Florida’s 3rd DCA REVERSES Murder Conviction – Addresses Miranda Rights, Jury Discrimination

April 23, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense, Violent Crimes Social Share

Florida’s 3rd District Court of Appeal found an initial violation of a murder defendant’s Miranda rights was “cured” by officers eventually reading him these – but it nevertheless REVERSED his convictions based on potential racial discrimination during jury selection.

CASE: Pickett v. State, 922 So.2d 987 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)

Charge(s): First-Degree Murder, Aggravated Child Abuse

Outcome: Convictions REVERSED, as racial discrimination may have occurred in jury selection before Pickett’s trial.

Miranda Rights in Florida

In Florida and throughout the U.S., someone must be advised of their Miranda rights before they are subject to CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION by law enforcement. These rights, per the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) decision, include:

• The right to remain silent
• The fact that anything they say can and will be used against them in court
• The right to an attorney, including to have one present during police questioning
• The fact that if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for them

If someone is read their Miranda rights, the SMART next move is to EXERCISE them! Tell law enforcement you will be remaining silent and are requesting an attorney. If you do not do so and simply sit there quietly, law enforcement has legal permission to keep questioning you until you “break” (and speak). Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010)

It is frequently believed that someone must be read their Miranda rights at the moment they are taken into custody by officers. But this is not the case, even if movies and television shows make it seem that way. A Miranda reading is only required before a suspect is subject to CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION.

But what do “custody” and “interrogation” mean in this context? The first of these two terms, custody, occurs when the following conditions are satisfied:

• The suspect must have their freedom of movement constrained in a manner consistent with a formal arrest (this includes a formal arrest)
• A reasonable person in the suspect’s position would not feel free to leave (J.G. v. State, 883 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004))

Someone DOES NOT have to be formally arrested to be considered in custody for purposes of Miranda. If the above two things are true of the suspect’s situation, they are in custody. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

Interrogation is defined as questioning or its “functional equivalent” that is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from a suspect. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). This may include:

• Accusing a suspect of something nefarious
• Confronting a suspect with evidence
• Telling a suspect that multiple witnesses put them at the crime scene

Note: To learn more about custody for Miranda purposes, click here. For more on interrogation, click here.

In the event that someone waives their Miranda rights, this must be knowing, intelligent, AND voluntary. Pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), this means both of the following must have been true at the time of the defendant’s waiver:

• The defendant understood the nature of their rights (e.g. what they were)
• The defendant understood the potential consequences of giving them up (e.g. that their statements could/would be used against them in court)

Examples of situations where law enforcement acts in a manner that renders a Miranda waiver (and subsequent confession) involuntary include:

• Law enforcement does not read someone their full Miranda rights (e.g. omits one or more rights when notifying a suspect of them, such as not disclosing the right to an attorney)
• Law enforcement fails to read someone their rights at all before custodially interrogating them (Evans v. State, 911 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005))
• Law enforcement reads someone their rights in a language that is not their own (e.g. reads a clear Spanish-speaker their rights in English)
• Law enforcement uses threats, coercion, or trickery to get someone to waive their rights – even once they have chosen to exercise them
• Law enforcement minimizes Miranda (e.g. “This is all just a formality…”)

In the event that someone believes they did not waive their Miranda rights knowing, intelligently, and voluntarily, an experienced and aggressive Florida criminal defense attorney can prepare and file a MOTION TO SUPPRESS on their behalf. 

If this is granted, any statements (including confessions) made by a defendant are inadmissible at trial. Moreover, if a Florida appellate court finds a trial judge improperly DENIED a defendant’s motion to suppress, their conviction(s) may be reversed unless the introduction of the defendant’s post-Miranda statements at trial (to the jury) did not impact the verdict. For more, click here.

Jury Selection in Florida

In Florida, jury selection (also known as voir dire) is a critical aspect of any criminal proceeding. Jury selection is an opportunity for the State and defense to question potential jurors to determine if they will be able to decide the case fairly/impartially (based ONLY on the evidence/testimony) – or if their preexisting bias(es) are likely to impact how they view the case.

In the event that a potential juror appears to be (clearly) biased and unable to be “rehabilitated,” a party may move for a CAUSE CHALLENGE of that potential juror. A cause challenge occurs if and when the “moving party” tells the trial judge that there is a legal basis to excuse a potential juror from service (e.g. due to likely bias) and urges the trial judge to act accordingly.

Examples of cases in which an experienced and aggressive Florida criminal defense attorney is likely to initiate a cause challenge of a potential juror:

• A potential juror says they will “absolutely” hold a defendant’s silence against him if he decides not to testify
• A potential juror says they will value the testimony of law enforcement officers over all other witnesses
• A potential juror says they know the victim in the case and feel a tremendous sympathy for them

Once a cause challenge occurs, the opposing party can either STIPULATE to the challenge (e.g. allow it) or indicate why they OPPOSE it on the record (by objecting). When the parties are at a “crossroads,” the trial judge has the ultimate say on whether to:

• Grant the cause challenge over the objection, sending the potential juror home
• Deny the cause challenge, allowing the potential juror to remain in the venire (for now)

If a cause challenge is denied, this DOES NOT mean that a potential juror will automatically be seated on the eventual jury. This is because there is a second type of “challenge” – a peremptory challenge. 

Peremptory challenges (frequently referred to as “peremptory strikes” ) occur when a party to the case UNILATERALLY (e.g. without getting the opposing party/the trial judge’s input) excuses a potential juror from service. Often, this is as simple as saying: “We are exercising a peremptory on Juror #12.”

Unlike cause challenges, peremptory strikes are LIMITED. The typical number of peremptory strikes awarded at the start of a criminal proceeding is:

• THREE to each party (State and defense) in misdemeanor cases
• SIX to each party in non-capital/non-life felony cases (e.g. first-degree felonies or below)
• TEN to each party in capital/life felony cases

But under certain circumstances, a peremptory challenge is, itself, “challenged.” If a party to the case (usually the defense) suspects that a peremptory challenge is being used to strike a potential juror (or multiple potential jurors) on the basis of RACE, GENDER, OR ETHNICITY, they are likely to initiate a Neil challenge.

This is because the U.S. Supreme Court has said a potential juror cannot be peremptorily stricken based on race, gender, or ethnicity. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). A Neil inquiry involves the following three-step process:

• #1: The objecting party (e.g. the defense) announces they are performing a Neil challenge of the peremptory strike.
• #2: The State provides the trial judge a race-, sex-, or ethnicity-neutral reason (depending on the basis of the objection) for the peremptory strike
• #3: The trial judge either “buys” the State’s explanation (e.g. finds it is good-faith) and allows the strike – or finds the explanation is pretextual (e.g. B.S.) and denies the strike

Note: A Neil inquiry is sometimes referred to as a Melbourne inquiry, as the same “three-step” process was also outlined in Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1996).

Step #3 of the Neil/Melbourne inquiry is critical in many cases. If the trial judge does either of the following, the defendant’s conviction(s) may be REVERSED on appeal due to potential racial/sex/ethnic discrimination in jury selection:

• Fails to make any on-the-record finding as to the “genuineness” of the State’s reasons for the strike (e.g. simply says “that’s a race-neutral reason, I’ll allow it”)
• Finds the State’s reason to be genuine when it is CLEARLY pretextual (e.g. obviously a cover for racial/gender/ethnic discrimination)

In one major Florida case involving an alleged first-degree murder and aggravated child abuse charges, a defendant was convicted on both counts. He challenged his convictions to Florida’s 3rd District Court of Appeal (Miami’s highest court) on two grounds:

• #1 – His Miranda rights were violated because officers FAILED to read his rights when they took him into custody and subjected him to interrogation – thus, the judge erred by denying his motion to suppress
• #2 – The State FAILED to offer a race-neutral reason for striking a potential juror during jury selection because the judge said this was NOT required (e.g. allowed the peremptory strike without a Neil inquiry)

After evaluating the defendant’s claims, the 3rd DCA REVERSED the defendant’s convictions and remanded the matter for a new trial. But why? 

Let’s take a look at the case – Pickett v. State, 922 So.2d 987 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) – and discuss what it means for those in Florida concerned about Miranda rights and jury selection.

KEY CASE: Pickett v. State, 922 So.2d 987 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)

In Pickett, the defendant (Pickett) was charged with and convicted of first-degree murder AND aggravated child abuse. Before trial and during jury selection, the following occurred:

• Pickett brought his severely injured two-year-old daughter to the hospital, and medical staff began to suspect child abuse due to inconsistent explanations from Pickett about the source of her injuries
• A police officer questioned Pickett at the hospital around 6:30 p.m., where he admitted being present when the injuries occurred and gave an initial explanation of events
• Additional officers arrived, noted inconsistencies in the story, then continued questioning him at the hospital
• The officers told him he “had to go with them” to the police station and he was placed in a police vehicle (Pickett still had not been read his Miranda rights)
• At approximately 10:00 p.m., he was interrogated at the police station, during which the officers confronted Pickett with inconsistencies 
• Pickett did not fully confess, but it became clear that he was likely involved
• Officers eventually read Pickett his Miranda rights, and he waived them – then confessed to inflicting the child’s injuries (the child later died)
• During jury selection at Pickett’s trial, the defense objected when the State attempted to peremptorily strike a Hispanic female juror and requested a race-neutral explanation for the strike of the potential juror (Munoz)
• The State said there was “no pattern” of discrimination, and the trial judge overruled the defense’s objection
• The defense objected to the subsequent attempt to strike another Hispanic juror (Lopez)
• Before the State could offer a race-neutral explanation, the trial judge cut off the State and immediately overruled Pickett’s objection, finding no “pattern” of discrimination on the State’s part (as the State previously argued)
• The jury was sworn over Pickett’s objection, and Pickett was convicted

On appeal, Pickett argued officers VIOLATED his Miranda rights by impermissibly delaying the administration of his rights until mid-interrogation at the police station. Pickett also argued that since the trial judge failed to evaluate if the State’s peremptory strikes of Hispanic jurors were discriminatory, he was entitled to a new trial.

The 3rd DCA AGREED with Pickett partially on the Miranda issue, and ENTIRELY on the jury selection issue – reversing Pickett’s convictions and remanding the matter for a new trial. First addressing Pickett’s Miranda argument, the 3rd DCA wrote:

“Pickett claims that the trial court erred in failing to suppress his statements and confession. He moved to suppress his statements and his confession on grounds that they were obtained as a result of custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings; arrest without probable cause and involuntary waiver of rights. The trial court denied his motion after a two-day suppression hearing. On appeal, the defendant contends that his custodial interrogation amounted to an involuntary arrest which was illegally effectuated. He argues that his statements and confession were obtained without probable cause and should have been suppressed. We disagree in part.”

“Here, Pickett admitted that his daughter was in his custody when the injuries occurred; his account of the accident was inconsistent with the level of injuries she sustained; the hospital staff indicated a possibility of child abuse; and Officer Gomez viewed the defendant’s stories as “conflicting.” Under the totality of these facts, we find that probable cause for an arrest existed at the time that Pickett was taken into custody and placed in the police vehicle. … Since Pickett did not receive his Miranda warnings until he was already at the police station just prior to his confessing to the crime, any statements that he made while in the police car and at the station before Miranda warnings were administered should have been suppressed. Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957 (Fla.1992) … The trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress his post-Miranda confession was proper and thus his confession was properly admissible.”

Put simply, the 3rd DCA ruled that any statements before Pickett’s full post-Miranda confession required suppression due to officers’ failure to administer a warning at the time he was taken into custody. However, Pickett’s actual confession was properly allowed into evidence, as he validly waived his rights before making it.

On the jury selection issue, the 3rd DCA found that Pickett was entirely correct and REVERSED his convictions. The 3rd DCA wrote:

“The defendant’s second ground on appeal is his claim that the trial court erred in dismissing two prospective jurors without conducting a Neil inquiry. We agree with the defendant’s argument and reverse for a new trial. … The Florida Supreme Court has mandated that an objecting party to a peremptory strike is required to request race-neutral reasons for the strike of any person who is a member of a distinct racial group without any showing that the challenge is being used impermissibly. State v. Holiday, 682 So.2d 1092 (Fla. 1996). Such was requested by the defense and the court failed to conduct the required Neil inquiry. This Court has held that failure to conduct a Neil inquiry, as required by Melbourne and State v. Johans, 613 So.2d 1319 (Fla. 1993), constitutes reversible error. Alsopp v. State, 855 So.2d 695 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)… There is no specification for the showing of a pattern of discrimination as a condition precedent to an explanation for a peremptory strike of a potential juror who is a member of a distinct racial or ethnic group. Bowden v. State, 588 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1991); Vasquez v. State, 711 So.2d 1305 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); see Wicks v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 908 So.2d 1190 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). We therefore reverse for a new trial.”

Put simply, the judge impermissibly stopped Neil inquiries from occurring before allowing the peremptory strikes. As a result of the fact that racial discrimination may have occurred in jury selection, Pickett was entitled to a NEW TRIAL.

In sum, Pickett v. State, 922 So.2d 987 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) marks a significant development in Florida’s corpus of case law surrounding Miranda rights and jury selection. Florida’s 3rd DCA (Miami’s highest court) held that:

• Pickett’s Miranda rights WERE violated by the fact that officers failed to read him his rights earlier in the evening
• This required suppression of all his pre-Miranda statements 
• However, the trial judge properly allowed Pickett’s POST-MIRANDA CONFESSION into evidence, as he validly waived his Miranda rights 
• Though Pickett’s convictions would have been affirmed on those grounds, a new trial was required because of potential racial discrimination in jury selection
• The State was required to give a race-neutral reason for peremptorily striking 2 Hispanic potential jurors after the defense challenged these
• However, the trial judge cut off a Neil inquiry before it even began
• This required REVERSAL of Pickett’s convictions as a matter of law

Florida’s criminal defense community should take note of Pickett v. State, 922 So.2d 987 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), as it makes clear that appellate courts must REVERSE major convictions under certain circumstances on procedural grounds (e.g. jury selection discrimination/Miranda rights violations), even if the evidence against a defendant is strong.

If someone is arrested and formally charged in Florida and concerned about Miranda rights, it is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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