Major FL Court Splits: Majority Finds NO Entrapment – But 1 Judge Disagrees

March 5, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense Social Share

Case Summary

Florida’s 3rd District Court of Appeal found that a defendant was not “entrapped” by police in a sting operation involving the alleged sale of drugs – but one judge disagreed.

• CASE: Blanco v. State, 218 So.3d 939 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)
• Charge(s): Trafficking in Crystal Methamphetamine
• Outcome: Conviction affirmed due to lack of entrapment by law enforcement, as the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime.

Entrapment in Florida

In Florida, entrapment functions as a total defense to criminal charges. There are two types of entrapment under state law – objective entrapment and subjective entrapment. The difference between these is critical to understand.

Objective entrapment occurs when law enforcement engages in such egregious misconduct in bringing about criminal charges, that prosecuting the defendant (even if they are guilty) would violate their due process rights under the Florida and U.S. Constitutions. Objective entrapment is decided as a matter of law (e.g. the judge will rule on a motion to dismiss).

Florida’s courts are generally reluctant to find objective entrapment, as law enforcement is given broad discretion to conduct sting operations and use confidential informants. Dippolito v. State, 275 So.3d 653 (Fla 4th DCA 2019).

However, examples of cases in which objective entrapment has been found include:

• Law enforcement manufactures drugs at the police station to sell to people on the street while undercover, only to arrest people when they try to buy them (State v. Williams, 623 So.2d 462, 466 (Fla. 1993))
• A police task force sends child pornography through the mail to arrest someone for possessing it (Farley v. State, 848 So.2d 393, 397-98 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003))
• A law enforcement officer or informant enters a sexual relationship with the defendant to get them to act criminally (Madera v. State, 943 So.2d 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006))

By contrast, subjective (or statutory) entrapment is codified by Munoz v. State, 629 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1993) and Fla. Stat. 777.201. Subjective entrapment also functions as a total defense to criminal charges – and is generally “easier” to prove.

Unlike objective entrapment, subjective entrapment can be argued in a pretrial motion to dismiss, at trial itself, or both. The first “prong” of subjective entrapment is that the defendant must prove that they were induced to commit the underlying offense(s) by a preponderance (majority) of the evidence. Gennette v. State, 124 So.3d 273 (Fla 1st DCA 2013)

Inducement does not exist simply because law enforcement was “involved” in bringing about the criminal charges. Inducement occurs when officers (or informants) resort to prohibited tactics in attempting to “bait” a defendant to act criminally – tactics that risk a person would commit the crime even if they were not “ready and willing, without persuasion” to do so (Munoz).

Examples of prohibited inducement tactics (per Gennette v. State, 124 So.3d 273 (Fla 1st DCA 2013)), include the following:

• Coaxing, cajoling, or harassment
• Threats
• Promises of friendship 
• Promises of monetary reward

If the defendant establishes they were induced to commit the charged offense(s), the State must prove the defendant was predisposed to commit the underlying crime(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. This means the defendant must have been “ready and willing, without persuasion” to act unlawfully – even in the absence of inducement.

If the State fails, the defendant was “subjectively entrapped” as a matter of law – requiring the dismissal of the charge(s) against them (or a jury finding of not guilty if entrapment is argued at trial). Morgan v. State, 112 So.3d 122 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) 

Note: To learn more about inducement for subjective entrapment purposes in Florida, click here. For more on predisposition, click here.

Sometimes, a defendant will argue they were subjectively entrapped at trial (and/or in the form of a pretrial motion to dismiss) – and nevertheless be found guilty. In such cases, they are likely to appeal their convictions to the Florida District Court of Appeal that has jurisdiction over the trial court.

In one major Florida entrapment case, a defendant was found guilty of selling crystal meth to an undercover law enforcement officer. He argued that he was entrapped – but he was nevertheless found guilty at trial.

On appeal, the defendant argued that as a matter of law, he established that he was induced to act unlawfully by law enforcement – and that he was not predisposed to commit the offense. But the 3rd DCA disagreed, finding sufficient evidence in the record from which the jury could conclude reasonably that the defendant was not subjectively entrapped.

But one 3rd DCA judge disagreed with the majority’s analysis. Let’s take a look at that case – Blanco v. State, 218 So.3d 939 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) – and discuss what it means for defendants exploring an entrapment defense in Florida.

KEY CASE: Blanco v. State, 218 So.3d 939 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)

In Blanco, the defendant (Blanco) was arrested after a drug sale – and charged with trafficking crystal meth through a confidential informant. Blanco was convicted after the jury found that he was not entrapped.

At trial, it was revealed that Blanco met the confidential informant (Felizzula) at an HIV facility. The CI was one of Blanco’s former lovers before he was charged with drug trafficking. Felizzula entered into a cooperation agreement with law enforcement (e.g. agreed to serve as CI) to reduce his prison exposure.

The CI called Blanco asking for his assistance in arranging a drug deal in Miami. The CI insisted Blanco should do so to “prove his love” – and to make amends for money lost on the CI’s house (Blanco was the CI’s realtor and sold for a low price). Blanco eventually relented and agreed.

The CI contacted his police handler, who referred him to an undercover narcotics agent (Villano). Villano called Blanco, and a recording of this phone call was played for the jury. Blanco agreed to sell Villano “five eight-balls” of crystal meth – and after a series of “code-worded” texts, the pair agreed to meet. When Blanco sold the drugs, he was immediately arrested.

On appeal, Blanco argued that he was induced to act as a matter of law by the CI (Felizzula) – and that there was no evidence he was predisposed to act unlawfully other than using “code” before and during the drug transaction. 

Blanco argued that speaking in “code” was insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, Blanco argued that as a matter of law, his “post-inducement” conduct (e.g. the coded conversation) could not be used to prove that he was predisposed (e.g. ready and willing to commit the crime before the CI’s inducement).

However, the 3rd DCA disagreed and affirmed Blanco’s drug trafficking conviction. The 3rd DCA rebuffed Blanco’s claim that post-inducement conduct was never relevant to establishing predisposition:

“[Blanco] essentially asks this court to fashion a rule that a defendant’s conduct after the government induced him to commit an offense is never relevant to prove predisposition. This proposed rule paints with too broad a brush. While “care must be taken in establishing the predisposition of a defendant based on conduct that results from the inducement,” Munoz v. State, 629 So.2d 90, 99 (Fla. 1993), post-inducement acts and statements can, in appropriate circumstances, be relevant to prove that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime before he was induced to do so. This case is one such example.”

The 3rd DCA began its analysis by agreeing with Blanco that a prima facie case of inducement was made through his testimony regarding his conversations with the CI: 

“In this case, Blanco’s testimony established a prima facie case of inducement. See Jimenez v. State, 993 So.2d 553, 556 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (holding, under similar circumstances, that the defendant demonstrated inducement); State v. Henderson, 955 So.2d 1193, 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (“Inducement includes persuasion, fraudulent representations, threats, coercive tactics, harassment, promises of reward, or pleas based on need, sympathy or friendship.”) (emphasis added) (quotation and citation omitted). He also provided evidence of a lack of predisposition based on his testimony that he had no criminal record or history of distributing drugs.”

However, the 3rd DCA rejected Blanco’s argument that under Munoz v. State, 629 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1993), his use of “drug-trade” jargon during his conversations with the undercover officer did not prove predisposition:

“Blanco argues that his use of drug-trade jargon during the drug transaction is irrelevant to prove predisposition because it occurred after the government induced him to commit the offense. He primarily relies on the following passage from the Munoz opinion: “admission of evidence of predisposition is limited to the extent it demonstrates predisposition on the part of the accused both prior to and independent of the government acts.” 629 So.2d at 99. Blanco is misreading Munoz on this point. 

“The passage of Munoz he cites does not categorically bar consideration of post-inducement conduct when deciding whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. Rather, the passage indicates that post-inducement evidence can be admissible if it tends to show that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime before the government induced him. In other words, the evidence may arise post-inducement, but it must tend to establish that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime before the inducement. … Blanco’s argument to the contrary, that evidence arising after the inducement must be excluded because it is per se irrelevant to prove predisposition to commit the crime before the inducement, has been uniformly rejected by the courts that have considered it.”

Because the 3rd DCA disagreed with Blanco’s claim that his use of drug-trade jargon did not prove his predisposition to engage in illicit drug activity, his conviction was affirmed – as the majority concluded the jury could have reasonably concluded that Blanco was not subjectively entrapped.

But one 3rd DCA judge disagreed with the majority. Judge Suarez penned a scathing dissent, arguing that the majority misapplied Florida’s entrapment case law on the predisposition issue:
“Despite its correct recitation of the law of entrapment, the majority relies on certain language—used by Blanco only during the transaction and only after inducement by the state to enter into a single drug transaction—as the sole evidence that Blanco was allegedly predisposed to commit the offence. “This view overlooks even the common connotation of the word ‘pre-disposition.’ The prefix pre-indicates that the disposition must exist before the first contact with the government.” Farley v. State, 848 So.2d 393, 396 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Moreover, the majority fails to acknowledge that, unlike the defendants in the cases it relies upon, Blanco had no prior connection to any criminal activity. The majority’s conclusion in this case is inconsistent not only with the cases it cites, but with due process. Soohoo v. State, 737 So.2d 1108, 1111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).”

“As discussed below, other courts which have addressed entrapment claims by defendants who were situated similarly to Blanco, have found entrapment as a matter of law, reversed the convictions and discharged the defendants. That is what should have occurred in this case … There was absolutely no evidence of the other potential areas of proof: “the defendant’s prior criminal activities;” a “reputation for such activities;” or “reasonable suspicion of his involvement in such activity.” Majority at 944. However, the majority has already conceded that Blanco agreed to participate in the drug transaction only “after repeated refusals,” so there actually was no proof of “ready acquiescence” on his part. The record is devoid of any proper evidence supporting any notion of predisposition on Blanco’s part to commit the offense.”

In essence, Judge Suarez argued that the overwhelming evidence in the case supported Blanco’s claim that he was not predisposed (e.g. no criminal record, repeated refusals to engage in the sale before acquiescing) – so the majority finding predisposition solely based on Blanco’s alleged use of “drug-trade jargon” was error.

In sum, Blanco v. State, 218 So.3d 939 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) is a major development in Florida’s corpus of case law on subjective entrapment. Florida’s 3rd DCA majority found that:

• Blanco’s use of “drug-trade jargon” while he was arranging a crystal meth sale/during the sale showed he was “predisposed” to engage in illicit drug activity
• The fact that his conduct was “post-inducement” (e.g. after the CI convinced him to sell the drugs) did not defeat the State’s claim of predisposition
• Because sufficient evidence existed of Blanco’s predisposition, a reasonable jury could have concluded he was not entrapped – requiring that his conviction affirmed

However, Judge Suarez of the 3rd DCA strongly disagreed – authoring a dissenting opinion in which he argued that:

• Blanco was clearly induced as a matter of law (which the majority conceded)
• The majority of the evidence supported Blanco’s lack of predisposition (e.g. no criminal record, reluctance to engage in the drug sale) 
• The use of “drug-trade jargon” was insufficient as a matter of law to establish Blanco’s predisposition to commit the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt 
• As a result, no reasonable jury could have concluded he was not entrapped – so Blanco’s conviction should have been reversed

Florida’s criminal defense community should take note of Blanco v. State, 218 So.3d 939 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017), as it provides a fascinating intra-court dialogue on the issue of predisposition in subjective entrapment cases.

If someone is arrested and formally charged in Florida in a case and has a potential entrapment defense, it is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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