Major FL Court Finds Confidential Informant Illegally Entrapped Defendant
February 9, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense Social Share
Florida’s 4th District Court of Appeal found a confidential informant’s conduct in attempting to get the defendant to purchase drugs – as well as law enforcement’s failure to supervise the CI – constituted entrapment as a matter of law.
In Florida, entrapment is a well-known defense to criminal charges. Entrapment acts as a “total defense” – meaning that if a defendant establishes that they were unlawfully induced to commit a crime they would not have otherwise committed, they are not guilty of the resulting charge(s).
There are two forms of entrapment in Florida – objective entrapment and subjective entrapment. Understanding the distinction is critical, as determining whether to argue objective entrapment or subjective entrapment (or both) in the event that an entrapment defense requires a comprehensive understanding of the law.
Objective entrapment is typically “more difficult” to prove than subjective entrapment. Objective entrapment occurs when law enforcement conduct that resulted in a defendant’s allegedly illegal activity was so egregious, that prosecuting them (even if they are guilty) would violate their due process rights under the Florida and U.S. Constitutions.
Examples of objective entrapment that Florida courts have found include:
All of the above go far beyond law enforcement simply engaging in undercover activity (e.g. “sting operations”). If government agents engage in behavior that is particularly objectionable (extremely unethical or illegal), objective entrapment is more likely to be found by courts. Dippolito v. State, 275 So.3d 653 (Fla 4th DCA 2019)
The second form of entrapment is subjective entrapment (also known as statutory entrapment). This is codified by Munoz v. State, 629 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1993) (a landmark Florida Supreme Court decision) and Fla. Stat. 777.201.
Unlike objective entrapment, whether subjective entrapment occurred is partially based on the conduct of the defendant – not just the conduct of law enforcement. There are two “prongs” to Florida’s subjective entrapment defense – inducement and predisposition.
The first of these, inducement, occurs when law enforcement relies upon tactics while engaging with a defendant that risk someone will commit a crime even if they are not “ready and willing, without persuasion” to do so. Inducement methods may include any of the following (Gennette v. State, 124 So.3d 273 (Fla 1st DCA 2013)):
- Coaxing, cajoling, or harassment (e.g. police repeatedly texting someone in an effort to “rope them in” to criminal activity when they have shown no interest)
- Promises of friendship with the defendant (e.g. “I know you’re lonely, but I’ll hang out with you all the time if you…”)
- Promises of monetary reward (e.g. “I’ll give you $1,000 if…”)
- Impugning the defendant’s manhood (e.g. “You’re not a real man, you’re scared…”)
Like an objective entrapment defense, a subjective entrapment defense can be raised before trial (in the form of a motion to dismiss), at trial itself (e.g. argued to the jury), or both. If subjective entrapment is argued, a defendant must prove by a preponderance (majority) of the evidence that they were improperly induced to commit the underlying crime(s).
It is important to note that just because police officers (or informants) are involved in facilitating unlawful activity, does not mean that someone was “induced.” As Munoz and its progeny note, inducement involves the use of prohibited tactics, like the ones listed in Gennette.
If a defendant establishes they were impermissibly induced by law enforcement to act illegally, the State must prove the defendant was predisposed to commit the underlying crime(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the State fails to do so, the defendant is not guilty as a matter of law (e.g. requiring pretrial dismissal of charges/finding of not guilty by the jury).
A defendant is considered predisposed if they were “ready and willing, without persuasion” to commit the underlying offenses. Evidence of predisposition may include a defendant’s criminal record for similar offenses, immediate eagerness to engage in the crime when suggested by law enforcement (or informants), and more.
Note: To learn more about inducement for entrapment purposes, click here. To learn more about predisposition, click here.
In some cases, undercover police officers will not engage directly with a defendant. Rather, the “agent” who allegedly committed the entrapment will be a confidential informant (e.g. someone the defendant may know who is working with law enforcement, likely without the defendant’s knowledge). For more on confidential informants (CIs), click here.
A confidential informant’s conduct can also serve as the basis for an entrapment defense. If a CI “entraps” a defendant through their conduct (often due failure of police to adequately supervise the CI), the defendant is just as “not guilty” as if the entrapment was done by undercover officers directly.
Florida’s courts have recognized this principle in many cases. Let’s take a look at one of those cases, Soohoo v. State, 737 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) – where Soohoo was objectively entrapped by a confidential informant.
In Soohoo, the defendant (Soohoo) was convicted of trafficking cocaine. He was sentenced to prison and appealed to the 4th DCA.
Soohoo was arrested in the parking lot of a store in Broward County. There, he intended to meet a confidential informant (Martinez) to buy two kilograms of cocaine. Martinez was facing a set of federal charges in California for drug offenses, and agreed to cooperate with authorities to reduce his exposure (e.g. he became a confidential informant).
Martinez witnessed Soohoo purchase cocaine in New York approximately a year earlier. In hopes of setting up a new drug deal, he called Soohoo and offered to sell him five kilograms of cocaine (as this was the threshold about to elevate state charges to a federal prosecution).
Soohoo declined to buy 5 kilograms, even after Martinez offered to help him distribute it “to people he knew” in New York. A short while later, Martinez again reached out to Soohoo, asking Soohoo to purchase a smaller quantity of cocaine. Martinez was given authority by the FBI to arrange the transaction himself.
Soohoo agreed to purchase one kilogram, and Martinez offered him an additional kilogram on credit. Martinez’s objective was to get Soohoo to buy five kilograms in smaller increments – with the intent of elevating Soohoo’s state charges to federal charges (to reap the benefit of cooperating with the FBI).
Soohoo ultimately agreed to the purchase of two kilograms, and was arrested by authorities just before the sale was set to occur.
At trial (in state court), Soohoo moved for a judgment of acquittal of the trafficking charge. He argued that he was objectively entrapped by Martinez (who was acting as a government agent). Soohoo asserted that law enforcement’s failure to supervise Martinez, combined with Martinez’s “egregious” conduct, constituted objective entrapment that violated his due process rights.
However, the trial judge denied the motion and Soohoo was convicted. Intriguingly, the trial judge held he was doing so because Soohoo was predisposed to commit the offense (which matters under Florida’s subjective entrapment law, but not objective entrapment law).
On appeal, Soohoo observed this error and argued the trial judge mistakenly used the subjective entrapment “predisposition” prong in an objective entrapment evaluation (which focuses entirely on police/CI conduct). Since the government (through lack of supervision of Martinez) violated his due process rights, Soohoo argued his conviction required reversal.
Florida’s 4th District Court of Appeal (Southeast Florida) agreed, reversing Soohoo’s conviction and releasing him from custody. The 4th DCA wrote:
“Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the ground of entrapment under both the subjective standard, which analyzes the accused’s predisposition to commit the charged offense, and the objective standard, which addresses the conduct of law enforcement officers. We find merit in appellant’s argument concerning the objective standard of entrapment.”
Turning to the facts of the case, the 4th DCA concluded there was copious evidence to support Soohoo’s argument that Martinez’s conduct (and law enforcement’s failure to supervise him) violated Soohoo’s due process rights:
“Viewing the instant record as a whole and looking to all the circumstances surrounding this sting operation, we conclude … that the conduct of confidential informant Martinez, acting on behalf of law enforcement, offends canons of decency and fairness. Perhaps most egregious and offensive in this case was Martinez’s offer to help Soohoo distribute the product if he were to purchase five kilos of cocaine and his subsequent offer to give Soohoo a second kilo on credit if he were to purchase one kilo. Because Martinez was working undercover as an agent of law enforcement, this consignment arrangement for the sale of drugs represents governmental conduct which this court cannot condone.”
“Not only did the government fail to investigate Martinez’s claims regarding Soohoo’s prior drug-related activity, but the government failed to closely monitor Martinez’s dealings with Soohoo after he became a target for this operation. Agent Fong was essentially unaware of the details of the transaction and never listened to any taped discussions between Soohoo and Martinez. We find that the government actions in this case constitute misconduct in violation of the defendant’s rights under article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution, regardless of any predisposition of Soohoo to commit the alleged offense…. Accordingly, appellant’s judgment of conviction and sentence are REVERSED.”
In sum, Soohoo v. State, 737 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) marks a significant development in Florida’s corpus of case law surrounding entrapment. The 4th DCA found:
- Martinez’s (the confidential informant) conduct was egregious, as he manufactured the charged crime without adequate law enforcement supervision to try to reduce his federal charges
- Soohoo’s due process rights were violated as a result when he was prosecuted/convicted
- Because Soohoo’s due process rights were violated, he was objective entrapped, making “predisposition” irrelevant
- This required reversal of his conviction as a matter of law
Florida’s criminal defense community should take note of Soohoo v. State, 737 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), as it is a key, defendant-friendly case on the issue of objective entrapment.
If someone is arrested and formally charged in Florida in a case and has a potential entrapment defense, it is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.
Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL
Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.
Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation
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