Major FL Court – Threatening Messages From Music Executive Were NOT Stalking… Here’s Why

October 5, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense Social Share

Florida’s 4th District Court of Appeal found a trial judge erred by issuing a stalking injunction, as the respondent’s messages to the petitioner served a legitimate purpose and were NOT likely to cause substantial emotional distress.

CASE: David v. Textor, 189 So.3d 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)

Charge(s): Cyberstalking Injunction

Outcome: Injunction set aside, as the respondent did not engage in behavior that totally lacked a legitimate purpose – and his conduct was NOT likely to cause the petitioner to suffer substantial emotional distress.

Stalking and Aggravated Stalking in Florida

Stalking and aggravated stalking are serious offenses in Florida that can carry significant legal and financial penalties. Stalking occurs when a person willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person. Florida Statutes Section 784.048(2) regulates the offense of stalking.

If someone has been accused of stalking by harassing the victim, the State must establish that the defendant engaged in a course of conduct directed at the victim that:

• Served no legitimate purpose
• Would cause substantial emotional distress to a reasonable person
• Did cause substantial emotional distress to the victim

If charged criminally, stalking is a first-degree misdemeanor – punishable by up to 1 year in jail and a $1,000 fine. Cyberstalking carries the same criminal penalties as stalking, and occurs when someone does either of the following:

• Engages in a course of conduct to communicate words, images, or language through electronic methods, either directly or indirectly, which is directed at or pertaining to a targeted person; or
• Accesses, or attempts to access, the online account or internet-connected home electronic system without the specified person’s consent and that causes SUBSTANTIAL emotional distress to the victim 

Stalking is an enhanceable offense, meaning certain forms of stalking are felonies and carry heavier criminal penalties under Florida law. For example:

• Someone who makes a credible threat to the victim in the course of stalking commits a third-degree felony, punishable by up to 5 years in prison and a $5,000 fine
• Someone who stalks a victim 16 years old or younger commits a third-degree felony, punishable by up to 5 years in prison and a $5,000 fine
• Someone who violates an existing injunction against stalking commits aggravated stalking, a third-degree felony punishable by up to 5 years in prison and a $5,000 fine

Important: An officer may make a warrantless arrest of anyone they suspect of stalking based on probable cause.

Under Florida law, stalking must be done both willfully and maliciously. “Willfully” is defined as knowingly, intentionally, and purposely. “Maliciously” is defined as wrongfully, intentionally, and without lawful justification or excuse. Seese v. State, 955 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) 

In addition to stalking, there is aggravated stalking. Aggravated stalking includes the elements of stalking, but with the added requirement of making a credible threat to the victim, or violating an injunction for protection against violence. Ford v. State, 387 So.3d 1283 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024)

Aggravated stalking is a third-degree felony punishable by up to 5 years in prison and a $5,000 fine. Moreover, under Florida Statutes Section 784.048, a court may issue an order restraining the defendant in an aggravated stalking case from contacting the victim for up to 10 years.

In addition to the criminal penalties that are likely to accompany a stalking and/or aggravated stalking conviction, someone may face ramifications in CIVIL proceedings as well. A petitioner may file for a stalking injunction, which prohibits the respondent (if granted) from continuing to engage in the alleged objectionable behavior.

There are TWO TYPES of stalking injunctions – temporary and permanent (final) injunctions. A temporary injunction (also known as an ex parte injunction) can be entered before the respondent (e.g. the party accused of stalking) receives a full hearing. The injunction process proceeds in the following way:

• The petitioner files a verified petition alleging stalking
• The judge reviews the petition – generally, the respondent does not have to be present
• If it appears that stalking exists, the court may issue a temporary injunction pending a full hearing
• Temporary injunctions ordinarily last no more than 15 days
• A full hearing must be scheduled no later than the date of expiration of the temporary injunction
• However, the hearing on the final injunction may be continued (e.g. delayed) for GOOD CAUSE, such as inability to obtain service on the respondent (and a temporary injunction may be extended accordingly)

Critically, the granting of a temporary injunction does NOT mean that a final injunction is likely to be issued. Though a permanent injunction may follow a temporary injunction, a final hearing must occur before a permanent injunction is granted. At that hearing, both parties (e.g. petitioner and respondent) will have the chance to do the following:

• Present evidence (including evidence in the form of exhibits)
• Testify as to the occurrence/nonoccurrence of the alleged events
• Call witnesses to corroborate their account and/or dispute the claims of an opposing party

It is important to understand that the burden of proof in a stalking injunction hearing is NOT the same as it is at a criminal trial where a defendant is charged with stalking, aggravated stalking, domestic/dating violence or a similar offense. The distinction is as follows:

• At a civil injunction proceeding, the petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (e.g. majority) that the respondent engaged in activity that violated Florida law, entitling them to an injunction (O’Neill v. Goodwin, 195 So.3d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016))
• At a criminal trial, the State must prove BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT that the defendant committed every element of the charged crime(s) 

There are various types of stalking injunctions that may be issued in Florida – depending on the facts of the case. These include:

• Injunction for protection for domestic violence – Under Fla. Stat. 741.30, this may issue if the petitioner and respondent presently reside together, have lived together in the past in an intimate or family relationship, are related by blood/marriage OR share a child
• Injunction for protection from repeat violence – May be issued when a party proves that at least 2 instances of stalking and/or violence have been committed against them by the respondent in the last 6 months and the petitioner/respondent do not have a relationship qualifying them for a domestic violence injunction
• Injunction for protection from dating violence – requires that 1) the dating relationship existed within the last 6 months; 2) the nature of the relationship is characterized by the expectation of affection or sexual involvement between the parties; and 3) the frequency and type of interaction is based on the party’s involvement over time and on a continuous basis during the course of the relationship
• Injunction for sexual violence – requires a victim or parent of a victim to establish that 1) the petitioner has reported the alleged sexual violence to a law enforcement agency and is cooperating in any criminal proceeding against the respondent; and 2) the respondent who committed sexual violence was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in state prison, and the term of imprisonment has expired or is due to expire within 90 days following the date the petition is filed

Though many believe that the issuance of a permanent injunction is the “end of the road” – and the respondent can never contact the petitioner again – this is not necessarily the case. In Florida, any of the following three things can lead a final injunction to be set aside:

• The petitioner moves, of their OWN FREE WILL, to dissolve the injunction on the basis that they are no longer in fear of the respondent/the circumstances have changed 
• The respondent moves to dissolve the injunction, arguing that there has been a substantial and material change in the circumstances that have led the injunction to become obsolete 
• A reviewing court (e.g. a Florida District Court of Appeal) concludes that the trial judge erred as a matter of law by entering the injunction on the basis that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the ruling (Shannon v. Smith, 278 So.3d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019))

At an injunction hearing, there are a few key legal issues that are often in dispute (though under certain circumstances, at least one element required to be proven by the petitioner is NOT being debated). These include:

• Whether the respondent’s conduct was willful, malicious, and repeated
• Whether the respondent’s conduct was likely to cause the petitioner to suffer substantial emotional distress
• Whether the respondent’s conduct lacked a legitimate purpose (which is broadly defined as a purpose other than malicious harassment, per Hart v. Griffis, 288 So.3d 770 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020))

In one Florida case involving alleged CYBERSTALKING, a petitioner alleged a respondent had engaged in unlawful activity by willfully and maliciously sending him various emails he claimed were likely to cause substantial emotional distress to a reasonable person.

The respondent disputed the petitioner’s characterization of the emails, arguing the messages had a legitimate (non-harassment) purpose and weren’t likely to inflict substantial emotional distress on a reasonable person. However, the judge DISAGREED and issued a permanent injunction.

Challenging the judge’s decision in Florida’s 4th District Court of Appeal (Southeast Florida’s highest court), the respondent argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the issuance of the injunction – requiring REVERSAL of the judge’s decision.

The 4th DCA AGREED with the respondent and SET ASIDE the cyberstalking injunction. But why? 

Let’s look at the case – David v. Textor, 189 So.3d 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) – and analyze what it means for those in Florida involved in stalking injunction proceedings.

KEY CASE: David v. Textor, 189 So.3d 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)

In David v. Textor, 189 So.3d 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), a petitioner (Textor) claimed David had cyberstalked him. At the final injunction hearing, the following was revealed:

• David and Textor were both in the music industry, and got into a dispute over the use of a Michael Jackson hologram at an awards show
• The first alleged act of cyberstalking involved David sending a text to Textor demanding that he give credit to David’s company for the hologram – and David threatened to “ruin” Textor in a lawsuit if he did not do so
• Next, David emailed a business associate of Textor’s indicated that he had “information” about Textor that he would release soon, but he did not specify what it was
• Third, David gave an interview to an online magazine in which he said that he would kill Textor “if he could”
• Finally, David reposted various unfavorable articles about Textor in online outlets on his social media page(s)
• Textor filed for a temporary (ex parte) injunction against cyberstalking, which the judge granted
• Before the final hearing, Textor amended his petition to add other conduct, such as David “tagging” Textor’s Instagram account when he uploaded a picture of Hitler 
• At the final hearing, David argued that his conduct had a “legitimate purpose” (e.g. aside from harassment) – which was to get credit from Textor for the use of the hologram
• He also claimed that his conduct was NOT likely to cause a reasonable person in Textor’s position to suffer SUBSTANTIAL emotional distress
• The judge was unpersuaded and issued the final injunction

On appeal to the 4th DCA, David renewed his arguments that his conduct was not likely to cause Textor substantial emotional distress and did not lack a legitimate purpose. The 4th DCA agreed with David and SET ASIDE the injunction. First addressing “substantial emotional distress,” the 4th DCA wrote the following:

“Whether a communication causes substantial emotional distress should be narrowly construed and is governed by the reasonable person standard. … In this case, Textor alleged that two communications came directly from David to him, both of which were demands that Textor drop his lawsuit. In neither of them did David make any threat to Textor’s safety. From the full e-mail, David’s threats that Textor would be “sorry” if he didn’t settle must be taken in the context of the lawsuit and its potential cost to Textor. Because of the existence of the various lawsuits and the heated controversy over the hologram patents, these e-mails had a legitimate purpose in trying to get Textor to drop what David considered a spurious lawsuit. Moreover, nothing in the e-mails should have caused substantial emotional distress to Textor, himself a sophisticated businessman. Indeed, that they did not is reflected in Textor’s refusal to settle or adhere to their terms. 

“The postings online are also not communications which would cause substantial emotional distress. Most of them are simply retweets of articles or headlines involving Textor. That they may be embarrassing to Textor is not at all the same as causing him substantial emotional distress sufficient to obtain an injunction. Moreover, the postings are more like the blog posts in Chevaldina, which the Third District found were not directed at a specific person, as they were simply generally criticizing the business involved to the blogging public. 133 So.3d at 1092. 7 Even the alleged physical threat made by David in an online interview, that David would have killed Textor if he could have, would not cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress. In the online article the author stated that “David joked” when stating that he would have killed Textor. Spoken to a journalist for publication, it hardly amounts to an actual and credible threat of violence to Textor.”

The 4th DCA further held that the communications had a legitimate purpose and that the judge’s prohibition on David making any online posts and comments about Textor violated David’s First Amendment rights:

“Those communications made directly to Textor served a legitimate purpose. An injunction in this case would also violate First Amendment principles. “[A] temporary injunction directed to speech is a classic example of prior restraint on speech triggering First Amendment concerns.” Vrasic v. Leibel, 106 So.3d 485, 486 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). An injunction may not be directed to prevent defamatory speech. Id. at 487; Chevaldina, 133 So.3d at 1090. “ ‘[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.’ ” Concerned Citizens for Judicial Fairness, Inc. v. Yacucci, 162 So.3d 68, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976)). Section 784.048 itself recognizes the First Amendment rights of individuals by concluding that a “course of conduct” for purposes of the statute does not include protected speech. § 784.048(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2014). This includes speech that may be offensive or vituperative. See Watts v. U.S., 394 U.S. 705, 708, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969). 13 Here, the online postings simply provide information, gleaned from other sources, regarding Textor and the many lawsuits against him. The injunction prevents not only communications to Textor, but also communications about Textor. Such prohibition by prior restraint violates the Constitution. If David’s communications about Textor are defamatory, then Textor can sue David for damages. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the temporary injunction and remand with directions to dismiss the petition.”

In sum, David v. Textor, 189 So.3d 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) marks a significant development in Florida’s corpus of case law surrounding stalking and cyberstalking injunctions. The 4th DCA (Southeast FL’s highest court) held that:

• David’s conduct was not likely to cause substantial emotional distress to Textor
• David’s conduct did not totally lack a legitimate purpose
• Moreover, the order restricting David from making any online posts ABOUT Textor was a “prior restraint” that violated David’s First Amendment rights under the United States Constitution
• As a result, the injunction was set aside

Florida’s legal community should take note of David v. Textor, 189 So.3d 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), as it makes clear when the evidence is sufficient and insufficient to support the issuance of a stalking injunction as a matter of law.

If someone is charged with stalking or aggravated stalking, it is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This vital decision could make the difference in whether or not a person is subject to a lengthy prison term, hefty fines, and more.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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