Major Florida Court Defines ‘Custodial Interrogation’ for Miranda Purposes

October 30, 2025 Criminal Defense

Tallahassee and North Florida’s highest court defines ‘custodial interrogation’ to clarify when law enforcement officers are required to read someone their Miranda rights.

In Florida and throughout the United States, someone must be read their Miranda rights before they are subject to custodial interrogation. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s landmark decision, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), law enforcement officers must notify a person of:

  • Their right to remain silent
  • The fact that anything they say can and will be used against them in court
  • The right to an attorney, including the right to have one present during questioning
  • The fact that if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for them free of charge

If someone is read their Miranda rights, the smart next move is to exercise them by telling the police you will be remaining silent and requesting an attorney! Simply say this, then be quiet. If you do not tell law enforcement that you are invoking your rights out loud, they can take your silence as permission to keep questioning you. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010)

Many believe that any time someone is arrested or detained by law enforcement officers, they must be read their Miranda rights. However, this is not true. Miranda readings are only required after someone is taken into custody, but before they are interrogated.

Only if officers plan to actually interrogate a suspect is it necessary to advise them of their rights. Simply handcuffing a person does not trigger a legal requirement for the police to read Miranda. Though some choose to do so immediately upon arresting a suspect (like you see on television), it is not mandatory to notify someone of their rights at that moment.

Again, “custodial interrogation” is the key. But what is custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes – and at what point is someone considered “in custody” and “interrogated”? 

A major decision from Tallahassee and North Florida’s highest court answered these critical questions. Let’s discuss it.

KEY CASE: Moore v. State, 798 So.2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)

In Moore, the defendant (Moore) was charged with trafficking in cocaine, possession of cannabis and possession of drug paraphernalia. He was convicted on all counts.

On appeal to Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal, Moore argued his post-Miranda statements were erroneously used against him at trial. Information he provided to officers after he was read his rights led officers to discover key evidence tying more to the alleged drug activity.

Moore was advised of his Miranda rights upon being arrested and invoked his right to remain silent. After communicating this to officers, one approached him with a handful of clothes. He indicated they were “not being retained as evidence” and wished to return the clothing to their rightful owner.

Moore informed the officer that some of the clothing was his. At trial, the State used this to tie Moore to the hotel room where the drugs were found. Moore and a codefendant were arrested in a vehicle outside the hotel after officers had executed a search warrant on the room – but the police only had evidence of the codefendant’s involvement at the time (not Moore’s).

Moore moved to suppress his acknowledgment of owning the clothes at trial, arguing that he was subject to custodial interrogation. But the trial judge disagreed and admitted the statement at trial. 

On appeal, the 1st DCA reversed the verdict from the trial court, finding that Moore’s statements had been illegally obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. As a result, the verdict against him was tossed out. 

The 1st DCA reasoned that Moore was subject to custodial interrogation. The 1st DCA began its analysis by noting that because Moore was arrested, he was indisputably considered “in custody” at the time the officer engaged him:

“There is no question here that the appellant was in custody in the instant case at the time he was asked to identify his clothing… Under Miranda, custodial interrogation occurs when a law enforcement officer initiates the questioning of an individual who ‘has been taken into custody or is otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’”

The 1st DCA clarified that any time someone is formally arrested (e.g. placed in handcuffs), this qualifies as custody for Miranda purposes. Moreover, the court observed that someone is in law enforcement custody when they are “deprived of freedom of action in any significant way.” In essence, the question is whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave.

Because there was no dispute that Moore was in custody at the time, the 1st DCA turned to the heart of the State’s argument – that Moore was not interrogated. The 1st DCA wrote that at the time he was asked about his clothing, Moore had already invoked his right to remain silent:

“It is well-established that once a suspect invokes his right to silence, no further police initiated custodial interrogation can take place unless the accused initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. … A request to remain silent is to be scrupulously honored.”

This fact made the 1st DCA automatically suspect of law enforcement’s behavior. Though the State attempted to rebut the court’s skepticism by claiming a lack of connection between the officer’s question (“Are these your clothes?”) and the alleged offenses, the 1st DCA held that “interrogation” has a very broad definition:

“Interrogation occurs when an individual in custody is subject to express questioning or its ‘functional equivalent’ … The “functional equivalent” of express questioning is ‘any word[ ] or action[ ] on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’”

Applying this framework (first created by the U.S. Supreme Court in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)), the 1st DCA concluded that Moore was improperly “interrogated” at the scene by the officer because the question was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The court wrote:

“Here, we conclude that, under Innis, it was error to admit the inculpatory statement by appellant. Officer Witherington’s inquiry about the clothing found in the hotel room did lead to an incriminating response by the appellant. Further, the officer’s intention as to whether he was trying to elicit an incriminating response or whether he was interested in returning items not being retained as evidence is not dispositive.”

The court noted that even though the officer may have not personally intended to use Moore’s statements as a tool to prosecute him, this did not ultimately matter. The key is whether, when evaluated objectively, the question was “reasonably likely” to elicit a reply from Moore that was incriminating. The 1st DCA concluded:

“Because, under Innis, it was error to admit appellant’s statement and because we cannot find the error harmless, we are constrained to reverse and remand for further proceedings. … On remand, a new trial may be sought without violating the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”

In sum, Moore v. State is a key case by Tallahassee and North Florida’s highest court that defines when “custodial interrogation” takes place. Custody is established when law enforcement arrests a suspect or otherwise significantly impedes their freedom of action (e.g. movement). This does not trigger a requirement for Miranda warnings by itself.

But if officers engage in interrogation or its “functional equivalent” in violation of someone’s Miranda rights (either by failing to read them to a suspect or interrogating a suspect in spite of their invocation, a la Moore), this is a violation of Miranda. As a result, any statements made by the suspect in response (including a confession) are inadmissible in court.

Moore v. State, 798 So.2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) did not involve an officer’s failure to inform a suspect of their Miranda rights before custodial interrogation began (unlike some other cases, such as Ross v. State, 45 So.3d 403 (Fla. 2010)). However, Moore is an excellent case for what is considered custodial interrogation – as it recognizes all of the following:

  • Custody for Miranda purposes occurs not just when a person is arrested, but when their freedom of action is impeded in any significant way by law enforcement
  • Interrogation occurs when officers engage in questioning or its “functional equivalent” that is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from a suspect 
  • A police officer’s intentions are not the key issue in evaluating whether interrogation occurred – it is whether the nature of that officer’s question/behavior was reasonably likely to produce an incriminating response from the suspect

If someone is arrested and formally charged in Florida in a case involving a Miranda waiver that was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary, it is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting drug charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.


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