North FL’s Highest Court Affirms Conviction, Finds Defendant Did Not Invoke Miranda Rights

April 10, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense Social Share

Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal ruled that a defendant validly did not unequivocally and unambiguously invoke his right to remain silent or right to counsel once custodial interrogation had commenced, requiring that his second-degree murder conviction be affirmed.

CASE: Alvarez v. State, 890 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)

Charge(s): Arson, Second-Degree Murder

Outcome: Convictions AFFIRMED, as the defendant did not unequivocally and unambiguously invoke his Miranda rights after custodial interrogation had commenced (and thus, suppression of his statements was not required).

Miranda Rights in Florida

In Florida and throughout the U.S., someone must be advised of their Miranda rights before they are subject to custodial interrogation by law enforcement. These rights, per the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) rulings, include:

• The right to remain silent
• The fact that anything they say can and will be used against them in court
• The right to an attorney, including to have one present during police questioning
• The fact that if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for them

If someone is read their Miranda rights in Florida, the SMART next move is to exercise them! Tell law enforcement that you will be remaining silent and request an attorney. If you simply sit there quietly, officers have permission to keep questioning you. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010)

Because of television shows and social media, it is commonly thought that law enforcement must read someone their Miranda rights any time they place them in handcuffs. However, this is NOT the case. Miranda must only be read after someone is taken into CUSTODY, but before they are subject to INTERROGATION. For more, click here.

For someone to be considered in custody for Miranda purposes (e.g. requiring law enforcement to notify a person of their Miranda rights), there are TWO conditions that must be satisfied:

• Their freedom of movement has been restricted consistent with a formal arrest (this can include actually being arrested)
• A reasonable person in their position would not feel free to leave (Green v. State, 878 So.2d 382 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003))

Interrogation for Miranda reading purposes occurs when law enforcement subjects an individual to questioning (or its functional equivalent) that is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from them. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). For more on this, click here.

If and when someone is read their Miranda rights, they have two options:

• Exercise their Miranda rights by telling law enforcement they wish to remain silent and want an attorney (DO THIS!)
• Waive their rights and agree to speak with police, without an attorney present

In the event that someone waives their Miranda rights and agrees to speak with police, this must be done knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. This means a person must understand both the nature of their rights and the potential consequences of not exercising them. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For more, click here.

In the event that a defendant believes their Miranda rights waiver was NOT knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, an experienced and aggressive Florida criminal defense attorney can file a motion to suppress on their behalf.

If such a motion is granted, the defendant’s post-Miranda statements (INCLUDING confessions) are rendered inadmissible in a court of law. That means they cannot be introduced into evidence, so a jury will not hear them – and by extension, will be unable to consider those statements as evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Ramirez v. State, 739 So.2d 568 (Fla. 1999)

Examples of situations where law enforcement acts in a manner that renders a Miranda waiver (and subsequent confession) involuntary include:

• Law enforcement does not read someone their full Miranda rights (e.g. omits one or more rights when notifying a suspect of them, such as not disclosing the right to an attorney)
• Law enforcement reads someone their rights in a language that is not their own (e.g. reads a clear Spanish-speaker their rights in English)
• Law enforcement uses threats, coercion, or trickery to get someone to waive their rights – even once they have chosen to exercise them
• Law enforcement minimizes Miranda (e.g. “This is all just a formality…”)

It is important to note that just because a defendant does not exercise their Miranda rights at the start of an interview, DOES NOT MEAN these are permanently waived. A defendant may tell law enforcement at any time once interrogation is underway that they are exercising their right to remain silent and/or want an attorney. 

But once custodial interrogation has commenced, a suspect’s invocation of their rights must be UNEQUIVOCAL and UNAMBIGUOUS for law enforcement to terminate questioning. Bailey v. State, 31 So.3d 809 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). Comments like “I think I may need a lawyer” will not suffice, as this is not considered unequivocal. For more, click here.

Note: The rules are different BEFORE a suspect has waived their rights and agreed to take part in the custodial interrogation. If a suspect has not yet waived their rights, a statement like “I think I may need a lawyer” would require law enforcement to clarify the suspect’s intent before any further questioning occurred. For more, click here.

This seminal legal principle was illustrated by a major case heard by Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal (Tallahassee and North FL’s highest court). In that case, a defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and arson. 

The defendant appealed to the 1st DCA, arguing that even though he waived his rights at the start of the interrogation, law enforcement impermissibly kept questioning him when he attempted to exercise his rights. Eventually, he confessed, and his inculpatory statement was used against him at trial.

Because his confession was erroneously used against him (according to the defendant), he urged the 1st DCA to REVERSE his convictions and remand to the lower court for a new trial. 

However, the 1st DCA declined to do so – affirming the defendant’s convictions on the basis that he did not unequivocally and unambiguously invoke his rights. According to the 1st DCA, this was required for reversal since interrogation was already underway.

Let’s take a look at that case – Alvarez v. State, 890 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) – and discuss what it means for defendants concerned about their Miranda rights in Florida.

KEY CASE: Alvarez v. State, 890 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) 

In Alvarez, the defendant (Alvarez) was charged with and convicted of arson and second-degree murder. The following facts were revealed at trial (and during the pretrial hearing on Alvarez’s motion to suppress his post-Miranda statements):

• Alvarez was brought to the police station and subjected to custodial interrogation
• Before questioning commenced, the detective (Detective McHale) read Alvarez his rights aloud and he was asked if he understood
• Alvarez then initialed (e.g. signed) a written Miranda form, indicating he understood his rights, and questioning began
• Though Alvarez did not initially know what the topic of the conversation was (as he had not been arrested yet), he soon realized it was in reference to the victim (Meijas)
• During the custodial interrogation, Alvarez was asked how he met the victim and what led up to her driving him home (which is allegedly when the crimes occurred)
• In response, Alvarez said: “From here on, I’m not supposed to talk about it. Mr. Stanfield told me not to talk about the rest of this.”
• The detective did not know who this was, and Alvarez did not identify Mr. Stanfield as an attorney
• Nevertheless, the detective treated the comment cautiously – asking Alvarez if he wanted to remain silent or or wished to continue talking
• Alvarez immediately clarified that he did want to continue, responding: “No, no, no. I want to tell you what happened.”
• To ensure Alvarez was speaking voluntarily, the detective readministered Miranda (e.g. read Alvarez his rights again) and had him sign another form
• After signing the second form, Alvarez was again asked if he wanted to “talk,” and he responded in the affirmative
• After 2 more hours of interrogation, Alvarez admitted to placing the victim in a suitcase, putting it in a car and setting it on fire, leading to her death

Before trial, Alvarez filed a motion to suppress his post-Miranda statements. He argued that the detective should have stopped questioning him when Alvarez commented about “Mr. Stanfield” wishing for him not to talk. 

However, the trial judge denied the motion to suppress, finding that the detective was extremely cautious and reread Alvarez’s Miranda rights (which was arguably unnecessary after Alvarez said he wanted to tell her what happened). Alvarez’s confession was played for the jury at trial, and he was convicted.

On appeal to the 1st DCA, Alvarez renewed his argument that the detective should have stopped the interrogation (and thus, his confession was “fruit of the poisonous tree”). But the 1st DCA did not agree and AFFIRMED his convictions. Discussing the law that governed the case, the 1st DCA wrote:

“After a suspect knowingly and voluntarily waives Miranda rights, a law-enforcement officer may continue questioning unless and until the suspect clearly, unequivocally requests an attorney. … In other words, the police must immediately cease questioning a suspect who has clearly asserted the right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85, 101 S.Ct. 1880. The test is objective; that is, a suspect must articulate the desire to cut off questioning with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be an assertion of the right to remain silent. See Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir.1994); United States v. Scurlock, 52 F.3d 531, 536–37 (5th Cir.1995). In Florida, law-enforcement officers have no duty to terminate questioning, or to limit themselves only to asking clarifying questions, when a suspect makes an equivocal invocation of a Miranda right. See Owen v. State, 862 So.2d 687, 697 (Fla.2003). Therefore, merely equivocal and ambiguous invocations of the right to remain silent require neither a cessation of the interview nor the resolution of the ambiguity.”

Applying the law to the facts of the case, the 1st DCA held that Alvarez’s alleged invocation of his rights was NOT unambiguous and unequivocal (which would have required the interrogation to end before the confession occurred):

“The instant record demonstrates that Alvarez did not make an unequivocal, unambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent or his right to counsel. See Owen, 862 So.2d at 696–98 (holding that defendant’s responses to police during interview regarding events surrounding capital murder that he would “rather not talk about it,” and “I don’t want to talk about it” were equivocal invocation of right to remain silent, so that police officers had no duty to terminate questioning or limit themselves to asking only clarifying questions). Like the defendant in Owen, Alvarez failed to articulate a desire to cut off questioning with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would have understood Alvarez’s statements to be an assertion of a constitutional right. … Because the record established that Alvarez’s post-Miranda oral and written statements were given freely, knowingly, and voluntarily after waiving the right to remain silent and the right to counsel, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.”

Put simply, since Alvarez did not invoke his rights “with sufficient clarity” such that a reasonable officer would understand he was unambiguously and unequivocally doing so, Alvarez’s eventual confession was NOT subject to suppression. Thus, it was not error to admit it at trial.

In sum, Alvarez v. State, 890 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) marks a significant development in Florida’s corpus of case law surrounding Miranda rights. The 1st DCA found that:

• Alvarez did not clearly invoke his right to remain silent/right to an attorney
• Because interrogation had already begun, Alvarez was required to exercise his Miranda rights “unambiguously and unequivocally”
• Since he failed to do so, it was not error for the trial judge to admit his confession into evidence (e.g. deny his motion to suppress)
• Because Alvarez’s confession was not wrongly used against him at trial, his convictions were AFFIRMED

Florida’s criminal defense community should take note of Alvarez v. State, 890 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), as it shows when Florida’s District Courts of Appeal will (and will not) affirm convictions on the basis that a suspect failed to clearly invoke their Miranda rights once custodial interrogation is underway.

If someone is arrested and formally charged in Florida in a case involving a Miranda waiver that was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary, it is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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