North FL’s Highest Court Allows Confession Into Evidence Despite Serious Miranda Rights Concerns

April 20, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense Social Share

Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal reversed a trial judge’s order suppressing a defendant’s post-Miranda statements, finding that the defendant was not misled by law enforcement into not asking for a lawyer.

CASE: State v. Parker, 144 So.3d 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)

Charge(s): Burglary with Battery, Attempted Sexual Battery, Sexual Battery, Battery

Outcome: Suppression of confession REVERSED, as law enforcement did not violate Parker’s Miranda rights during interrogation.

Miranda Rights in Florida

In Florida and throughout the U.S., someone must be advised of their Miranda rights before they are subject to custodial interrogation by law enforcement. These rights, per Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), include:

• The right to remain silent
• The fact that anything they say can and will be used against them in court
• The right to an attorney, including to have one present during police questioning
• The fact that if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for them

If someone is notified of their Miranda rights, the smart next move is to EXERCISE them! Tell law enforcement that you will be remaining silent and are requesting an attorney. Say all of this out loud, as if you sit there quietly and say absolutely nothing, law enforcement has permission to treat this as consent to continued questioning. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010)

It is commonly believed due to television shows and movies that Miranda rights must be read to a suspect at the moment they are arrested. However, this is not true. Someone is only required to be notified of their Miranda rights once they are in police CUSTODY, but before they are subject to INTERROGATION. For more, click here.

For a person to be considered in custody for purposes of requiring them to be notified of their Miranda rights, both of the following must be true:

• The suspect must have their freedom of movement constrained in a manner consistent with a formal arrest (this includes a formal arrest)
• A reasonable person in the suspect’s position would not feel free to leave (J.G. v. State, 883 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004))

For interrogation to occur, law enforcement must subject the suspect to QUESTIONING or its “functional equivalent” that is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from them. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). For more on interrogation, click here.

When someone is taken into custody and read their Miranda rights before interrogation begins, they have two options: 

• Invoke their rights by telling law enforcement they will be remaining silent/requesting an attorney (DO THIS!)
• Waive their Miranda rights and agree to speak with law enforcement without an attorney present

It is important to note that someone does not permanently waive their Miranda rights when they agree to talk to law enforcement at the start of interrogation. Someone may invoke their rights at any time during questioning – however, this must be done unequivocally and unambiguously. 

Unlike when someone has not yet waived their Miranda rights, law enforcement is not required to clarify a suspect’s intent to invoke (or not invoke) if this is expressed EQUIVOCALLY (e.g. ambiguously). For more on this, click here.

In the event that someone waives their Miranda rights and agrees to speak with law enforcement, this must have been done knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. If it was not, their subsequent interrogation is INADMISSIBLE in a court of law (if one is made). Chavers v. State, 115 So.3d 1017 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)

Examples of situations where law enforcement acts in a manner that renders a Miranda waiver (and subsequent confession) involuntary include:

• Law enforcement does not read someone their full Miranda rights (e.g. omits one or more rights when notifying a suspect of them, such as not disclosing the right to an attorney)
• Law enforcement fails to read someone their rights at all before custodially interrogating them (Evans v. State, 911 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005))
• Law enforcement reads someone their rights in a language that is not their own (e.g. reads a clear Spanish-speaker their rights in English)
• Law enforcement uses threats, coercion, or trickery to get someone to waive their rights – even once they have chosen to exercise them
• Law enforcement minimizes Miranda (e.g. “This is all just a formality…”)

To learn more about when a Miranda rights waiver is considered to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, click here.

If someone believes their Miranda waiver (and confession during custodial interrogation) was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, an experienced and aggressive Florida criminal defense attorney can file a MOTION TO SUPPRESS on their behalf. 

If this is granted, the defendant’s post-Miranda statements are rendered inadmissible in a court of law. Put simply, this means that the jury will not hear them, which can significantly influence the outcome of a criminal proceeding. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

In some cases, before or immediately after someone waives their Miranda rights, they may ask a “prefatory question.” An example prefatory question may include:

• “Can I have an attorney right now, or later?”
• “Do these rights kick in now or when I go to trial?”
• “Does this mean I shouldn’t talk to you?”

If police officers do not acknowledge and honestly answer prefatory questions, a subsequent confession is inadmissible in a court – because it is “contaminated” by the failure to address the prefatory question. Almeida v. State, 737 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1999)

In one major North Florida case, a defendant in a burglary and sexual battery case alleged he was ignored by an interrogating detective when he tried to ask him if he “needed to get a lawyer.”

Based on the transcript of the interrogation, the trial judge agreed that the detective IGNORED the defendant’s prefatory question, which was asked shortly after he waived his Miranda rights and agreed to speak with law enforcement.

Pursuant to Almeida v. State, 737 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1999), the trial judge ordered the suppression of the defendant’s subsequent confession, rendering it inadmissible in court (e.g. at his trial). The State APPEALED this ruling to Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal (Tallahassee and North FL’s), arguing the trial judge’s interpretation of what occurred was incorrect.

The 1st DCA AGREED with the State, finding the judge was wrong to suppress the defendant’s inculpatory statements. As a result, they were used against him at trial. But why?

Let’s take a look at that case – State v. Parker, 144 So.3d 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) – and discuss what it means for your Miranda rights in Florida.

KEY CASE: State v. Parker, 144 So.3d 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)

In Parker, the defendant (Parker) was arrested and charged with various offenses ranging from burglary to sexual battery. At the hearing on his motion to suppress his post-Miranda statements, the following facts were revealed:

• Parker was taken to the police station for questioning, informed he was NOT under arrest, and read his Miranda rights
• Parker waived his rights and agreed to speak with law enforcement
• Once interrogation commenced, the interrogating detective insisted Parker was guilty of the crimes he was being investigated for
• Parker denied the allegations, then asked: “Can you just tell me if I need to get a lawyer or something? I’ll tell you but I just don’t—I don’t want to like—”
• The interrogating detective (Jones) responded: “Listen, that’s your right. But what I’m interested in is the truth,—”
• Parker said “I know,” then made various incriminating statements 
• Eventually, Parker expressed a desire to write apology letters to the victims, and asked if a lawyer was present at the police station: “I want to say I’m sorry. I don’t know what to do right now. Is there—is there a lawyer in the building or am I going to have to f****ng sit in there and wait?”
• The detective responded: “No, you would have to call one,” then told Parker he did not have to write apology letters if he didn’t want to
• Parker went on to make additional inculpatory statements before he was arrested

Parker moved to suppress his confession, arguing that Detective Jones failed to give an “honest and straightforward” answer to his prefatory question (“Can you just tell me if I need to get a lawyer or something?”). The trial judge AGREED and granted Parker’s motion for the following reasons, according to the 1st DCA:

“The trial court found in pertinent part that the interview became an interrogation when Detective Jones confronted Parker with the allegations and that “[t]he audio of the interview reflects that there was no space between the words ‘right’ and ‘but’ in Detective Jones’ response to [Parker’s] question. It would more accurately be described as ‘Listen, that’s your right but what I’m interested in is the truth.’ The trial court further concluded that Parker made at least two attempts to request an attorney; that “[w]henever he asked if he could make a call to get advice, Detective Jones prevented him from doing so”; that Detective Jones failed to answer in good-faith Parker’s question of whether a lawyer was available; and that throughout the interrogation, Detective Jones engaged in gamesmanship and either overrode or steamrolled Parker as he attempted to invoke his right to counsel. Accordingly, the trial court granted Parker’s motion “as to the statements that he made as a result of custodial interrogation after he initially invoked his right to counsel (‘Can you just tell me if I need to get a lawyer or something?’).”

The State appealed the trial judge’s ruling to the 1st DCA, arguing he misapplied the law – and urging the 1st DCA to reverse his order. The 1st DCA AGREED with the State and reversed the order to suppress Parker’s confession(s), allowing his inculpatory statements to be used by the State at his trial (e.g. used against him). The 1st DCA began by noting:

“A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress carries a presumption of correctness. Spivey v. State, 45 So.3d 51, 54 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). This Court defers to the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviews its findings of law de novo. Id. During custodial questioning, a suspect has the right to consult with an attorney and to have an attorney present. Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469–73, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). “If a suspect clearly and unequivocally requests counsel at any time during a custodial interview, the interrogation must immediately stop until a lawyer is present or the suspect reinitiates conversation.” … If, on the other hand, a suspect who has knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights makes an equivocal or ambiguous request for counsel, police officers are not required to stop the interrogation or ask clarifying questions.”

“In Almeida v. State, 737 So.2d 520, 523–24 (Fla. 1999), the Florida Supreme Court distinguished an equivocal statement that requires no clarification from a question that is “prefatory to—and possibly determinative of—the invoking of a right.” The Court held: if, at any point during custodial interrogation, a suspect asks a clear question concerning his or her rights, the officer must stop the interview and make a good-faith effort to give a simple and straightforward answer.”

The 1st DCA noted Almeida requires asking three questions to determine if a suspect’s Miranda rights were violated after a confession that followed a “prefatory question” about the right to an attorney:

• Whether the suspect was actually referring to his right to counsel
• Whether the utterance was a “clear, bona fide question” calling for an answer – not a “rumination or a rhetorical question”
• Whether the officer made a good-faith effort to give a simple and straightforward answer

Finding that Parker did indeed ask a prefatory question, the 1st DCA nevertheless REVERSED the trial judge’s suppression order because it found Detective Jones provided Parker an “honest, straightforward answer.” The 1st DCA wrote:

“In the present case, the issue turns on the third step of the Almeida analysis: whether Detective Jones gave a good-faith answer to Parker’s prefatory question of “[c]an you just tell me if I need to get a lawyer or something?,” or tried to override or steamroll him. We conclude that Detective Jones’s response of “[l]isten, that’s your right. But what I’m interested in is the truth,—” complied with Almeida because the response was simple, straightforward, and true and in effect communicated to Parker that he had the right to counsel and whether to ask for one was his choice. We further find with regard to Parker’s prefatory question of “[i]s there—is there a lawyer in the building,” that Detective Jones’s response of “[n]o, you would have to call one” satisfied Almeida because it, too, was simple, straightforward, and honest. … We agree that Parker was in fact referring to his right to counsel when he posed that prefatory question and that his utterance called for an answer. However, we conclude that the detective made a good-faith effort to give a simple and honest answer. For these reasons, the trial court erred by granting Parker’s motion to suppress his statements. Accordingly, we REVERSE the trial court’s order.”

One 1st DCA judge – Judge Benton – disagreed with the majority’s analysis. Authoring a fiery dissenting opinion, Judge Benton argued that the trial judge’s order should have been affirmed:

“Given the trial court’s findings and the record on which they are based, the trial court’s ruling should be affirmed. After a scholarly discussion of the pertinent cases, the trial court summarized its findings of fact in the following paragraph…”

“Here, the record reflects that, Defendant made at least two, if not more, attempts to request access to an attorney. Though Detective Jones did tell Defendant that it was his right to speak to an attorney, he continued on with the interrogation without any pause. It is clear from Detective Jones’ responses to Defendant, on at least the two occasions when that word, lawyer, is used, that Detective Jones understood that Defendant wanted to speak to an attorney. Furthermore, Defendant repeatedly requested to use the phone after asking if he needed an attorney. Whenever he asked if he could make a call to get advice, Detective Jones prevented him from doing so. Even when he explicitly asked if a lawyer was available to speak with him, Detective Jones still did not make a good-faith effort to answer his question. Even when answering the question initially, Detective Jones stated to Defendant that he had a right to an attorney, but he (Detective Jones) just wanted the truth. Throughout the interrogation, Detective Jones engaged in “gamesmanship” with Defendant; and, either overrode or “steamrolled” Defendant as he attempted to invoke his right to counsel. See State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So.2d 297, 305 (Fla. 2001). For this reason, Defendant’s statements to law enforcement after invocation of his right to counsel are suppressed.”

“On this basis, the trial court understandably ordered “Defendant’s statements to law enforcement after his invocation of his right to counsel … suppressed.” The majority opinion’s claim that the appellant never sought to invoke his right to counsel and that his interlocutor never rebuffed or “overrode” these efforts—and thus that the trial court erred as a matter of fact—cannot be squared with the detailed findings the trial court made on the circumstances surrounding the statements and the evidence underlying the findings.”

Put simply, Judge Benton felt that the trial judge’s conclusion was reasonable given the record – and that the 1st DCA must defer to it because it is presumed correct on appeal. However, this position did not win the day.

In sum, State v. Parker, 144 So.3d 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) marks a significant development in Florida’s corpus of case law surrounding Miranda rights. The 1st DCA (Tallahassee and North FL’s highest court) found that:

• Parker asked a good-faith question about his right to counsel (“Can you just tell me if I need to get a lawyer or something?”)
• However, the detective’s answer was “honest and straightforward” (e.g. ““Listen, that’s your right…”)
• Because of this, there was no Almeida v. State, 737 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1999) violation – requiring the trial judge’s suppression order to be REVERSED

Judge Benton of the 1st DCA strongly disagreed, noting that the “totality of the circumstances” revealed Detective Jones was engaged in “gamesmanship” and “steamrolled” Parker when he tried to ask for a lawyer. He believed affirmance of the trial judge’s order was required – as it is “presumed correct” and there was a strong basis to believe Parker’s rights were violated.

Florida’s criminal defense community should take note of State v. Parker, 144 So.3d 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), as it reveals how the 1st DCA evaluates claims of Miranda violations when a prefatory question is asked.

If someone is arrested and formally charged in Florida in a case involving a Miranda waiver that was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary, it is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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