Major Florida Court Defines ‘Custody’ For Miranda Purposes In Upholding Murder Conviction

October 30, 2025 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense, Violent Crimes Social Share

A top Florida court recently upheld a murder conviction – ruling that the defendant’s Miranda rights were not violated because even though she was not read them before she confessed, she was not in police custody at the time.

In Florida and throughout the U.S., someone must be advised of their Miranda rights before they are subject to custodial interrogation by law enforcement. These rights, per Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), include:

• The right to remain silent
• The fact that anything they say can and will be used against them in court
• The right to an attorney, including to have one present during police questioning
• The fact that if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for them

If someone is read their Miranda rights, the smart next move is to exercise them. Tell the police you will be remaining silent and ask for an attorney. Say all of this out loud, then be quiet – as if you simply sit silently (without first invoking your rights), police can continue questioning you. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010)

One of the biggest misconceptions about Miranda rights is that someone must be read them any time they are talked to by the police or detained. This is not true. A suspect must only be notified of their rights after officers have taken them into custody, but before police engage in behavior that constitutes interrogation (e.g. questioning) of a suspect – or its “functional equivalent.”

For Miranda reading purposes, interrogation is defined as any words or behavior by an officer that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from a suspect. To learn more about when someone is being “interrogated,” requiring law enforcement to read their Miranda rights for their post-arrest statements to be admissible against them at trial, click here.

If someone is read their Miranda rights, they may waive them and agree to speak with the police without an attorney present. Such a waiver must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. A person must understand both the nature of their rights and the potential consequences of not exercising them before validly waiving their rights and giving statements during custodial interrogation.

But if someone’s waiver was not legally valid (e.g. they did not understand their rights or the consequences of not invoking them), a defendant may file a motion to suppress their post-arrest statements (preventing them from being used at trial). If a Miranda waiver is legally invalid, it is error to use statements made during custodial interrogation against them at trial.

Again, someone only must be read their rights before they are subject to custodial interrogation. Though much of the time this is not in dispute (e.g. if someone is handcuffed at a police station), sometimes it is unclear if someone is actually considered the subject of custodial interrogation or voluntary questioning (e.g. they are not in custody).

This seemingly small detail can be critical for trial judges and appeals courts when evaluating whether a defendant should have been read their Miranda rights earlier (or at all, if no reading occurred before a confession). Sometimes, a person will challenge the use of their post-arrest statements on the grounds that they were not given Miranda warnings despite being in custody.

But when is someone actually in custody, requiring them to be advised of their Miranda rights before officers can question them about a case? This question does not have a simple answer, as someone does not have to be formally “under arrest” to be in custody.

However, one top Florida court tackled this issue in a major case surrounding the murder of a minor in Tampa: State v. Thompson, 193 So. 3d 916 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). Let’s break it down.

KEY CASE: State v. Thompson, 193 So. 3d 916 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) 

In Thompson, the defendant (Thompson) was arrested and charged with aggravated child abuse and felony murder following the death of her infant child. She was questioned by police in what they described as a “voluntary interview,” and eventually confessed to her involvement in the murder.

Before trial, Thompson filed a motion to suppress her post-Miranda statements (confession). She argued that law enforcement erroneously did not advise her of her rights, as she was actually “in custody” for Miranda purposes at the time she was questioned by officers (interrogated). Because she was not informed of her rights, Thompson argued, her confession was inadmissible at trial.

The trial judge agreed, holding that Thompson was in custody at the time she confessed – and thus, she should’ve been read her rights. Thompson was interviewed five times by the Tampa Police Department in relation to the offense. The trial judge held that because she was called into the police station so many times and pressed about the crime, this was custodial interrogation.

The State appealed, as the inability to use Thompson’s confession in court made their case much harder to prove. The State argued Thompson was not in custody at the time of the interviews, including the final interview (during which she confessed). 

Florida’s 2nd District Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the trial judge’s ruling. It found that because Thompson was not “in custody” at the time she was interviewed about the case, she was not entitled to receive Miranda warnings. Thus, her confession could not be kept out of court on the grounds that she was not advised of her Miranda rights.

The 2nd DCA (Greater Tampa area) discussed the factors established by the Florida Supreme Court’s Ramirez decision (Ramirez v. State, 739 So.2d 568, 573 (Fla. 1999)), writing:

“The supreme court has established four nonexclusive factors that we consider in evaluating whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would consider herself in custody and, thus, entitled to Miranda warnings: (1) the manner in which the police summon the suspect for questioning; (2) the purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation; (3) the extent to which the suspect is confronted with evidence of her guilt; and (4) whether the suspect is informed that she is free to leave.”

“Ultimately, the inquiry is whether, under a totality of the circumstances, ‘a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would feel a restraint of his or her freedom of movement, fairly characterized, so that the suspect would not feel free to leave or to terminate the encounter with police.’”

The 2nd DCA discussed these factors in order. Addressing the manner in which Thompson was summoned, the court found that on each occasion she was interviewed, Thompson voluntarily came into the police station (and was never improperly pressured by detectives). The majority wrote:

“Nothing in our record indicates that every encounter between Ms. Thompson and the detective was anything but her voluntary undertaking. The detective did not coerce, cajole, entice, or summon Ms. Thompson to engage in the interviews.”

The 2nd DCA then turned to the next Ramirez factor, arguing that the “purpose, place, and manner” of the interrogation indicated Thompson was not in custody:

“We must observe that although this was Ms. Thompson’s fifth interview, and the third at the police station, her mother was present and was not asked to leave. Ms. Thompson was unrestrained; she was able to leave at the end of the session, even after making incriminating statements. The tone and content of the conversation suggest nothing coercive or confining about the location of the last interview.”

After concluding this analysis, the 2nd DCA turned to the third Ramirez factor (extent to which a suspect is confronted with evidence of guilt). It held that because Thompson already knew about the nature of the infant’s injuries and cause of death before choosing to speak with police, raising these details did not make her feel so “unfree to leave” as to establish custody: 

“By the time of the last interview, there seems to be no question that Ms. Thompson, independent of any information she obtained from the detective, knew the extent of the infant’s injuries and cause of death before coming to the police station. The detective confronted her with nothing she did not already know.”

“Further, while being questioned about the infant’s broken ribs, Ms. Thompson spontaneously confessed to striking the child in the abdomen. Detective Kirlangitis showed her photographic evidence of the child’s abdominal injuries only after she admitted the blow.”

Finally, the 2nd DCA noted Thompson was told on various occasions that she was not under arrest, remained free to leave, and could stop the interviews. The court also pointed out that family members were present with Thompson during police questioning. Concluding Thomspon was not in custody (and thus not entitled to Miranda warnings), the court wrote:

“Ms. Thompson had the benefit of meeting with Detective Kirlangitis over numerous days where he continually told her that she was not under arrest, was free to leave, and could stop the interviews. He always allowed her to be with her family members during questioning and to leave at the conclusion of each interview.”

“…[T]here was no threat that compelled Ms. Thompson to come to the police station. As she repeatedly told the detectives, she wanted to come to tell the truth. Based on our review of the record, a considered analysis of the Ramirez factors, and the pertinent case law, we must conclude that the trial court erred in suppressing Ms. Thompson’s incriminating statement from the fifth interview. We reverse the trial court’s order granting the motion to suppress.”

Essentially, the 2nd DCA performed a “line-by-line” Ramirez analysis based on how the Florida Supreme Court defined custody in that case and found Thompson was not in custody. Because there must be custodial interrogation (not just interrogation) for Miranda warnings to be read, Thompson’s confession was not illegally obtained (and thus, was admissible at her trial).

In sum, the 2nd DCA’s State v. Thompson, 193 So. 3d 916 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ruling is a significant (and arguably, prosecution-friendly) development in Florida’s corpus of case law surrounding Miranda rights. It recognized that custody occurs when a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would not feel free to leave. 

In finding that Thompson was not in custody, the 2nd DCA primarily considered the following:

• Thompson’s five interviews with police were entirely voluntary
• Thompson was routinely told she was not under arrest, free to leave, and relatives were allowed to accompany her
• The evidence that Thompson was confronted with were facts already known to her, not evidence that proved her guilt (though it may have had an emotional impact that led to her confession)

The Thompson case makes clear that in cases where there is a dispute as to whether someone was in custody for purposes of requiring Miranda warnings, this determination must be made based on the totality of the circumstances (using the Ramirez factors).

If someone is arrested and formally charged in Florida in a case involving a Miranda waiver that was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary, it is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting drug charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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