Major FL Reverses Dismissal of Vehicular Homicide Charge Against Police Officer

February 9, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense, Violent Crimes Social Share

Florida’s 3rd District Court of Appeal reversed a trial judge’s dismissal of a vehicular homicide charge against a police officer, finding that the State presented a “prima facie” case that she drove recklessly and caused the victim’s death.

In Florida, vehicular homicide (Fla. Stat. 782.071) is a very serious felony offense. It is typically considered a second-degree felony, punishable by up to 15 years in prison and a $10,000 fine.

However, vehicular homicide is considered a first-degree felony (up to 30 years in prison and a $10,000 fine) if either (or both) of the following are true:

• The defendant failed to stop at the scene, give information to law enforcement, or render aid to the victim(s)
• The defendant has one or more prior convictions for vehicular homicide, vessel homicide, DUI manslaughter or BUI manslaughter (Trenton’s Law, 2025)

For someone to be guilty of vehicular homicide, the State must prove all of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

• The defendant operated a vehicle
• The defendant’s operation of the vehicle caused the death(s) of one or more other people
• The defendant’s operation of the vehicle (which caused the death) was reckless

All three of these elements have been at issue in vehicular homicide cases. However, the two most common issues are typically whether the defendant’s operation of the vehicle caused the death of the victim(s), and whether the defendant was reckless (as opposed to simply careless) while behind the wheel.

Though causation is often not disputed, a defendant may sometimes argue that they were not primarily responsible for the crash that caused the death of the victim(s). Unlike DUI or BUI manslaughter, vehicular homicide (and vessel homicide) require that a defendant have been the proximate cause of the victim’s death – not simply have “contributed to” it.

Cases in which Florida courts have found a defendant is not guilty of vehicular homicide because they did not cause the death of the victim(s) include:

• The victim grabbing the steering wheel from the defendant and causing the vehicle to lose control, resulting in a crash that caused their death (J.A.C. v. State, 374 So.2d 606 (Fla. 3d. DCA 1979))
• The victim was consensually involved in a street race with the defendant – and in the process lost control of their own vehicle and crashed (Velazquez v. State, 561 So.2d 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990))

The most “hotly contested” issue in a vehicular homicide prosecution is typically whether the defendant’s driving was reckless, careless (negligent), or if they were simply “unlucky” to have been involved in a crash that caused someone’s death. 

Florida’s courts have made clear that proving someone’s recklessness for purposes of securing a vehicular homicide conviction requires the State to establish the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

• The defendant operated their vehicle in a manner they knew or should have known was likely to cause death or great bodily harm
• The defendant did more than simply exceed the speed limit, as this is negligence, not recklessness (Luzardo v. State, 147 So.3d 1083 (Fla. 3d. DCA 2014))

Note: Recklessness is the same legal standard in vehicular homicide and vessel homicide (Fla. Stat. 782.072) cases. For more, click here.

On appellate review, courts in Florida evaluate the defendant’s recklessness (or lack thereof) based on the totality of the circumstances. Factors in determining recklessness, in addition to the defendant’s speed, include (Hamilton v. State, 439 So.2d 238 (Fla. 2d. DCA 1983)):

• Whether visibility was good or poor at the time of the accident
• Whether the defendant was staying “in their lane” or swerving out of it
• Whether there was signage indicating drivers should pay particular attention or slow down (e.g. school zones)
• Whether the cause of the death (e.g. the hazard that caused it) was foreseeable/perceived by others 
• Whether the defendant exercised “any degree of care” to avoid collision
• Whether the defendant was traveling in an area with heavy foot traffic (e.g. residential)
• Whether the defendant was familiar with the area in which they were traveling

Sometimes, a jury will find a defendant in Florida guilty of vehicular homicide after determining their driving was reckless. On appeal, courts occasionally reverse guilty verdicts in vehicular (or vessel) homicide cases as a matter of law – finding that even if a defendant was careless behind the wheel, they were “not quite” reckless.

In many cases, however, courts affirm vehicular homicide convictions – agreeing with the jury’s finding that the defendant drove recklessly. One such case, which is frequently cited in Florida vehicular homicide law discussions, is State v. Gensler, 929 So.2d 27 (Fla. 3d. DCA 2006).

Let’s take a look at Gensler – which addressed both causation and recklessness in vehicular homicide cases – and what it means for defendants charged with vehicular (or vessel) homicide in Florida.

KEY CASE: State v. Gensler, 929 So.2d 27 (Fla. 3d. DCA 2006)

In Gensler, the defendant (Gensler) was a police officer who was dispatched to a call as back-up. As she was traveling to the scene, Gensler sped her police cruiser up to approximately 90 miles per hour. The speed limit was 45 at the time.

While driving, Gensler encountered a flashing yellow traffic signal that sat above an intersection with a crosswalk. Gensler did not slow down as she approached it. Upon reaching the crosswalk, Gensler struck a victim who was approximately 5 feet off the curb – but not in the crosswalk – killing her.

Gensler was charged with vehicular homicide. Before trial, Gensler moved to dismiss the charges as a matter of law, arguing the following:

• Gensler did not drive recklessly (e.g. she was speeding, which is insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction)
• The victim was high on cocaine and drunk at the time of her death, which may have been the primary cause of the victim’s death, as they were not in the crosswalk when they were struck

The trial judge granted Gensler’s motion to dismiss, finding the State was unable to present a prima facie case of vehicular homicide. The trial judge agreed with Gensler that the State was unable to prove recklessness or causation as a matter of law. Thus, the case did not need to go to the jury.

The State appealed the trial judge’s ruling to Florida’s 3rd District Court of Appeal (Miami area). The State argued that since a prima facie case of vehicular homicide existed, the judge erred by dismissing the charge as a matter of law. Gensler renewed her arguments that the State could not prove recklessness or causation.

The 3rd DCA agreed – concluding that the judge wrongly granted Gensler’s motion to dismiss, and that a jury was required to determine her guilt or lack thereof. Finding the State presented a prima facie case of recklessness, the 3rd DCA wrote:

“In determining whether a defendant is driving recklessly, the issue is whether the defendant knowingly drove the vehicle in such a manner and under such conditions as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm. D.E. v. State, 904 So.2d 558 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Michel v. State, 752 So.2d 6 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). The focus is on the actions of the defendant and, considering the circumstances, whether it was reasonably foreseeable that death or great bodily harm could result. See D.E., 904 So.2d at 562. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State and based on the fact that the defendant was traveling at a speed of ninety miles per hour—way over the posted speed limit of forty-five miles per hour—on a federal highway, at 3:00 a.m. where the street lights were out, coupled with the fact that she willfully disregarded a flashing, yellow traffic signal at the intersection one block from an open convenience store, we find that the State established a prima facie case of recklessness on the part of the defendant—likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to another. … As such, the recklessness issue is within the province of the jury and not subject to a motion to dismiss.”

The 3rd DCA also concluded that the State had shown Gensler was the proximate cause of the victim’s death, as the victim’s conduct in no way “superseded” Gensler’s, even if the victim was under the influence of alcohol and drugs:

“The defendant urges that the material facts do not demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of the accident. As part of this contention, she argues that the wrongful conduct of the defendant cannot be deemed the proximate cause of the homicide because her wrongful conduct was superseded by the victim’s own independent intervening act—that the impairment caused by the alcohol and drugs may have been responsible for her entering the highway at an unmarked location resulting in the accident and her death. Unless it can be said that the victim’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of the homicide, or unless there is some reason why it would be unjust or unfair to impose criminal liability, the decedent’s conduct does not supersede the defendant’s conduct as the proximate cause of the homicide.”

“Therefore, we find that the State presented a prima facie case demonstrating that the defendant’s conduct, speeding excessively and ignoring a yellow flashing signal in a business district on a darkened highway at 3:00 a.m., was the proximate cause of the accident. We further conclude that the State has presented a prima facie case of vehicular homicide showing that the victim’s death was within the scope of danger created by the defendant’s reckless driving. … Whether Gensler’s conduct was reckless and the proximate cause of the death of the victim are jury issues not properly resolved on motion to dismiss. … In consideration of the record facts stated in the motion to dismiss and based upon the foregoing authorities, we reverse the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss.”

In essence, because a reasonable jury could have concluded that Gensler drove recklessly and was the cause of the victim’s death, the trial judge erred by granting Gensler’s pretrial motion to dismiss.

In sum, State v. Gensler, 929 So.2d 27 (Fla. 3d. DCA 2006) is a significant development in Florida’s corpus of case law on the issues of causation and recklessness in vehicular homicide cases when a defendant moves to dismiss vehicular homicide charges. The 3rd DCA found:

• Gensler’s driving – at double the speed limit, through a blinking yellow light, near a convenience store and crosswalk – could reasonably be viewed as reckless (e.g. likely to cause death or serious bodily harm)
• There was no evidence the victim’s intoxication “superseded” Gensler’s driving as the primary cause of the victim’s death
• Because the State had established a prima facie case of vehicular homicide in Gensler’s case, the trial judge should not have granted Gensler’s motion to dismiss – so the charges were reinstated (and a jury heard the case)

Florida’s criminal defense community should take note of State v. Gensler, 929 So.2d 27 (Fla. 3d. DCA 2006), as it provides a clear outline for courts and advocates when evaluating motions to dismiss in vehicular homicide (or vessel homicide) cases. 

If the facts – viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution – present a prima facie (on its face) case of vehicular homicide, a trial judge must deny a pretrial motion to dismiss and send the case to a jury.

It is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible if someone is charged with vehicular homicide, DUI manslaughter, BUI manslaughter or vessel homicide. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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