FL Supreme Court Discusses When Severance of Charges is Necessary in Major Case

January 14, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense Social Share

Florida’s Supreme Court discussed when severance of charges and co-defendants is necessary to avoid unnecessary prejudice against a defendant that violates their due process rights.

In Florida and throughout the U.S., defendants at criminal trials are guaranteed the rights to due process and a fair trial. These liberties are guaranteed by both the Florida and U.S. Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Fla. Const. art. I, § 9. 

Sometimes, a necessary part of protecting a defendant’s due process rights is moving to sever charges or co-defendants.

Severance may occur when either of the following are true:

• Defendants that were initially going to be tried together (e.g. for an underlying crime that they are accused of perpetrating) are “separated,” resulting in the defendants being tried individually
• The defendant was charged with multiple criminal offenses, and to ensure that the nature of one charge does not lead to an “automatic” finding of guilt on the other charges (e.g. reduction of burden of proof due to jury bias), separate trials are ordered for each of the charges 

Severance in Florida is governed by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.152. This rule creates a set of guidelines for when severance of charges or co-defendants is required, and when it is not.

A defendant is not automatically entitled to severance (for charges or co-defendants) because they asked for it. Severance must be necessary to ensure that the defendant receives a “fair determination of guilt or innocence,” in the event that the current charging situation would potentially jeopardize this. 

The first type of severance is severance of co-defendants. Severance of co-defendants is likely to occur (e.g. the defendants will be tried individually rather than together) if either of the following are true:

• The evidence sought to be admitted at trial applies only to one co-defendant, but may improperly influence the jury as to the charge against the other defendant(s) (Miller v. State, 756 So.2d 1072, 1072 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000))
• The jury is likely to be confused or improperly influenced by evidence which applies to only one of several (two or more) defendants (McCray v. State, 416 So.2d 804, 806 (Fla. 1982))

Note: Under Florida law, the trial court (e.g. the judge) is given authority to sever (or not sever) charges or co-defendants. The judge has broad discretion on the issue of severance – but this is not unlimited, as a clearly erroneous refusal to sever may lead to the reversal of a defendant’s conviction(s) on appeal. For more on this, click here.

For severance of charges (under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.152(a)(2)(a)), severance is warranted if the following are true:

• The consolidation of the charges (e.g. trying them in the same proceeding) seriously risks that evidence relating to each of the crimes will have the effect of “bolstering proof” of the other(s) (Crossley v. State, 596 So.2d 447, 450 (Fla. 1992))
• The prejudice to the defendant from a joint trial outweighs “judicial economy” (e.g. the efficiency of trying the counts together) (State v. Williams, 453 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1984))

Important: Two or more related offenses may be joined if they are based on the same act or transaction, or two or more connected acts or transactions. However, this does not mean they must be – and if unnecessary prejudice will result from joinder, severance is warranted. Vinas v. State, 299 So.3d 456, 458 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2020)

It is difficult to navigate this labyrinth of esoteric regulations surrounding severance without examining real-life cases in which a defendant’s convictions were reversed based on the trial judge’s failure to sever. 

One key case on this issue is Crossley v. State, 596 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1992), in which the Florida Supreme Court reversed a defendant’s convictions based on the prejudice that resulted from the trial judge’s failure to sever the charges in his case. Let’s examine Crossley and what it means for defendants in Florida seeking severance of charges or co-defendants.

KEY CASE: Crossley v. State, 596 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1992)

In Crossley, the defendant (Crossley) was charged with two robberies that took place on the same day, just a few hours apart. He was convicted on both counts at a joint trial (e.g. the charges were not severed).

Crossley moved at trial to sever the two robbery charges, arguing that trying the charges together would reduce the burden of proof through the backdoor. Crossley reasoned:

• If the jury finds enough evidence at trial (proof beyond a reasonable doubt) that Crossley committed one of the robberies, he would almost certainly be found guilty of the other one automatically
• Even if the jury was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Crossley was guilty of either robbery, the “combined proof” between the two may result in them rendering guilty verdicts on both counts (e.g. they would ‘bolster’ each other)

However, the trial judge denied Crossley’s motion to sever, finding this did not violate his due process rights or right to a fair trial. The trial judge cited the State’s discretion to try the cases together – and found that because of the similarity of the offenses, joinder was proper.

Appealing his convictions to Florida’s 1st DCA (Tallahassee and North Florida’s highest court), Crossley argued that the trial judge violated his due process rights (e.g. “abused his discretion”) by failing to sever the charges. However, the 1st DCA affirmed the denial of severance (and by extension, Crossley’s convictions), writing:

“We find that the offenses here are sufficiently close temporarily, geographically, and factually. The crimes were separated by a period of only 2 hours and 45 minutes, and occurred only two or three miles apart. Both involved armed robbery commencing on the property of a commercial establishment. In both, the robber approached female victims and pulled a gun on them. In both, the victims identified the robber as a black man wearing a cap, dark sunglasses, a blue shirt or jacket, and gray shorts. Based on the temporal, geographic, and factual closeness of the offenses, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for severance.”

Crossley then appealed to the Florida Supreme Court. Crossley argued that there was insufficient evidence connecting the robberies – so they were not part of the same “criminal episode” (e.g. they were two separate “courses of conduct”). Given this, Crossley claimed his motion to sever should have been granted, as the robberies were “independent” from one another.

The Florida Supreme Court agreed, reversing Crossley’s convictions on the grounds that the trial judge failed to sever the charges. The Supreme Court found that the “similarities” identified by the First District Court of Appeal between the robberies could not serve as the basis to charge them together:

“The justifications for the consolidation of charges are convenience and the preservation of the courts’ valuable resources. However, practicality and efficiency cannot outweigh the defendant’s right to a fair trial. State v. Vazquez, 419 So.2d 1088 (Fla. 1982). The danger in improper consolidation lies in the fact that evidence relating to each of the crimes may have the effect of bolstering the proof of the other. While the testimony in one case standing alone may be insufficient to convince a jury of the defendant’s guilt, evidence that the defendant may also have committed another crime can have the effect of tipping the scales. Therefore, the court must be careful that there is a meaningful relationship between the charges of two separate crimes before permitting them to be tried together.”

“In the instant case, both robberies were committed within a few hours of each other and only a few miles apart. However, the two episodes were entirely independent. Unlike Livingston, here there was absolutely nothing to connect one crime with the other. Though Crossley was arrested after the Jones robbery while driving White’s car, there is no evidence that Crossley used White’s car to perpetrate the Jones robbery. The money in Crossley’s possession when he was arrested was not identified as having come from either robbery. Thus, we hold that the court erred in refusing to sever the trial of the Jones robbery from that of the White robbery and kidnapping.”

In essence, the Court found that the only true “link” between the two robberies was that Crossley was the one accused of committing them. Because this had been frowned upon by Florida courts for years (e.g. Livingston v. State, 565 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 1988)), Crossley’s charges should have been severed.

In sum, Crossley v. State, 596 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1992) is a significant development in Florida’s corpus of case law surrounding the issue of severing charges and co-defendants. The Florida Supreme Court held:

• The alleged robberies were two “independent” episodes of criminal activity, not part of a continuous unlawful scheme hatched by Crossley
• The charges were joined only because Crossley was the accused in both cases and it was more “efficient” to consolidate the charges into a single trial
• There was no “meaningful relationship” between the two robberies
• The joint trial prejudiced Crossley unnecessarily (e.g. made it more likely he would be found guilty), requiring the reversal of his convictions and separate trials on remand

Florida’s criminal defense community should take note of Crossley v. State, 596 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1992), as it is a landmark case on the issue of severance in the state. Just because a defendant is accused of multiple crimes that were committed around the same time, does not mean that the charges are to be automatically joined. 

In fact, severance is required if the relationship between the offenses is not “meaningful” and they are only truly connected by the fact that the defendant is accused in both cases.

If someone is arrested and formally charged in Florida and concerned about severance of charges or co-defendants, it is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting drug charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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