Major FL Court Expands Vehicular Homicide Liability in Street Racing Cases

February 9, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense, Violent Crimes Social Share

Florida’s 2nd District Court of Appeal ruled that a man who drove thirty miles an hour over the speed limit, attempted to weave through crowded traffic and drifted into bike lanes, was guilty of vehicular homicide.

In Florida, vehicular homicide (Fla. Stat. 782.071) is a very serious criminal offense. Vehicular homicide is typically considered a second-degree felony, punishable by up to 15 years in prison.

Vehicular homicide becomes a first-degree felony (up to 30 years in prison and a $10,000 fine) if either (or both) of the following are true:

• The defendant failed to give information to authorities, render aid to the victim(s), or left the scene (e.g. failed to stop after the collision)
• The defendant has one or more prior convictions for vehicular homicide, vessel homicide, DUI manslaughter or BUI manslaughter (Trenton’s Law)

Unlike its name implies, vehicular homicide does not require intentionally killing someone using a vehicle as a weapon.

For a person to be guilty of vehicular homicide in Florida, the State must prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

• The defendant operated a vehicle
• The defendant’s operation of the vehicle caused the death(s) of one or more other people
• The defendant’s operation of the vehicle (which caused the death) was reckless

The two typical issues at the center of vehicular homicide convictions are whether the defendant was reckless, and whether they were the cause (e.g. primarily responsible) for the demise of the victim(s). 

For someone to be considered the “cause” of a victim’s death for purposes of vehicular homicide, it is not required that they be 100 percent responsible for a fatal collision. However, a defendant must have been the “but-for” cause (e.g. their actions were primarily responsible for the victim’s death). To learn more, click here.

The most common point of dispute in vehicular homicide prosecutions is the recklessness (or lack thereof) of the defendant. A common defense to vehicular homicide is that the defendant was either a victim of circumstance (e.g. drove properly and something outside of their control caused the victim’s death) – or that the defendant drove carelessly but not recklessly.

For purposes of establishing recklessness in a vehicular homicide (or vessel homicide) case in Florida, the following must have been true of the defendant’s actions:

• The defendant operated their vehicle in a manner they knew or should have known was likely to cause death or great bodily harm
• The defendant did more than simply exceed the speed limit – as this is negligence, not recklessness (Luzardo v. State, 147 So.3d 1083 (Fla. 3d. DCA 2014))

To determine whether someone was truly reckless (as opposed to merely careless or a victim of circumstance), Florida’s courts evaluate the “totality of the circumstances.”

Factors courts have used to determine if someone was driving recklessly include (Hamilton v. State, 439 So.2d 238 (Fla. 2d. DCA 1983)):

• Whether the defendant was speeding (not dispositive, but considered a factor)

• Whether visibility was good or poor at the time of the accident
• Whether the defendant was staying “in their lane” or swerving out of it
• Whether the defendant was traveling in an area with heavy foot traffic (e.g. residential)
• Whether the defendant was familiar with the area in which they were traveling
• Whether there was signage indicating drivers should pay particular attention or slow down (e.g. school zones)
• Whether the cause of the death (e.g. the hazard that caused it) was foreseeable/perceived by others 
• Whether the defendant exercised “any degree of care” to avoid collision

In one major case heard by Florida’s 2nd District Court of Appeal (Greater Tampa area), a man allegedly drove in a manner that witnesses characterized as “extremely reckless” and similar to what someone would expect on the “Indiana Speedway” (e.g. during the Indianapolis 500).

Though the trial judge granted his motion for judgment of acquittal (MJOA) after he was found guilty by a jury of vehicular homicide, the judge was reversed by the 2nd DCA, who reinstated the conviction. Let’s take a look at that case – State v. Desange, 294 So.3d 433 (Fla. 2d. DCA 2020) – and what it means for those charged with vehicular homicide in Florida.

KEY CASE: State v. Desange, 294 So.3d 433 (Fla. 2d. DCA 2020)

In Desange, the defendant (Desange) was arrested and charged with vehicular homicide after a fatal collision.

At trial, it was revealed that Desange was driving his Ford Mustang alongside the vehicle of one of his friends (Christophe), who was driving a BMW. The two cars were “speeding and changing lanes.”

At some point, Desange sideswiped a car in traffic and kept driving. As the two cars approached Lake Avenue (in Tampa), Desange made a sudden right turn from the left lane of 40th Street. He collided with Christophe, who was in the right lane – resulting in Christophe’s BMW flying into a pole and bursting into flames. Christophe succumbed to his injuries.

Various witnesses testified that they saw Desange traveling at a “high rate of speed” at roughly 9:00 in the evening. These included individuals who were in traffic near Desange’s vehicle. A traffic homicide detective testified the “black box” of Desange’s vehicle showed he was traveling at approximately 72 miles per hour five seconds before the crash (speed limit was 40).

The jury found Desange guilty. However, immediately after the trial concluded, Desange moved for a judgment of acquittal (MJOA) on two grounds:

• Desange argued that pursuant to Velazquez v. State, 561 So.2d 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), Christophe was the primary cause of his own death (due to his consensual participation in a street race) – precluding a vehicular homicide in Desange’s case
• Desange also asserted that he was not reckless as a matter of law, citing various appellate decisions to support his claim

The trial judge did not agree with Desange’s argument that he did not cause the collision – but he granted the MJOA on the issue of recklessness. The trial judge found that as a matter of law, the State’s evidence was insufficient to sustain a vehicular homicide conviction. As a result, the jury verdict was set aside.

The State appealed the trial judge’s ruling, asserting that the jury reasonably concluded Desange drove recklessly – and that the judge “abused his discretion” by setting aside the verdict. The 2nd DCA agreed and reversed the trial judge, reinstating the jury’s guilty verdict.

The 2nd DCA found that there was copious support in the evidentiary record to support the jury’s finding that Desange drove recklessly, not just negligently:

“Here, the facts were plainly sufficient to show recklessness as distinguished from ordinary negligence. The State’s evidence established the following: The speed limit on 40th Street was forty miles per hour. The street had many traffic lights. There was testimony that, on the night of the collision, the traffic was heavy on 40th Street. Eyewitnesses testified that Mr. Desange’s car was “flying,” “zooming,” driving “like the Indiana Speedway,” “driving in and out of traffic,” and driving “too recklessly.” A second car driven by a friend of Mr. Desange and headed to the same destination as Mr. Desange was doing the same thing. The two cars were using turn lanes and bicycle lanes to pass traffic. Mr. Desange’s car attempted to squeeze in between two occupied lanes of traffic and hit another car. Mr. Desange did not even stop.”

“Five seconds before the collision, Mr. Desange was traveling at seventy-two miles per hour. At Lake Avenue, Mr. Desange rapidly decelerated and made a sudden right turn from the left lane, directly in front of Mr. Christophe. This evidence showed far more than a mistake or a momentary lapse of judgment. It showed Mr. Desange in a race or other concerted driving with Mr. Christophe that was highly dangerous to life and limb. On this evidence, the jury could reasonably have concluded (1) that Mr. Desange was intentionally driving his car in a way that was likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to others, perhaps as part of a race with Mr. Christophe, and (2) that he consciously disregarded that likelihood.”

Though the 2nd DCA conceded Desange reduced his speed before making the right turn that resulted in the fatal collision, the 2nd DCA found this did not negate the recklessness of his preceding conduct:

“Mr. Desange points out that he reduced his speed to twenty-four miles per hour when he made the right turn from the left lane that immediately preceded the collision. That is true enough, but it does not follow from that that the evidence of recklessness was insufficient. Mr. Desange was engaged in obviously dangerous behavior leading up to the accident—including hitting another car and refusing to stop—which culminated in his slamming on his brakes to make an equally obviously dangerous right turn from the left lane. The evidence was sufficient to show that the turning maneuver that resulted in the collision was both knowingly dangerous and part and parcel of the knowingly dangerous conduct that preceded it.”

Finding that the cases the judge relied upon in granting the MJOA were clearly distinguishable from Desange’s, the 2nd DCA concluded that the reinstatement of the jury’s guilty verdict was necessary:

“The trial court reached a different conclusion by citing a number of cases that it thought bore similarities to this case. We note that in some of the cases upon which the trial court relied, the defendant’s misconduct consisted of only a momentary lapse in judgment far more consistent with ordinary negligence than knowingly dangerous conduct. … Similarly, in others, the defendant was merely reacting to a situation beyond his or her control—again, evincing conduct more consistent with negligence than intentionally dangerous conduct. … And finally, the trial court also relied on cases where the State’s evidence did not involve misconduct that was so dangerous that it was likely to result in serious injury. … Unlike this case, those cases did not involve evidence showing that a defendant knowingly engaged in a continuous pattern of highly dangerous behavior. For the reasons we have explained, the State’s evidence here was sufficient to prove recklessness. … We reverse and remand for reinstatement of the jury’s verdict.”

In sum, State v. Desange, 294 So.3d 433 (Fla. 2d. DCA 2020) marks a significant development in Florida case law on the issue of recklessness in vehicular homicide cases. The 2nd DCA found that:

• Desange exceeded the speed limit by over 30 miles per hour in dense traffic, sideswiped another car and refused to stop, and made an obviously dangerous right turn from the left lane that caused a fatal collision
• This was a “continuous pattern of dangerous behavior” that displayed recklessness, not a “momentary lapse in judgment” that constituted mere negligence (carelessness)
• Since the jury reasonably concluded that Desange’s reckless driving caused the victim’s death, the trial judge erred by setting aside Desange’s vehicular homicide conviction – so the conviction was reinstated

Florida’s criminal defense community should take note of State v. Desange, 294 So.3d 433 (Fla. 2d. DCA 2020), as it provides a clear breakdown of how courts distinguish recklessness from carelessness in vehicular homicide cases.

Note: Vehicular homicide and vessel homicide (Fla. Stat. 782.072) have the same legal standard for recklessness under state law. To learn more, click here.

It is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible if someone is charged with vehicular homicide, DUI manslaughter, BUI manslaughter or vessel homicide. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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