North FL’s Highest Court REVERSES Sexual Battery Conviction Due to Williams Rule Violation

April 16, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Sex Crimes Social Share

Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge erred by admitting testimony from a victim who the defendant allegedly committed simple battery upon, in a sexual battery case – as this was done solely to prove the defendant’s bad character or propensity to act unlawfully.

CASE: Moss v. State, 169 So.3d 223 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)

Charges: Burglary, Sexual Battery

Outcome: Convictions REVERSED, as the State improperly introduced irrelevant “Williams Rule” evidence that was insufficiently similar to the charged offenses at trial.

Sexual Battery in Florida

In Florida, sexual battery (Fla. Stat. 794.011) is a very serious felony offense. For someone to be guilty, the State must prove all of the following beyond a reasonable doubt: 

• The defendant orally, anally, or vaginally penetrated the victim using an object or their sexual organ, or had the victim do any of this to them
• The victim did not consent to this (either due to being unable to legally consent or the act being done against the victim’s will)

Consent occurs when someone is 18 years of age or older (e.g. an adult) and engages in a sexual act of their own free will, WITHOUT the use of force or coercion to get them to participate. A few things are critical to know about consent:

• Someone does not have to physically resist for a lack of consent to be established
• Someone who is unconscious, asleep, or otherwise unable to physically communicate an unwillingness to engage in a sexual act cannot consent (Coley v. State, 616 So.2d 1017 (Fla. 3d. DCA 1993))
• Minors (under the age of 18) cannot consent to sex under ANY circumstances – however, “willing participation” of a minor between the ages of 12 and 17 may result in a lewd or lascivious charge rather than a charge of sexual battery (State v. Stalvey, 795 So.2d 968 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000))

Sexual battery is widely recognized as one of the most serious felonies in Florida. Because of this, prison sentences and hefty fines are likely if someone is convicted. Per Fla. Stat. 794.011, the penalties are as follows:

• Victim under 12, defendant 18 or older: Also known as capital sexual battery, this is punishable by the death or a mandatory minimum of life in prison. Though the Florida and U.S. Supreme Courts have held the death penalty unconstitutional for rape that does not result in death, Florida law authorizes it. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981)
• Victim 12 or older but under 18, defendant 18+: Sexual battery is a first-degree felony punishable by up to 30 years in prison and a $10,000 fine, or up to LIFE IN PRISON if there was a threat of violence or the use of a weapon.
• Victim under 18, defendant 18+ and in a position of familial or custodial authority: A first-degree felony punishable by life (PBL) in prison.
• Victim 18+, defendant 18+: Sexual battery is a second-degree felony punishable by up to 15 years in prison and a $10,000 fine (enhanceable to more severe penalties if actual force or a weapon was used).

It is important to note that if someone is found guilty of sexual battery, they are automatically ineligible to avoid registering as a sex offender/predator under Florida’s Romeo and Juliet law. To learn more about when Romeo and Juliet applies, click here.

In sexual battery prosecutions – especially when the victim is a minor – a key legal issue is the admissibility of so-called “Williams Rule” evidence (also known as collateral crime evidence). Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959)

Under the “Williams Rule” (Fla. Stat. 90.404), proof of SIMILAR but UNCHARGED criminal conduct allegedly perpetrated by a defendant against that victim OR another victim is admissible when the evidence/testimony is relevant to prove a MATERIAL FACT in issue. Donton v. State, 1 So.3d 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)

Per Fla. Stat. 90.404, this includes – but is not limited to – proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. It is inadmissible, however, if it is relevant solely to proving “bad character or propensity.”

For many years, Florida’s courts (post-Williams) recognized that alleged offenses committed by the defendant that were introduced pursuant to the Williams Rule (e.g. uncharged conduct) had to be “strikingly similar” in nature. Tollefson v. State, 525 So.2d 957, 960 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)

Although this is still the case in most prosecutions, the “strikingly similar” doctrine does NOT necessarily apply any longer in cases involving alleged child molestation (e.g. sexual battery, lewd or lascivious molestation/batter, etc.). 

A carve-out to the standard Williams Rule, Fla. Stat. 90.404(2) allows the admission of ANY evidence of a defendant’s prior acts of child molestation (even if uncharged) – which may be “considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.” 

Put simply, the State is given broad leeway to introduce evidence or testimony of a defendant’s prior sexual abuse of children, even if the victims, context, and circumstances surrounding the alleged abuse were different. McLean v. State, 934 So.2d 1248 (Fla. 2006)

Since Fla. Stat. 90.404(2) codified (in the early 2000s), Florida’s courts have heard various cases involving the admission of Williams Rule child sexual battery/molestation evidence. In nearly all of those cases, the defendant strongly protested the admission of the evidence at their trial on the basis that:

• The Williams Rule evidence is not sufficiently similar to the charged conduct, making it irrelevant to proving the offenses they are charged with beyond a reasonable doubt
• Because of the dissimilarities between the uncharged conduct and the charged conduct, the true reason for seeking to admit the former is to attack the defendant’s character or show propensity – which remains barred by the Williams Rule (even Fla. Stat. 90.404(2))

Though these arguments are often rejected by appellate courts when a defendant challenges their conviction on the basis that the collateral crime evidence was WRONGLY used against them – despite being irrelevant – some challenges to child sexual battery convictions on this basis have succeeded.

One such case was heard by Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal (Tallahassee and North FL’s highest court). There, the defendant was accused of sexual battery upon a minor and burglary. Before trial, the State sought to introduce testimony from another minor the defendant allegedly attempted to have sex with, but left when she rejected his advances.

The defendant strongly objected to the introduction of the other victim’s testimony at his sexual battery trial, arguing that he allegedly committed SIMPLE BATTERY upon the other victim – not an act of child molestation. The State countered by claiming the testimony was admissible pursuant to the “broadened” Williams Rule in child sex crime cases (Fla. Stat. 90.404(2)).

The trial judge ultimately ruled to ADMIT the collateral crime evidence. Both the victim of the charged crime and the victim of the uncharged battery testified at trial – and the defendant was found guilty on all charges.

On appeal to the 1st DCA, the defendant argued the trial judge abused his discretion and erred as a matter of law in admitting the collateral crime evidence (pursuant to Fla. Stat. 90.404(2)). The 1st DCA agreed – REVERSING his convictions (after finding this was not harmless error) and remanding the matter to the lower court for a new trial.

Let’s take a look at that case – Moss v. State, 169 So.3d 223 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) – and discuss what it means for defendants charged with child sex crimes in Florida seeking to exclude the introduction of Williams Rule evidence.

KEY CASE: Moss v. State, 169 So.3d 223 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) 

In Moss, the defendant (Moss) was charged with sexual battery on a minor and burglary of a dwelling. He was ultimately convicted. At trial, the following was revealed:

• Moss entered the apartment and sexually battered a minor victim (R.L.) while he worked as a maintenance man at her apartment complex
• The State sought to introduce testimony from another minor resident of the complex that a month before the alleged sexual battery, Moss attempted to have sex with her
• According to the victim, Moss approached her in the kitchen, placed his hands on her breasts and asked if they were real
• Before he could do anything else, however, the minor victim told him to “get the f**k out” – so he left
• Moss strongly objected to the introduction of the second victim (M.A.), claiming this was not an act of child molestation (technically only a simple battery) and thus, not covered by Fla. Stat. 90.404(2)
• The trial judge ultimately ruled against Moss, admitting the testimony as to the battery despite the lack of any direct sexual contact (other than groping) between Moss and the victim
• The judge did so to show “lack of consent or mistake,” “modus operandi,” and “intent”
• Both child victims (R.L. and M.A.) testified at Moss’s trial
• In closing, the State argued the second victim’s testimony was evidence that Moss felt “empowered” to prey on young women without consequence – and he was ultimately convicted

On appeal, Moss argued that the collateral crime (e.g. Williams Rule) evidence was improperly admitted due to the clear dissimilarities between the two incidents. Because Moss’s first “attack” on a minor victim was a SIMPLE BATTERY, not a sexual battery, he claimed that the trial judge erred in admitting M.A.’s testimony.

The 1st DCA agreed and REVERSED Moss’s convictions, remanding the matter to the lower court for a new trial. Discussing the law that governed the case, the 1st DCA wrote:

“Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), known as the Williams rule, addresses the admission of collateral crime evidence: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. This rule is “a special application of the general relevancy rule for [a] collateral crime,” Wright v. State, 19 So.3d 277, 292 (Fla. 2009), which describes ways in which collateral crime evidence may be relevant to specific issues in a trial. Although the rule addresses “similar fact evidence,” mere similarity to the charged offense does not ensure the relevance or admissibility of collateral crime evidence. … Likewise, lack of similarity in itself does not require exclusion of evidence of a collateral offense that is relevant to a material issue. McLean v. State, 934 So.2d 1248, 1258 (Fla.2006). The Williams rule addresses similarity because the relevance of collateral crime evidence is “often a function of its similarity.” Id. at 1255.”

Finding that the alleged battery upon M.A. was not sufficiently similar to the sexual battery of R.L. to be covered by the Williams Rule, the 1st DCA concluded: 

“Although there are clear similarities between the two offenses described in the State’s evidence, the crime against M.A. is not similar enough to the distinct crime against R.L. to provide a sufficient basis from which the jury could find that Moss was not mistaken in any belief he may have held that R.L. consented to sexual intercourse. Other evidence provided that basis, but M.A.’s testimony did not. M.A. described a simple battery that Moss stopped when she pushed him away and verbally protested. Although the battery M.A. reported was of a sexual nature, it was substantially less severe than the two sexual batteries detailed in R.L.’s testimony. Perhaps most importantly, the two scenarios are significantly distinguishable due to Moss’s acquiescence to M.A.’s protest in comparison with R.L.’s description of his extreme escalation of the offense against her, by throwing her over his shoulder, carrying her to the bedroom, locking the door, and sexually battering her, after she protested in the exact same way as M.A. 

“The two incidents are similar in terms of the opportunities Moss exploited and the manner in which he approached the women, but they are quite different on the crucial issue of what Moss did when his unprovoked and unwelcomed actions were rejected. The actions that followed this rejection, not the initial attempt to touch R.L., led to the charge of sexual battery, and M.A.’s testimony is not probative of Moss’s intent with regard to those actions. M.A.’s testimony establishes only that Moss has a propensity to touch women’s bodies offensively, without their consent. This type of propensity evidence is inadmissible and presumptively harmful. See Vice, 39 So.3d at 355. Because we are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that this presumptively harmful evidence did not affect the verdict, we reverse.”

In sum, Moss v. State, 169 So.3d 223 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) marks a significant development in Florida’s corpus of case law surrounding the admissibility of Williams Rule evidence in sexual battery cases. The 1st DCA held that:

• The two offenses (one a simple battery, one a sexual battery) were insufficiently similar in nature for M.A.’s testimony to be covered by the Williams Rule
• Because of this, the trial judge erred by allowing M.A. to testify as to the alleged battery that occurred a month prior to the alleged sexual battery of R.L. 
• The testimony of M.A. was actually introduced to prove bad character/propensity, NOT intent and “modus operandi”
• Since the State relied upon M.A.’s testimony in making their case, the error of allowing her to testify was NOT harmless (e.g. may have impacted the jury’s verdict)
• This required REVERSAL of Moss’s convictions and a new trial in his case

Florida’s criminal defense community should take note of Moss v. State, 169 So.3d 223 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), as it is a WIN for defendants in Tallahassee and North Florida seeking to exclude evidence the State attempts to introduce under the Williams Rule.

If someone is charged in a case involving alleged sexual battery by a family member or person in custodial authority, it is critical to seek out experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This vital decision could make the difference in whether or not a person is subject to hefty fines and prison time. 

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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