North Florida’s Highest Court DISSOLVES Stalking Injunction: “Fear NOT Objectively Reasonable”

September 11, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense Social Share

Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal dissolved a stalking injunction entered by a lower court judge after finding the petitioner did not have an objectively reasonable fear of the respondent. However, one 1st DCA judge disagreed.

CASE: Hobbs v. Hobbs, 290 So.3d 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)

Charge(s): Stalking Injunction

Outcome: Injunction SET ASIDE, as the petitioner did not establish that she had an objectively reasonable fear of her ex-husband at the time her husband moved to dissolve it (20 years after it was originally issued).

Stalking and Aggravated Stalking in Florida

Stalking and aggravated stalking are serious offenses in Florida that can carry significant legal and financial penalties. Stalking occurs when a person willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person. Florida Statutes Section 784.048(2) regulates the offense of stalking.

If someone has been accused of stalking by harassing the victim, the State must establish that the defendant engaged in a course of conduct directed at the victim that:

• Served no legitimate purpose
• Would cause substantial emotional distress to a reasonable person
• Did cause substantial emotional distress to the victim

If charged criminally, stalking is a first-degree misdemeanor – punishable by up to 1 year in jail and a $1,000 fine. Cyberstalking carries the same criminal penalties as stalking, and occurs when someone does either of the following:

• Engages in a course of conduct to communicate words, images, or language through electronic methods, either directly or indirectly, which is directed at or pertaining to a targeted person; or
• Accesses, or attempts to access, the online account or internet-connected home electronic system without the specified person’s consent – and that causes substantial emotional distress to the victim 

Stalking is an enhanceable offense, meaning certain forms of stalking are felonies and carry heavier criminal penalties under Florida law. For example:

• Someone who makes a credible threat to the victim in the course of stalking commits a third-degree felony, punishable by up to 5 years in prison and a $5,000 fine
• Someone who stalks a victim 16 years old or younger commits a third-degree felony, punishable by up to 5 years in prison and a $5,000 fine
• Someone who violates an existing injunction against stalking commits aggravated stalking, a third-degree felony punishable by up to 5 years in prison and a $5,000 fine

Note: A police officer may make a warrantless arrest of anyone they suspect of stalking based on probable cause.

Under Florida law, stalking must be done both willfully and maliciously. “Willfully” is defined as knowingly, intentionally, and purposely. “Maliciously” is defined as wrongfully, intentionally, and without lawful justification or excuse. Seese v. State, 955 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) 

In addition to stalking, there is aggravated stalking. Aggravated stalking includes the elements of stalking, but with the added requirement of making a credible threat to the victim, or violating an injunction for protection against violence. Ford v. State, 387 So.3d 1283 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024) 

Aggravated stalking is a third-degree felony punishable by up to 5 years in prison and a $5,000 fine. Moreover, under Fla. Stat. 784.048, a court may issue an order restraining the defendant in an aggravated stalking case from contacting the victim for up to 10 years.

In addition to a criminal charge, someone may be subject to a stalking INJUNCTION. In Florida, an injunction is defined as a court order that is meant to compel a person to engage in, or refrain from engaging in, a particular course of conduct. 

There are two broad types of stalking injunctions – temporary injunctions and permanent (final) injunctions. A temporary injunction (also known as an ex parte injunction) can be entered before the respondent (e.g. the party accused of stalking) gets a full hearing. The process proceeds in the following way:

• The petitioner files a verified petition alleging stalking
• The judge reviews the petition – generally, the respondent does not have to be present
• If it appears that stalking exists, the court may issue a temporary injunction pending a full hearing
• Temporary injunctions ordinarily last no more than 15 days
• A full hearing must be scheduled no later than the date of expiration of the temporary injunction
• However, the hearing on the final injunction may be continued (e.g. delayed) for GOOD CAUSE, such as inability to obtain service on the respondent (and a temporary injunction may be extended accordingly)

A FINAL (or permanent injunction) must only issue after the respondent is given notice – and an evidentiary hearing occurs. At that hearing, both parties have the opportunity to:

• Testify regarding the facts of the case
• Present witnesses and evidence
• Contest whether the statutory requirements for stalking have been established

There are various types of stalking injunctions that may be issued, depending on the facts of the case. These include:

• Injunction for protection for domestic violence – Under Fla. Stat. 741.30, this may issue if the petitioner and respondent presently reside together, have lived together in the past in an intimate or family relationship, are related by blood/marriage OR share a child
• Injunction for protection from repeat violence – May be issued when a party proves that at least 2 instances of stalking and/or violence have been committed against them by the respondent in the last 6 months and the petitioner/respondent do not have a relationship qualifying them for a domestic violence injunction
• Injunction for protection from dating violence – requires that 1) the dating relationship existed within the last 6 months; 2) the nature of the relationship is characterized by the expectation of affection or sexual involvement between the parties; and 3) the frequency and type of interaction is based on the party’s involvement over time and on a continuous basis during the course of the relationship
• Injunction for sexual violence – requires a victim or parent of a victim to establish that 1) the petitioner has reported the alleged sexual violence to a law enforcement agency and is cooperating in any criminal proceeding against the respondent; and 2) the respondent who committed sexual violence was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in state prison, and the term of imprisonment has expired or is due to expire within 90 days following the date the petition is filed

It is important to note that a final injunction does NOT automatically last forever after it has been entered. A final injunction may be dissolved if any of the following occur:

• The party who sought the injunction (petitioner) moves the court to set it aside – and the court does so
• The respondent seeks to set the injunction aside, and a court finds that there is no longer a legally valid basis for its existence
• A reviewing court (usually a Florida appellate court) finds there is a legally insufficient basis for the injunction’s issuance – and dissolves it (Garcia v. Soto, 337 So.3d 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022))

Critically, the burden of proof in a civil injunction proceeding differs from the State’s burden of proof at a criminal trial where stalking, aggravated stalking, or violation of an existing injunction has been alleged.

In civil proceedings, the petitioner must establish by a PREPONDERANCE of the evidence (e.g. majority of the evidence) that the legal requirements for an injunction have been met. In criminal proceedings, the State must prove BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT that the defendant has committed each and every element of the charged offense(s). For more, click here.

If someone is seeking an injunction for DOMESTIC VIOLENCE in Florida, the following must be true of the petitioner’s allegations for an injunction to issue:

• The respondent’s alleged conduct must not have been too remote in time to support the issuance of the injunction (e.g. many years prior to the start of the proceedings)
• The petitioner must have an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that they are IN FEAR of the respondent at the time of the hearing (subjective fear alone is insufficient)

If these conditions are not satisfied, a domestic violence injunction cannot issue as a matter of law – even if the petitioner is personally in fear of domestic violence. Hart v. Griffis, 288 So.3d 770 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)

This was made clear in a major decision handed down by Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal (Tallahassee and North FL’s highest court). There, an ex-husband moved to dissolve a domestic violence injunction that was roughly 20 years old after he was denied the right to buy a firearm due to its existence.

At a hearing, the ex-husband argued that he had not contacted his ex-wife in roughly 20 years – and had no intent to do so. As he’d complied with the terms of the injunction, he claimed that it no longer served a valid legal purpose, since the domestic violence allegations levied against him were two decades old.

The ex-wife, however, strongly opposed the dissolution of the injunction. She claimed she was still in fear of her ex-husband and cited the domestic violence he allegedly perpetrated over two decades earlier as the basis for that fear. She claimed that his recent move to a residence closer to hers heightened her fear, which had not subsided since their divorce.

The judge concluded that there was a sufficient basis for the injunction to remain in place – and refused to dissolve it. As a result, the ex-husband was unable to purchase a firearm. He appealed.

On appeal to the 1st DCA, he contended that the judge erred as a matter of law when he kept the injunction in place. The ex-husband claimed that the alleged episodes of domestic violence were too long ago for the continued fear of his ex-wife to be objectively reasonable – especially given the fact that he had never once violated the injunction. He urged the 1st DCA to dissolve it.

The 1st DCA majority AGREED with the ex-husband and dissolved the injunction. But one 1st DCA judge DISSENTED.

Let’s look at the case – Hobbs v. Hobbs, 290 So.3d 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) – and discuss what it means for those in Florida involved in injunction proceedings.

KEY CASE: Hobbs v. Hobbs, 290 So.3d 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)

In Hobbs v. Hobbs, 290 So.3d 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020), an ex-husband petitioned the court to dissolve a 20+ year-old domestic violence injunction that his ex-wife successfully sought as part of divorce proceedings. At the hearing, the following was revealed:

• Hobbs went to purchase a firearm in 2018, but he was denied – because his background check showed the existence of the injunction 
• He immediately petitioned the court to dissolve the injunction, arguing it was no longer necessary because his wife could not still have an objectively reasonable fear of falling victim to domestic violence at his hands
• Hobbs cited the fact that he had not made any effort to contact his ex-wife in 20 years
• The ex-wife attended the hearing and argued that the court should keep the injunction in place
• She claimed that her ex-husband moved in a home much closer to hers six months earlier and his attempted purchase of a gun made her fearful of him committing violence against her
• The judge AGREED with the ex-wife and found that she still had a reasonable fear of her ex-husband (sufficient to support the injunction remaining in place)
• The injunction continued to be effective, rendering the ex-husband unable to purchase a firearm

The ex-husband APPEALED the judge’s decision to the 1st DCA, arguing that for the injunction to remain in effect, his ex-wife must have an OBJECTIVELY reasonable fear of future domestic violence. As he’d not contacted her in 20+ years and had no intent to do so, he claimed her fear was unreasonable – thus, the injunction should be dissolved.

The 1st DCA majority AGREED with him and DISSOLVED the injunction, reversing the lower court’s decision. The majority wrote:

“Even though Ms. Hobbs’ testimony consisted of speculation and hearsay, the trial court found Ms. Hobbs’ fear of violence from Mr. Hobbs was objectively reasonable. The court found that Ms. Hobbs had been absent from the Pensacola area for almost eighteen years and had returned only six months before the hearing. The trial court observed Ms. Hobbs’s demeanor and body language and found that she was still “very, very angry at what [Mr. Hobbs] did in the year ’99/2000.” The trial court found that she “looked scared.” The record supports these findings. But these findings only show that Ms. Hobbs had a subjective fear of Mr. Hobbs. And subjective fear is not enough to maintain a permanent injunction. McMath v. Biernacki, 776 So. 2d 1039, 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Instead, Ms. Hobbs’ fear of harm from Mr. Hobbs had to be objectively reasonable, based on all the circumstances. See Alkhoury, 54 So. 3d at 642. The evidence did not show that Ms. Hobbs’ fear was objectively reasonable. The trial court erred in finding otherwise.”

“Mr. Hobbs never violated the injunction and has no criminal history. Ms. Hobbs admitted that Mr. Hobbs had not contacted her in almost twenty years—not in person, not by phone, email, or text. Nor did he try to contact Ms. Hobbs after he learned that she had returned to the Pensacola area or in the six months leading up to the hearing. Mr. Hobbs’ conduct in the twenty years following the entry of the injunction renders Ms. Hobbs’ subjective fear that she was in imminent danger objectively unreasonable. And though a trial court has broad discretion to grant an injunction, the evidence must be legally sufficient to justify imposition of the injunction. … Here, the evidence was legally insufficient to show that Ms. Hobbs had reasonable cause to believe she was in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence. For this reason, and because Mr. Hobbs showed the requisite change in circumstances so that the injunction no longer serves a valid purpose, we reverse the order denying the motion to dissolve the injunction.”

However, one 1st DCA judge – Judge Bilbrey – dissented. Judge Bilbrey claimed that the judge DID NOT abuse his discretion by leaving the injunction in place, writing:

“Certainly, as the majority discusses, some circumstances have changed since the injunction was entered. The parties’ marriage has been dissolved, Appellee’s children are adults living in their own homes, and many years have passed since the altercation which led to the issuance of the injunction. And shortly after the injunction was entered, Appellee relocated her residence outside the State of Florida. But in this case, unlike the permanent relocation of both parties in Trice v. Trice, 267 So. 3d 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019), Appellee recently returned, after years of living elsewhere, to the same home where she resided when the injunction was entered. She is back near Appellant in the same small-town area. And she testified that third-parties have told her that Appellant is still “crazy about her and [has] crazy stuff in his head” causing her to remain in fear of Appellant.4 Furthermore, Appellant admitted to shooting a firearm while taking a course to get a concealed weapons license, which clearly violated the injunction. See § 790.06(2)(h), Fla. Stat. (requiring an applicant attempting to obtain a license to carry a concealed weapon by attending various courses to discharge a weapon “including live fire using a firearm and ammunition”). While reasonable people could differ on whether the injunction still serves a valid purpose, the trial court observed the parties, determined their credibility and the weight to be given their respective testimony, and exercised its discretion by denying the motion to dissolve.”

Essentially, Judge Bilbrey found the trial court made a proper judgment call based on the totality of the circumstances. But his opinion did NOT win the day – and the injunction was set aside.

In sum, Hobbs v. Hobbs, 290 So.3d 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) marks a significant development in Florida’s corpus of case law surrounding injunctions for stalking and domestic violence. The 1st DCA (Tallahassee and North FL’s highest court) found that:

• An ex-wife’s fear that she would be a domestic violence victim at the hands of her former husband was not objectively reasonable
• He had made no attempt to contact her in roughly 20 years, and there was no evidence his purchase of a firearm had anything to do with doing or threatening violence towards her
• Moreover, the mere fact that he moved to a residence relatively close to his ex-wife was insufficient to justify the injunction remaining in effect
• As a result, the judge ERRED by failing to dissolve it – requiring reversal of his decision

Judge Bilbrey of the 1st DCA dissented, asserting that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to set aside the injunction, and that the trial judge was in the best position to evaluate the evidence and testimony.

Florida’s criminal defense community should take note of Hobbs v. Hobbs, 290 So.3d 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020), as it explains when someone’s fear is and is not objectively reasonable when an injunction for stalking, repeat violence, or domestic/dating violence is pursued (or when a party seeks to dissolve it).

If someone is charged with stalking or aggravated stalking, it is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This vital decision could make the difference in whether or not a person is subject to a lengthy prison term, hefty fines, and depending on the nature of the abuse, whether they are required to register as a sex offender for the rest of their life.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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