“I Want To” Is Not a Crime: Major Florida Court Discusses What Counts As Solicitation
October 30, 2025 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense, Sex Crimes Social Share
A major Florida court ruled that a defendant telling a minor he “wanted to” commit an illegal sex act upon her did not constitute criminal solicitation as a matter of law.
In Florida, sexual solicitation of a minor is a very serious offense. There are two types of unlawful sexual solicitations of minors under Florida law – online solicitation of a minor (Fla. Stat. 847.0135(3)) and lewd or lascivious conduct via solicitation (800.04(6)(a)(2)).
Online solicitation is a third-degree felony (up to 5 years in prison and a $5,000 fine), whereas lewd or lascivious conduct via solicitation is a second-degree felony (up to 15 years in prison and a $10,000 fine). For more information on the similarities and differences between these charges, click here.
If someone or a loved one is accused of sexual solicitation of a minor, they may initially think that they had to request an explicit sex act from the alleged victim in order for a conviction to be handed down. However, this is not true.
Under Florida law, “solicitation” of a minor for unlawful sexual activity is not limited to asking a minor (or someone believed to be a minor under (Fla. Stat. 847.0135(3)) to perform a particular act. Rather, “solicit” means any of the following three things, per Grohs v. State, 944 So.2d 450 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006):
- Command, encourage, hire, or request another person to engage in specific conduct
- To “entice or lure, especially into evil”
- To “proposition (someone), especially as or in the character of a prostitute”
In Grohs, the defendant used euphemisms for sexual acts and avoided expressly requesting the “minor” (who turned out to be an undercover officer) engage in particular behavior. He appealed his online solicitation conviction by arguing that he never solicited the “minor” to engage in any illicit sexual activity.
But the 4th District Court of Appeal ruled against Grohs, finding that “solicitation” does not demand enumeration of a particular act or list of sex acts by the defendant that they intend to engage in. Use of innuendo or euphemisms. under some circumstances, can still qualify as solicitation if the underlying meaning and intent is obvious.
Though Grohs dealt specifically with Florida’s online solicitation of a minor statute (Fla. Stat. 847.0135(3), both this law and lewd or lascivious conduct via solicitation criminalize sexual solicitation of minors. No Florida court has argued that the definition of “solicitation” under one statute differs from the other.
Reading Grohs v. State, 944 So.2d 450 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), it becomes easy to believe that almost anything that could be construed as a sexually solicitous communication is automatically a crime. But this is not true – and it is made clear by a ruling by Florida’s 4th District Court of Appeal handed down nine months earlier: Randall v. State, 919 So.2d 695 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).
Let’s discuss Randall v. State and its implications for defendants in Florida who have been charged with online solicitation of a minor and/or lewd or lascivious conduct via solicitation.
In Randall, the defendant (Randall) was charged with lewd or lascivious conduct via solicitation of a minor (a 14-year-old middle school student) and various other offenses. He was convicted of lewd solicitation and received a seven-year prison sentence.
According to the 4th DCA, Randall and the minor (A.J.) were speaking on a walk when he began to question her about sex. Randall was an adult at the time. At some point during the discussion, Randall said (according to A.J.’s trial testimony) that he “wanted to” lick her “on the vagina.” As a result, he was convicted of lewd or lascivious conduct.
On appeal, Randall argued that he could not be convicted of lewd or lascivious conduct via solicitation – as even if he said he “wanted to” engage in the prohibited sexual activity, this did not constitute a solicitation. The 4th DCA agreed with Randall and reversed his conviction, ordering him to be released from prison – writing:
“Randall argues that his alleged statement to A.J. that he wanted to lick her vagina was not sufficient to support the conviction of solicitation to commit lewd or lascivious conduct. We agree.”
The 4th DCA distinguished Randall’s case from one cited by the State on appeal (Kobel v. State, 745 So.2d 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)), noting:
“[T]he difference between the conduct in Kobel and the conduct in this case is that in Kobel, the defendant asked the minors if they wanted to make some money by engaging in the sexual act, while in this case, Randall did not ask A.J. to engage in a sexual act, but merely told her what he would like to do to her.”
“Because the discussion in Kobel was focused on the difference between procurement and solicitation, there is nothing in the opinion that supports the state’s argument that Randall telling A.J. what he wanted to do to her is the equivalent of ‘requesting’ A.J. to engage in a sexual act, thereby constituting solicitation.”
In essence, the court recognized that Randall had not “asked” (directly or indirectly) for the minor to engage in the prohibited sexual behavior. Because he had only commented that he “wanted” to do so with her, this was insufficient as a matter of law for a solicitation conviction (under (800.04(6)(a)(2))). The 4th DCA concluded:
“We find that Kobel is not controlling and Patel and Stumpf are more persuasive based on the facts of the instant case. A.J.’s testimony that Randall ‘wanted’ to lick her vagina was not an act of solicitation and the state, as a matter of law, failed to elicit sufficient competent evidence to sustain Randall’s conviction as charged in count III.”
Again, it is important to note that Randall dealt only with Florida’s lewd or lascivious conduct via solicitation statute. However, the 4th DCA did draw a line – simply expressing the desire to engage in unlawful sexual activity (e.g. “I want to…”) is not by itself a solicitation.
In sum, Randall v. State, 919 So.2d 695 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) is a significant decision in Florida case law surrounding solicitation of minors. Though the 4th DCA seems to have broadened its definition of solicitation later in 2006 with Grohs v. State, 944 So.2d 450 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), Grohs did not overrule Randall.
Thus, as a matter of law, a defendant expressing a “want” to engage in unlawful sexual activity (even if this is communicated to an alleged minor victim/someone believed to be a minor online) is not alone a crime.
But if additional messages or actions by the defendant indicate solicitous intent (e.g. asking for sex), this can cross into unlawful territory. Florida defense attorneys would be wise to make note of this fact in preparing pretrial motions to dismiss or motions for judgment of acquittal (MJOA).
If someone is charged with solicitation of a minor, it is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This vital decision could make the difference in whether or not a person is subject to a lengthy prison term, hefty fines, and whether they are required to register as a sex offender for the rest of their life.
Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL
Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.
Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting drug charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.
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