Major FL Court Finds OBJECTIVE Entrapment in Major Drug Bust

February 9, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense, Drug Charges Social Share

Florida’s 4th District Court of Appeal ruled that a defendant charged with unlawfully selling hydrocodone was objectively entrapped by law enforcement, requiring reversal of her conviction.

In Florida, entrapment serves as a total defense to criminal charges. Entrapment occurs when law enforcement impermissibly induces someone to commit a crime that would not have otherwise occurred but for the police intervention. A person may be the victim of entrapment at the hands of undercover police officers, confidential informants, or other government agents.

There are two types of entrapment in Florida – objective entrapment and subjective entrapment. The difference between these is important to understand, as if someone is seeking to pursue an entrapment defense, they will be more able to readily identify which of these (or both) to rely upon.

Objective entrapment is generally considered the “harder” form of entrapment to prove. Also known as “due process” entrapment, objective entrapment occurs when law enforcement (e.g. government) activity that facilitated the defendant’s alleged criminal conduct is so outrageous, that prosecuting the defendant violates their due process rights – even if they are guilty.

Objective entrapment is decided as a matter of law (e.g. by the judge, not the jury). Examples of cases in which Florida’s courts have recognized objective entrapment include:

• Law enforcement manufactures drugs at the police station to sell to people on the street while undercover, only to arrest people when they try to buy them (State v. Williams, 623 So.2d 462, 466 (Fla. 1993))
• A police task force sends child pornography through the mail to arrest someone for possessing it (Farley v. State, 848 So.2d 393, 397-98 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003))
• A law enforcement officer or informant enters a sexual relationship with the defendant to get them to act criminally (Madera v. State, 943 So.2d 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006))

In an objective entrapment analysis, predisposition of a defendant to act unlawfully is not an element courts consider. Even if the defendant was “ready and willing” to commit the underlying offenses, certain government conduct “shocks the conscience” to such a degree that it cannot be a basis for prosecuting someone (such as in the above cases).

Subjective entrapment occurs when law enforcement (or its agents, such as CIs) impermissibly induce a non-predisposed person to act unlawfully. The subjective entrapment (e.g. statutory entrapment) defense is codified in Florida law by Munoz v. State, 629 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1993) and Fla. Stat. 777.201.

Inducement for purposes of proving subjective entrapment must be established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. Inducement occurs when law enforcement/its agents relied upon tactics that risked even a non-predisposed person would end up “ensnared” (e.g. illegally act).

A classic example of “subjective entrapment” is a police officer dressing up as a homeless man and pretending to be asleep on the sidewalk with a wad of cash sticking out of his pocket. This risks that even a person who is not predisposed to commit theft will fall victim to “temptation” and do so anyway. State v. Casper, 417 So.2d 263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)

If inducement is established by the defendant by a preponderance (e.g. majority) of the evidence, the burden shifts to the State to prove predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt. 

This means the State must provide evidence beyond a reasonable doubt (e.g. in the form of criminal record or a defendant’s immediate “acquiescence”) the defendant was “ready and willing, without persuasion”) to commit the unlawful act(s) charged.

If the judge believes there is evidence of inducement and none of predisposition, the case will be dismissed as a matter of law (if entrapment is raised in a pretrial motion to dismiss), so long as the judge concludes no reasonable jury could find otherwise. 

If entrapment is raised at trial, the jury must find the defendant not guilty on entrapment grounds if inducement is proven by a preponderance of the evidence, and predisposition is not established beyond a reasonable doubt.

Note: For more on what constitutes inducement under Florida’s subjective entrapment law, click here. For more on predisposition, click here.

Though many defendants will attempt to argue subjective entrapment (as this does not require police conduct to be especially egregious, assuming the defendant was not predisposed), some will argue objective entrapment if they believe their due process rights were violated. 

One such case involving an objective entrapment argument was heard by Florida’s 4th District Court of Appeal. There, a defendant was convicted for allegedly selling hydrocodone (controlled substance in Florida). Her motion for a judgment of acquittal (MJOA) on objective entrapment grounds was denied by the trial judge.

On appeal, however, the 4th DCA reversed the defendant’s conviction – finding that the alleged drug sale was the product of objective entrapment by law enforcement and their agents. Let’s take a look at that case – Dial v. State, 799 So.2d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) – and what it means for defendants seeking to argue objective entrapment in Florida.

KEY CASE: Dial v. State, 799 So.2d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)

In Dial, the defendant (Dial) was arrested and charged after allegedly selling hydrocodone. She was convicted at trial after the judge denied her motion for a judgment of acquittal (MJOA) on objective entrapment grounds.

At trial, it was revealed that Dial was working at McDonald’s in St. Lucie County. Her manager, Barbara, was attempting to provide substantial assistance to the police department to reduce her own sentence by arranging drug buys for an undercover officer (Silverman).

Barbara knew that Dial was taking hydrocodone, which was prescribed by Dial’s doctor for a condition she suffered from. Barbara went to Dial and told her that she had a friend who was “very sick” and needed some of the hydrocodone to alleviate their symptoms.

Dial initially told Barbara that she would give her some of the medicine to give to her friend. But Barbara declined this, insisting on setting up a direct meeting between the “friend” (undercover officer) and Dial to purchase the tablets for $5 a piece. Barbara continued to pressure Dial to sell the drugs to the “friend” until Dial agreed.

Upon engaging in the transaction with Silverman, Dial was arrested. Despite using her as a CI, Silverman had not been supervising Barbara in any way. Thus, he was unsure what tactics she may have used to get Dial to sell him the hydrocodone – Silverman only knew that it was a drug sale.

On these grounds, Dial moved for a judgment of acquittal at trial – asserting she was objectively entrapped due to Barbara’s conduct and Silverman’s failure to supervise Barbara. This MJOA request was denied, leading to her conviction.

Dial appealed to the 4th DCA, claiming Barbara’s tactics (and Silverman’s failure to supervise her) were so egregious that Dial’s due process rights were violated – requiring reversal of her conviction for selling the drugs.

The 4th DCA agreed and reversed Dial’s conviction, releasing her from custody. Analogizing Dial’s case to others where objective entrapment was found to occur, the 4th DCA wrote:

“In Nadeau, the defendant was set up by an acquaintance who was an informant working off a substantial assistance agreement with law enforcement. See Nadeau, 683 So.2d at 505. Barbara, the informant in this case, was not only an acquaintance but appellant’s employment supervisor at the McDonald’s where appellant worked. Barbara knew that appellant was vulnerable, appellant had little income and she wanted to work extra hours to save money for Christmas. Barbara also knew that appellant had a serious medical condition which caused chronic pain. As in Nadeau, appellant was not versed in drug dealing. See id. at 505–06. Barbara set the price and arranged the deal. Furthermore, as in Nadeau, Soohoo and Anders, the informant, in this case Barbara, was not given guidance or limitations about with whom to negotiate drug deals or how to avoid entrapment, and her conversations with appellant were not monitored. See id.; Anders, 596 So.2d at 465; Soohoo, 737 So.2d at 1110–11.”

“As in Robichaud, the informant exploited her position to create a crime where none existed. Robichaud, 658 So.2d at 166. When appellant offered to let Barbara’s sick friend have some of her medicine, Barbara insisted that appellant needed the money and her friend was able to pay. Barbara repeatedly urged the appellant to follow through with the “drug deal.” Furthermore, as in both Robichaud and Nadeau, appellant had no criminal record and there was no evidence she was suspected of criminal activity before Barbara brought her into this scheme.”

Because the drug sale had only occurred due to the CI “exploiting” her position of authority over Dial to get her to act unlawfully, the 4th DCA found objective entrapment had occurred:

“We need not address the issue of subjective entrapment as we hold that the informant’s conduct in this case, targeting an innocent person under her supervision and exploiting her weaknesses without any efforts from law enforcement to avoid entrapment or monitor the informant’s activities, offends due process under Florida’s constitution and constitutes entrapment as a matter of law. We, therefore, reverse and direct the trial court to vacate the conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal.”

In sum, Dial v. State, 799 So.2d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) marks a significant development in Florida’s corpus of case law surrounding entrapment – particularly, objective entrapment. The 4th DCA held that:

• There was no evidence Dial wished to sell her hydrocodone to anyone
• The confidential informant (Barbara) pressured Dial to sell hydrocodone to a “friend” – who was actually an undercover officer – resulting in Dial’s arrest and prosecution
• This was a textbook example of law enforcement/informants targeting an “innocent person” and “exploiting her weaknesses,” which led to Dial’s criminal charge
• Because this constituted objective entrapment, Dial’s MJOA request should have been granted – so reversal of her conviction was necessary

Florida’s criminal defense community should take note of Dial v. State, 799 So.2d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), as it offers important insight into the kind of conduct police officers (or informants) must engage in for a defendant to successfully argue objective entrapment.

If someone is arrested and formally charged in Florida in a case and has a potential entrapment defense, it is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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