How Do Florida Courts Assess Williams Rule Evidence in Child Molestation Cases?

April 16, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense, Sex Crimes Social Share

Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal reversed a defendant’s lewd or lascivious molestation convictions, finding the judge erred by improperly admitting evidence of a sex crime allegedly perpetrated against another victim by the defendant 17 years earlier.

CASE: Woodard v. State, 978 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)

Charge(s): Lewd or Lascivious Molestation

Outcome: Conviction REVERSED, as the trial judge improperly admitted evidence of a prior “sexual assault” allegedly perpetrated against another victim 17 years earlier.

Lewd or Lascivious Molestation in Florida

In Florida, lewd or lascivious molestation is a second-degree felony – typically punishable by up to 15 years in prison and a $10,000 fine (Fla. Stat. 800.04(5)). For someone to be guilty, the State must prove all of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

• A defendant intentionally touched the breasts, genitals, genital area, buttocks or clothing covering them of the victim without the victim’s consent, or forced or enticed the victim to so touch them in this manner 
• The victim was under 16 years old
• The touching was lewd or lascivious 

Important: “Lewd” and “lascivious” are defined interchangeably under state law – both involve “a wicked, lustful, unchaste, licentious, or sensual intent on the part of the person doing an act.” (Fla. Stat. 800.04(8)).

Lewd or lascivious molestation is usually a second-degree felony punishable by up to 15 years in prison and a $10,000 fine. This is the case if the defendant is 18 or older and the victim is age 12 to 15. However, penalties vary when the ages of the victim and defendant change:

• Victim under 12, defendant 18 or older: A life felony punishable by up to life in prison (mandatory minimum of 25 years) and lifelong sex offender probation
• Victim under 12, defendant under 18: A second-degree felony punishable by up to 15 years in prison and a $10,000 fine
• Victim between 12 and 15, defendant under 18: A third-degree felony punishable by up to 5 years in prison and a $5,000 fine

Lewd or lascivious molestation almost always requires someone to register as a sex offender – likely for the rest of their life. However, per Florida’s Romeo and Juliet law, someone may be eligible to avoid the registry if all of the following were true of the alleged lewd molestation:

• The alleged victim was between the age of 14 and 17 years old at the time of the offense
• The defendant was not over four years older than the victim (1,460 days)
• The alleged victim consented to the sexual activity (not legally, but willingly chose to engage in the activity without the application of force or coercion)
• The defendant has no prior convictions for any sex crimes

Note: Even if a defendant qualifies to petition to avoid the registry under the Romeo and Juliet law (Fla. Stat. 943.04354), the judge has total discretion to deny such a petition even if someone qualifies for coverage under the statute. For more, click here.

If someone entices a minor victim to touch them in a way that qualifies the touching as lewd or lascivious molestation under Fla. Stat. 800.04(5), actual physical contact must occur. Solicitation of the contact is insufficient as a matter of law to qualify as lewd or lascivious molestation. For more, click here. Sylvaince v. State, — So.3d —- (Fla. 6th DCA 2025)

If someone is accused of lewd or lascivious molestation, this is considered “child molestation” under Florida law for purposes of allowing Williams Rule evidence to be admitted at their trial. Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959)

Under the “Williams Rule” (Fla. Stat. 90.404), proof of SIMILAR but UNCHARGED criminal conduct allegedly perpetrated by a defendant against that victim OR another victim is admissible when the evidence/testimony is relevant to prove a MATERIAL FACT in issue. Donton v. State, 1 So.3d 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)

Per Fla. Stat. 90.404, Williams Rule evidence may be offered for proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Such evidence is inadmissible, however, if it is relevant solely to proving “bad character or propensity.”

For decades, Florida courts recognized that for Williams Rule evidence (also known as collateral crime evidence) to be admissible at trial, the “uncharged conduct” had to be “strikingly similar” in nature to the charges a defendant faces (e.g. almost identical). Tollefson v. State, 525 So.2d 957, 960 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)

However, this rule has been broadened by the Florida Legislature in child molestation cases. Per Fla. Stat. 90.404(2), ANY evidence of a defendant’s prior acts of child molestation (even if uncharged) – which may be “considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.” 

This allows the State broad leeway to introduce evidence/testimony of a defendant’s prior sexual abuse of children – even if the victims, context, and circumstances surrounding the alleged abuse were different. McLean v. State, 934 So.2d 1248 (Fla. 2006)

Since Fla. Stat. 90.404(2) was codified, many defendants in child molestation cases have sought the exclusion of evidence the State intends to introduce under the broadened Williams Rule for this class of offenses. Defendants frequently argue that:

• The Williams Rule evidence is insufficiently similar to the charged conduct to prove the offenses they are charged with beyond a reasonable doubt, making the true reason for its admission bad character/propensity, and/or;
• There is insufficient proof that the prior uncharged offense occurred for the evidence or testimony relating to it to be admitted – even if the uncharged crime is sufficiently similar to the charged one (such that it would qualify for admission the allegation was credible)

In one major Florida lewd or lascivious molestation case, a defendant was accused of molesting two girls, who were cousins. The testimony of both cousins was heard by the jury at trial.

Attempting to support the testimony of the alleged victims in the case (e.g. make her seem more credible), the State moved to introduce testimony of a now-31-year-old woman who claimed to have been “sexually assaulted” by the defendant 17 years earlier. She gave no additional details.

The defendant moved to exclude the testimony of the 31-year-old woman, arguing that the lack of specificity of the allegation and general questions about its credibility required the court not to allow the woman to testify. The State countered that because of Fla. Stat. 90.404(2)’s breadth, the court should allow her to take the stand (e.g. let the jury hear her speak).

The trial judge sided with the State, admitting the 31-year-old’s testimony at trial. The defendant was ultimately convicted of lewd or lascivious molestation of the still-juvenile victims.

On appeal to the Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal (Tallahassee and North Florida’s highest court), the defendant argued the trial judge read the Williams Rule TOO BROADLY, requiring REVERSAL of his conviction due to improper use of irrelevant testimony that was designed to prove only bad character/propensity.

The 1st DCA AGREED and reversed his conviction, remanding the matter to the lower court for new proceedings and directing the court to not admit the 31-year-old’s testimony at the next trial.

Let’s take a look at that case – Woodard v. State, 978 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) – to see how Florida’s courts apply the Williams Rule (Fla. Stat. 90.404(2)) in child molestation cases.

KEY CASE: Woodard v. State, 978 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)

In Woodard, the defendant (Woodard) was charged with lewd or lascivious molestation of a child victim. According to the 1st DCA, the following was revealed at trial:

• Woodard allegedly molested a 12-year-old girl (F.W.) while she was sleeping in the living room of her aunt’s apartment, then molested her cousin that same night
• Woodard was the boyfriend of the second victim’s mother
• The second victim (St. R.) barely remembered the incident and could not provide specific details about it (however, F.W. was allegedly a witness)
• To support the testimony of the victims, the State attempted to introduce (pursuant to Fla. Stat. 90.404(2)) testimony from a much older victim (Sh. R.) – who Woodard allegedly committed a “sexual assault” upon 17 years before the lewd or lascivious molestation charges were brought
• Woodard objected – arguing the “Williams Rule” testimony was not similar enough to the charged offenses, that the alleged “sexual assault” happened nearly two decades ago (and did not have corroborating evidence), and that the victim’s statement was vague
• The trial judge admitted the testimony of Sh. R. (who was 31 at the time of the trial), who said only that she was “the victim of a sexual assault” at the hands of Woodard  – without elaborating 
• Woodard was convicted of both counts of lewd or lascivious molestation

On appeal, Woodard renewed his argument that the trial judge improperly admitted the alleged victim’s testimony. The State attempted to counter this by arguing that because the 31-year-old victim (who was 14 at the time) accused Woodard of an act of child molestation, her testimony was AUTOMATICALLY covered by Fla. Stat. 90.404(2) (making it admissible).

The 1st DCA sided with Woodward, REVERSING his lewd or lascivious molestation basis on the grounds that the 31-year-old’s testimony was improperly admitted into evidence (e.g. heard by the jury) under the Williams Rule. Discussing Fla. Stat. 90.404(2) and McLean v. State, 934 So.2d 1248 (Fla. 2006), the 1st DCA wrote: 

“The evidence proffered under the statute must satisfy the several requirements laid down by the McLean court. Initially, the trial court must determine that the evidence clearly and convincingly shows the defendant committed the prior act. McLean, 934 So.2d at 1262. The court must then “assess [ ] whether the probative value of evidence of previous molestations is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,” and must therefore determine whether the prior act is sufficiently similar to the charged act. Id. To guide this analysis, McLean mandates consideration of the following factors: (1) the similarity of the prior acts to the act charged regarding the location of where the acts occurred, the age and gender of the victims, and the manner in which the acts were committed; (2) the closeness in time of the prior acts to the act charged; (3) the frequency of the prior acts; and (4) the presence or lack of intervening circumstances…. The trial courts should also consider other factors unique to the case.”

Applying the law to the facts of the case, the 1st DCA concluded that the allegation from Sh. R. (the 31-year-old) was too vague and temporally distant from the charged offenses to be admitted pursuant to the Williams Rule (Fla. Stat. 90.404(2)). The 1st DCA wrote:

“The questioned evidence in the present case did not satisfy the requirements of McLean, or of the cases following and applying McLean. Sh. R. presented vague testimony regarding an incident that occurred some seventeen years before the charged crimes. She described the incident only as a “sexual assault.” The record reveals none of the analyses or findings required by McLean. In the absence of such findings, we note that the few details available about the collateral crime do not support a conclusion that the 1988 incident was sufficiently similar to the charged offenses.”

“For better or worse, we know nothing about the 1988 incident, save the witness’s characterization of it as a “sexual assault.” Having concluded that the proffered evidence was improperly admitted, we have also considered the impact of the evidence at the trial. The State had no evidence to corroborate F.W.’s testimony other than the collateral crime evidence elicited from Sh. R. Moreover, the prosecutor referred to the 1988 incident in both the opening statement and closing argument. We are unable to find that admission of this evidence was harmless error. Based upon the foregoing, we REVERSE appellant’s conviction and REMAND for a new trial.”

In essence, the 1st DCA found that not only was the testimony erroneously admitted – it also may have contributed to the jury finding Woodard guilty (e.g. it was not harmless error). As a result, his convictions required reversal – and he received a new trial.

In sum, Woodard v. State, 978 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) marks a significant development in Florida’s corpus of case law surrounding how courts determine the admissibility of collateral crime evidence pursuant to the Williams Rule. The 1st DCA found that:

• The 31-year-old “collateral crime” victim (Sh. R.) simply alleged that she was sexually assaulted by Woodard, and nothing more
• The act allegedly occurred 17 years earlier
• Because she did not elaborate, there was no way to assess how similar (or different) the alleged “sexual assault” was from what Woodard allegedly did to the two victims in the instant case
• Since there was no way to truly assess its relevance, the testimony was inadmissible under the Williams Rule
• As its erroneous admission into evidence may have contributed to the jury’s guilty verdict in Woodard’s case, his convictions were REVERSED

Florida’s criminal defense community should take note of Woodard v. State, 978 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), as it makes clear courts continue to assess the credibility and relevance of child molestation-related evidence before it can be introduced at a defendant’s trial under the Williams Rule (Fla. Stat. 90.404(2)).

If someone is charged in a case involving alleged sexual battery by a family member or person in custodial authority, it is critical to seek out experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This vital decision could make the difference in whether or not a person is subject to hefty fines and prison time. 

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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