North FL’s Highest Court Reinstates Vehicular Homicide Charge for Wrong-Way Driver

April 16, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense Social Share

Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal REVERSED a trial judge’s order dismissing a vehicular homicide case against a defendant who drove in the wrong lane for half a mile before a fatal crash.

CASE: State v. Depriest, 180 So.3d 1099 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)

Charge(s): Vehicular Homicide

Outcome: Dismissal of charge REVERSED, as a jury could reasonably conclude the defendant was guilty of vehicular homicide.

Vehicular Homicide in Florida

In Florida, vehicular homicide (Fla. Stat. 782.071) is a very serious felony offense. Vehicular homicide is typically punishable by up to 15 years in prison and a $10,000 fine. However, it is considered a first-degree felony (up to 30 years in prison and a $10,000 fine) if either (or both) of the following are true:

• The defendant has a prior conviction for DUI manslaughter, BUI manslaughter, vehicular homicide or vessel homicide (Trenton’s Law, 2025)
• The defendant fails to give information to authorities, render aid to the victim(s), or leaves the scene of the accident (e.g. fails to stop)

For someone to be guilty of vehicular homicide, the State must prove all of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

• The defendant operated a vehicle
• The defendant’s operation of the vehicle caused the death(s) of one or more other people
• The defendant’s operation of the vehicle (which caused the death) was reckless

In a vehicular homicide prosecution, “operation” is rarely debated. The two most common legal issues argued in a vehicular homicide case are:

• Whether the defendant’s operation of the vehicle was the CAUSE of the victim’s death
• Whether the defendant drove RECKLESSLY as a matter of law

Unlike DUI manslaughter, vehicular homicide can only be established if the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the victim’s death. Simply “contributing to” this is insufficient. Cases in which Florida courts have found NO causation as a matter of law – requiring reversal of the defendant’s vehicular homicide conviction – include:

• The victim grabbing the steering wheel from the defendant and causing the vehicle to lose control, resulting in a crash that caused their death ((J.A.C. v. State, 374 So.2d 606 (Fla. 3d. DCA 1979))
• The victim was consensually involved in a street race with the defendant – and in the process lost control of their own vehicle and crashed (Velazquez v. State, 561 So.2d 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990))

Because both of these examples involve “other variables” (such as the victim’s conduct) that are significantly more responsible for the victim’s death than the defendant’s conduct, the defendant was NOT guilty of vehicular homicide as a matter of law in either case. For more on causation in vehicular homicide cases, click here.

However, the most common issue of dispute in a vehicular homicide prosecution is whether the defendant was reckless, careless, or simply “unlucky.” Florida’s courts have consistently found that for a defendant’s operation of a vehicle to be reckless – a requirement to sustain a vehicular homicide conviction – the following must have been true:

• The defendant operated their vehicle in a manner they knew or should have known was likely to cause death or great bodily harm (House v. State, 831 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002))
• The defendant did more than simply exceed the speed limit, as this is negligence – not recklessness (Luzardo v. State, 147 So.3d 1083 (Fla. 3d. DCA 2014))

Though speeding alone cannot establish that the defendant was reckless for purposes of vehicular homicide, speeding can be considered alongside other factors used to evaluate recklessness, such as (Hamilton v. State, 439 So.2d 238 (Fla. 2d. DCA 1983)):

• Whether visibility was good or poor at the time of the accident
• Whether the defendant was staying “in their lane” or swerving out of it
• Whether there was signage indicating drivers should pay particular attention or slow down (e.g. school zones)
• Whether the cause of the death (e.g. the hazard that caused it) was foreseeable/perceived by others 
• Whether the defendant exercised “any degree of care” to avoid collision
• Whether the defendant was traveling in an area with heavy foot traffic (e.g. residential)
• Whether the defendant was familiar with the area in which they were traveling

Note: The legal standard for recklessness is the same in vehicular homicide and vessel homicide cases. For more on this, click here.

If a defendant believes their operation of a vehicle WAS NOT RECKLESS, an experienced and aggressive Florida criminal defense attorney can file a motion to dismiss a vehicular homicide charge on their behalf (Fla. Crim. P. Rule 3.190(c)(4)). If such a motion is filed, the trial judge has two options:

• Grant the motion to dismiss, resulting in the vehicular homicide charge being tossed out BEFORE trial
• Deny the motion to dismiss, resulting in the defendant being tried for vehicular homicide (and possibly convicted) 

If a trial judge GRANTS a pretrial motion to dismiss in a vehicular homicide case, the State may appeal this decision. This is because the legal standard for granting a pretrial motion to dismiss is quite favorable to the State. 

Specifically, the judge must ask whether, when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a reasonable jury could convict the defendant (otherwise known as a prima facie case). Bonge v. State, 53 So.3d 1231, 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)

In one major Florida vehicular homicide case, a trial judge granted a defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss – finding the State failed to present a prima facie case of the defendant’s guilt. 

The State appealed to Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal (Tallahassee and North FL’s highest court), arguing that the trial judge erred as a matter of law by dismissing the case (e.g. arguing a prima facie case was presented). The 1st DCA AGREED and reinstated the vehicular homicide charge against the defendant.

But why? Let’s take a look at that case – State v. Depriest, 180 So.3d 1099 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) – and discuss what it means for defendants in Florida charged with vehicular homicide (and who wish to dismiss the charge before trial).

KEY CASE: State v. Depriest, 180 So.3d 1099 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) 

In Depriest, the defendant (Depriest) was charged with vehicular homicide after a fatal head-on collision on Highway 331. Depriest filed a pretrial motion to dismiss pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(c)(4), arguing no reasonable jury could find that he drove recklessly. At the hearing on that motion, the following was revealed:

• The crash occurred in the middle of the night on an undivided rural highway
• The speed limit was 55 miles per hour
• There was limited traffic and no artificial lighting
• Depriest was driving southbound and came upon a slower-moving van (the driver of the van testified at the hearing), which he legally passed
• After passing, Depriest remained in the northbound lane (e.g. failed to return to his lane) for approximately half a mile
• While still in the wrong lane, Depriest eventually collided with an oncoming vehicle 
• Depriest and the victim were both traveling at around the speed limit (55 miles per hour)
• Depriest said he did not see the victim’s headlights and admitted he stayed in the wrong lane for “convenience,” in case he needed to pass another car that was slowly traveling southbound 

After hearing this, the trial judge DISMISSED the vehicular homicide charge against Depriest. He ruled that while Depriest’s decision to stay in the northbound lane may have been careless, it was NOT reckless as a matter of law (e.g. no reasonable jury could find recklessness) because:

• Depriest was not speeding
• Traffic was very light
• Depriest was seemingly paying attention before the crash

The State appealed the trial judge’s dismissal of the case against Depriest, arguing that he WAS reckless – or, at least, that a reasonable jury could have concluded he drove recklessly. The 1st DCA AGREED and REVERSED the judge’s ruling, reinstating the vehicular homicide charge against Depriest. Discussing the law, the 1st DCA wrote:

“Section 782.071, Florida Statutes (2014), outlines “vehicular homicide” as “the killing of a human being … caused by the operation of a motor vehicle by another in a reckless manner likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another.” In Cahours v. State, 147 So.3d 574, 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), this court recently discussed the burden of proof for vehicular homicide, holding: In determining the State’s burden of proof for a vehicular homicide conviction, this court has reasoned that because “the offense of vehicular homicide has been described by the supreme court as involving a degree of negligence more than a mere failure to use ordinary care, the state must necessarily adduce evidence showing conduct at least sufficient to constitute reckless driving as … involving a ‘willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property….’ ” W.E.B. v. State, 553 So.2d 323, 326 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).”

Applying the law to the facts of the case, the 1st DCA concluded that Depriest’s conduct could reasonably have been considered RECKLESS:

“We have considered the case law cited by both Depriest and the State to support their respective positions. See e.g. Miller v. State, 75 So.2d 312 (Fla.1954); Sexton v. State, 898 So.2d 1187 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). We find that the undisputed facts of this case are not like the cases cited by Depriest. Depriest was not briefly distracted. He made a calculated and willful decision to travel in the wrong lane for one-half mile at a speed which was very likely to kill or seriously maim in the event of a head-on collision, which occurred. A jury could lawfully and reasonably decide that willfully and unnecessarily driving 55 mph for a half-mile in the wrong lane of traffic, when fully capable of returning to the correct lane, was a willful and wanton disregard for the safety of others. To affirm the trial court’s order would be equivalent to holding that a driver who travels in the wrong lane of traffic until he kills another driver in a head-on collision is mere negligence. We decline to so hold … Accordingly, we REVERSE the order of dismissal and REMAND for reinstatement of the charge of vehicular homicide.”

Notably, Judge Kelsey of the 1st DCA dissented (e.g. felt that the trial judge properly dismissed the vehicular homicide charge). However, he did so without authoring an opinion.

In sum, State v. Depriest, 180 So.3d 1099 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) marks a significant development in Florida’s corpus of case law surrounding vehicular homicide. The 1st DCA (Tallahassee and North FL’s highest court) found that:

• Depriest made a “calculated and willful” decision to drive in the wrong lane of traffic for half a mile
• He was fully capable of returning to the correct lane
• He was traveling at 55 miles per hour while doing so
• This constituted “willful or wanton disregard for the safety of others” (W.E.B. v. State, 553 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)) sufficient for a jury to conclude Depriest committed vehicular homicide
• This required REVERSAL of the trial judge’s dismissal of the case and the reinstatement of the charge

Florida’s criminal defense community should take note of State v. Depriest, 180 So.3d 1099 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), as it makes clear District Courts of Appeal will reverse dismissals of vehicular homicide charges in cases where a jury could reasonably find recklessness on a defendant’s part.

It is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible if someone is charged with vehicular homicide, DUI manslaughter, BUI manslaughter or vessel homicide. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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