Entrapment in North Florida: What Tallahassee’s 1st DCA Held in Kent v. State

March 5, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense Social Share

Case Summary

Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal reversed a defendant’s drug trafficking conviction because the trial judge reversibly erred by excluding testimony from key defense witnesses that rebutted the defendant’s alleged predisposition to commit the offenses.

• CASE: Kent v. State, 704 So.2d 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
• Charge(s):Possession of Cocaine
• Outcome: Conviction REVERSED, as the trial judge reversibly erred by not allowing defense witnesses to testify in support of Kent’s entrapment defense (e.g. that he was not predisposed to sell the drugs).

Entrapment in Florida

In Florida, entrapment functions as a total defense to criminal charges. As a general principle, entrapment occurs when law enforcement uses impermissible tactics to manufacture a crime that would not have otherwise occurred. For more, click here.

There are two types of entrapment recognized under Florida law – objective and subjective. The difference between objective and subjective entrapment is critical to understand for purposes of devising defense strategy if entrapment appears to have occurred.

Objective entrapment occurs when law enforcement officers act so egregiously in bringing about (e.g. manufacturing) the alleged offense(s), that prosecuting the defendant would violate their due process rights even if they are guilty (and/or were predisposed to commit the offense(s)).  Dippolito v. State, 275 So.3d 653 (Fla 4th DCA 2019))

Florida courts are usually reluctant to rule a defendant was objectively entrapped. However, some examples of cases in which objective entrapment has been found include:

• A police task force sends child pornography through the mail to arrest someone for possessing it (Farley v. State, 848 So.2d 393, 397-98 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003))
• A law enforcement officer or informant enters a sexual relationship with the defendant to get them to act criminally (Madera v. State, 943 So.2d 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006))
• Law enforcement manufactures drugs at the police station to sell to people on the street while undercover, only to arrest people when they try to buy them (State v. Williams, 623 So.2d 462, 466 (Fla. 1993))

Note: Unlike subjective entrapment, objective entrapment is argued only as a matter of law (e.g. in the form of a pretrial motion to dismiss/motion for judgment of acquittal). In other words, it is a decision for the trial judge, NOT the jury. For more, click here.

It is also critical to note that just because law enforcement conducts a sting operation, this does not mean a defendant was objectively entrapped. Florida gives law enforcement broad discretion to engage in undercover activities for the purpose of “apprehending criminals” – as long as the tactics they employ do not “cross the line” (e.g. become entrapment). For more, click here.

The second form of entrapment in Florida, which is typically considered the “easier” to prove, is subjective entrapment. Codified under Fla. Stat. 777.201 and Munoz v. State, 629 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1993), subjective entrapment occurs if law enforcement impermissibly induces a nonpredisposed defendant to commit one or more crimes.

Subjective entrapment, unlike objective entrapment, can be argued to the trial judge in a pretrial motion to dismiss/motion for a judgment of acquittal AND to the jury (e.g. at trial). This gives a defendant multiple “layers” of insulation from conviction – unlike objective entrapment, which is purely a matter of law (e.g. if the trial judge denies the motion, it can’t be argued to the jury).

For a subjective entrapment defense to succeed, a defendant must first prove by a preponderance (majority) of the evidence that their actions were the product of law enforcement inducement. Gennette v. State, 124 So.3d 273 (Fla 1st DCA 2013) 

Critically, this does NOT simply mean the police were “involved” in making the alleged crime(s) happen. The police must have relied upon impermissible tactics, “such as persuasion, fraudulent representations, threats, coercive tactics, harassment, promises of reward, or pleas based on need, sympathy or friendship.” State v. Henderson, 955 So.2d 1193, 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)

If the defendant proves that one or more of these tactics were impermissibly employed (resulting in their unlawful conduct), the burden shifts to the State to prove the defendant was predisposed to commit the underlying offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. 

This means the defendant must have been “ready and willing, without persuasion” to engage in the charged conduct BEFORE the police ever intervened. Law enforcement may use evidence such as a defendant’s criminal history – or, in certain cases, a defendant’s “ready acquiescence” to commit the charged crimes. State v. Lopez-Garcia, 356 So. 3d 857 (Fla. 2d. DCA 2022)

If the defendant shows inducement occurred (by a preponderance of the evidence) and the State cannot establish predisposition, the defendant is entitled to the dismissal of the charge(s) as a matter of law if no reasonable jury could conclude subjective entrapment did not occur. Munoz v. State, 629 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1993)

Note: To learn more about inducement for entrapment purposes, click here. To learn more about predisposition, click here.

If a trial judge denies a pretrial motion to dismiss (Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(c)(4)) motion to dismiss on subjective entrapment grounds, a defendant may still argue subjective entrapment occurred at trial. There, the same legal standards apply – inducement must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, and if it is, the State must show predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt.

When inducement is clear, the key issue becomes predisposition. Thus, the defendant is likely to try to introduce any and all evidence at their disposal to show LACK of predisposition to commit the charged offense(s). If reasonable doubt is created as to predisposition after inducement has been shown, a jury verdict of “not guilty” due to entrapment is warranted.

In one major entrapment case decided by Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal (Tallahassee and North FL’s highest court), predisposition became a key issue at trial. Both parties to the case (e.g. State and defense) attempted to introduce evidence to SUPPORT or OPPOSE the argument that the defendant was predisposed – specifically:

• The State attempted to introduce evidence of a subsequent cocaine sale by the defendant to prove he was predisposed to sell cocaine (to support a finding of predisposition)
• The defense attempted to call three witnesses to testify to the fact that the defendant repeatedly resisted the idea of selling cocaine when he was first approached by the officer (to oppose a finding of predisposition)

The trial judge ultimately decided to ADMIT the evidence of the subsequent cocaine sale – but did NOT admit the testimony from the three witnesses alleging the defendant was reluctant to sell the cocaine. 

The jury convicted the defendant, and he appealed to the 1st DCA – arguing that the trial judge reversibly erred by excluding the witness testimony that would have raised reasonable doubt as to predisposition. The 1st DCA agreed and reversed his conviction, remanding the matter for a new trial.

Let’s take a look at that case – Kent v. State, 704 So.2d 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) – and discuss what it means for defendants arguing subjective entrapment in Florida.

KEY CASE: Kent v. State, 704 So.2d 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)

In Kent, the defendant (Kent) was charged with and convicted of possessing cocaine after selling it to undercover officers. According to the 1st DCA, the following facts emerged at trial:

• Two officers bought cocaine from Kent, leading to his arrest
• Kent testified in his defense, asserting he was entrapped – as the officers had attempted to get him to buy cocaine for them on 12 PREVIOUS OCCASIONS leading up to the sales and he refused each time (e.g. Kent argued he was induced/not predisposed)
• To rebut Kent’s claim, an officer testified (over defense objection) that Kent engaged in a subsequent cocaine sale before he was arrested 
• This was used by the State to argue that Kent was indeed predisposed to buy/sell cocaine
• The defense attempted to call witnesses to testify that they heard Kent resist the officer’s attempts to induce him to buy cocaine, but the trial judge EXCLUDED this testimony (e.g. the jury never heard it)
• Kent was ultimately convicted

Kent appealed, arguing that the State erred by admitting evidence of his subsequent crime (e.g. the sale) to support a finding that he was “predisposed.” Kent contended that logically, there was no way this could prove predisposition – as it occurred AFTER the police induced him (and after he allegedly sold the drugs to law enforcement).

Kent also argued that the judge reversibly erred by keeping the three witnesses from testifying as to his lack of predisposition. Kent claimed this was directly relevant to his entrapment defense – and this error required that he receive a new trial.

The 1st DCA disagreed with Kent’s first argument, but agreed with the second – and reversed his conviction (remanding the matter for a new trial). The 1st DCA first addressed Kent’s claim that the subsequent cocaine sale was irrelevant to establish his predisposition to commit the charged crime, writing:

“We find no error in the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of the December 12 cocaine sales to show the defendant’s predisposition to sell the drug on December 7. The defendant argues that any act occurring after a charged offense cannot, by definition, prove predisposition to commit the prior charged offense. In our view, this argument places too high a premium on the time of the collateral offense. A subsequent offense could reveal a criminal intent formed earlier. Depending on the circumstances, a subsequent offense might also complete a pattern of criminal activity that refutes a claim of police inducement. In the present case, the state’s proof that the defendant sold drugs to a private individual shortly after selling drugs to the police tends to refute the defendant’s claim that he had sold the drugs to the police only because of their inducement.”

“Evidence of subsequent offenses is arguably less probative than evidence of prior acts, but the ultimate issue in either case is whether the evidence is relevant to prove the defendant’s intent. As the court said in Moschiano, evidence of subsequent acts “does have a tendency to make it more probable that the defendant was predisposed to commit the offense charged.” In addition, the court stressed that the admissibility of subsequent acts depends heavily on its probative value and prejudicial effect, which the trial court must balance.”

However, the 1st DCA embraced Kent’s second argument – finding that the trial judge erred by excluding the testimony of “pro-defense” witnesses that would have supported Kent’s claim that he resisted initial attempts by officers to get him to purchase drugs. Finding the testimony WAS NOT inadmissible hearsay (for more on hearsay, click here). The 1st DCA wrote:

“We conclude, however, that the trial court erred in excluding as hearsay the testimony of the three defense witnesses who had overheard previous conversations between the defendant and the undercover officers. An out-of-court statement is hearsay only if it is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. … In this case, the statements by the undercover detectives were not offered for their truth, but rather to illustrate the alleged inducement resulting from the fact that the statements were made. The issue is not whether it was true that the detectives wanted to purchase cocaine. On the contrary, the statements have independent evidentiary value in that they reveal the detectives’ entreaties of the defendant. Likewise, statements by the defendant in these out-of-court conversations tend to show his lack of predisposition to commit the crime charged. 

“The defendant’s repeated rejection of the detectives’ offer is evidence that logically supports his claim that he was not inclined to sell drugs before the alleged inducement. For this reason, the statements were relevant non-hearsay and should have been admitted. Exclusion of this evidence could not have been harmless error, since the testimony was “crucial to the appellant’s defense of entrapment.” … In summary, we affirm the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of the subsequent crime evidence but hold that the statements of the three witnesses regarding the conversations between the defendant and undercover officers were not hearsay, and that the exclusion of this testimony was error requiring reversal and a new trial.”

Put simply, since the witness testimony was offered for the purpose of proving inducement (e.g. that the statements were made) – not for proving the “truth of the matter asserted” – the trial judge erred by not allowing the trio of defense witnesses to testify. Since this was not harmless error (e.g. may have impacted the verdict), Kent received a new trial.

In sum, Kent v. State, 704 So.2d 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) marks a significant development in Florida’s corpus of case law on the issues of subjective entrapment – and in particular, the issue of what evidence is admissible to rebut allegations of predisposition. The 1st DCA found that:

• Subsequent crime evidence (e.g. the cocaine sale after Kent sold the cocaine to officers) was relevant to prove predisposition
• Defense witness testimony that would have rebutted allegations of predisposition was erroneously EXCLUDED by the trial judge on hearsay grounds
• The statements were being offered for the purpose of proving they occurred, not the truth of the matter asserted (e.g. verbal act doctrine)
• Because this may have impacted the outcome of the proceedings (and likely did), Kent’s conviction was reversed and the matter was remanded for a new trial

Florida’s criminal defense community should take note of Kent v. State, 704 So.2d 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), as it makes clear that trial judges in Tallahassee and North Florida REVERSIBLY ERR if they exclude defense witness testimony that is RELEVANT to rebut predisposition when subjective entrapment is argued.

If someone is arrested and formally charged in Florida in a case and has a potential entrapment defense, it is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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