower area of the juvenile facility at a time other than when the detainees usually bathed. According to Meyer’s eyewitness testimony, Appellant was surprised by Meyer’s presence in the shower area and warned him not to disclose what he had seen occurring between Appellant and R.M.”

“It is reasonable to infer that in the 2004 incident at the babysitter’s residence and in the charged 2005 incident at the juvenile detention facility, Appellant did not expect to be caught having sex with the victims. The trial court found that the prior act upon P.K. occurred once, in close temporal proximity to the charged offense. Acknowledging the obvious anatomical differences between the two victims, the court concluded that, in a broader sense, the prior act and the charged act are similar, in that Appellant acted with “an authoritative familiarity” over both victims, whom he already knew and exploited when given the opportunity to be alone with them.”

Finding the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by allowing P.K. to testify (citing McLean v. State, 934 So.2d 1248 (Fla. 2006)), the 1st DCA held:

“In the Williams Rule proceedings, the trial court afforded counsel for the State and for Appellant generous opportunities to argue the facts and the law. The State presented ample reasons from which the court could conclude that the collateral-crime evidence was admissible under section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), which is a general rule of admissibility, subject to certain exceptions, rather than a general exclusionary rule. See Williams, 110 So.2d at 658. Additionally, the State argued the applicability of the somewhat relaxed standard of admission enunciated in section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), and fully discussed in McLean. Appellant concedes on appeal that the charged crime involved “child molestation,” and the particular evidence adduced in the trial court certainly supports the conclusion that the victim is, for all intents and purposes, a “child,” and that he was molested. Given the record, we conclude that the trial court correctly applied the law, and we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s allowing into evidence the collateral-crime evidence.”

“The trial court is in the better position to determine whether testimony can be admitted pursuant to the McLean line of decisions, and we shall not second-guess the circuit judge on this record. See Fiore v. State, 967 So.2d 995, 999 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). Given these detailed findings made by the trial court pursuant to McLean, and the ample precautions taken to avoid emphasizing the collateral-crime evidence, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s overruling the defense’s objections and in denying the motion for mistrial. The trial court took steps to avoid the danger of undue prejudice in accordance with section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2005). Appellant was afforded the due process required by law.”

One 1st DCA judge, Judge Benton, disagreed. Believing that the offenses were not sufficiently similar to justify the admission of P.K.’s testimony at Donton’s trial, Judge Benton wrote:

“The evidence concerning the other crime a year earlier was not, in my opinion, legally admissible to prove the crime charged in the present case. Identity was not an issue, nor was this a “familial” case. According to our supreme court, proper application of the Evidence Code “does not open the door to introduction of any and all propensity evidence in sexual molestation cases.” McLean v. State, 934 So.2d 1248, 1251 (Fla. 2006).”

But Judge Benton’s dissenting opinion did not win the day. As a result, Donton’s conviction and sentence were affirmed.

In sum, Donton v. State, 1 So.3d 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) is a major development in Florida’s corpus of case law surrounding the admission of Williams Rule (collateral crime) evidence in alleged child molestation and sexual battery cases. The 1st DCA (Tallahassee and North FL’s highest court) found that:

• The alleged sexual battery upon P.K. was sufficiently similar to the one Donton was charged with to allow its admission as Williams Rule evidence
• P.K.’s testimony was not solely for the purpose of proving “bad character or propensity”
• The judge reasonably found that because of the “relaxed” Fla. Stat. 90.404(2) standard, the crimes did not have to be precisely analogous for P.K.’s testimony to be admissible
• Because Donton’s fair trial and due process rights were not violated, his conviction was AFFIRMED

Florida’s criminal defense community should take note of Donton v. State, 1 So.3d 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), as it makes clear that in Tallahassee and North FL, courts tend to err on the side of ADMITTING collateral crime evidence in child sexual battery prosecutions. 

If someone is charged in a case involving alleged sexual battery by a family member or person in custodial authority, it is critical to seek out experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This vital decision could make the difference in whether or not a person is subject to hefty fines and prison time. 

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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