Major Florida Court Discusses “Independent Proof” vs. Circumstantial Evidence in Constructive Drug Possession Case

December 19, 2025 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense, Drug Charges Social Share

Florida’s 2nd District Court of Appeal reversed the conviction of a driver accused of possessing drugs found in a caddy by his feet while driving in a jointly occupied vehicle.

In Florida, there are two ways to prove that someone unlawfully possessed a particular item or set of items (e.g. illegal drugs, guns). The first of these is actual possession, and the second is constructive possession. Understanding the distinction between these is critical.

Per Sanders v. State, 210 So. 3d 246, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), someone is considered to have be in “actual possession” of contraband (illegal items) if any of the following are true:

• The contraband is found in the defendant’s hand(s) or on their person
• The contraband is found in a container in the defendant’s hand(s) or on their person
• The contraband is discovered within the defendant’s “ready reach” and exclusively under his dominion and control

Though actual possession (if it can be proven) makes the State’s job easier, law enforcement’s failure to find someone in physical possession of illegal items does not stop charges from being brought. This is because a prosecution in Florida can also proceed on a theory of constructive possession.

A person may be convicted on a theory of constructive possession when the State can prove all of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:  

• The defendant knew about the contraband (found in their presence, on their property, etc.)
• The defendant knew that the contraband was illegal (e.g. if a firearm, they knew they were prohibited from owning one)
• The defendant was able to exercise dominion and control over the contraband (T.W. v. State, 666 So.2d 1001, 1002 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)

Important: For a comprehensive breakdown on the differences between actual and constructive possession under Florida law, click here.

Constructive possession is especially difficult to prove when contraband is discovered on jointly occupied premises. Jointly occupied premises may include:

• A home with many residents inside
• A vehicle pulled over that has both a driver and one or more passengers
• An area in an office building to which many people have had access

If contraband is discovered on jointly occupied premises and a defendant is prosecuted under a theory of constructive possession (because they were not found in actual possession), the State must offer independent proof that the contraband belonged to the defendant. Typically, this is in one (or more) of the following three forms: 

• A defendant’s incriminating statements (e.g. “The drugs were mine…”)
• Witness testimony (e.g. someone else in the home/vehicle or an uninvolved witness claiming the contraband belongs to the defendant)
• Scientific evidence (e.g. DNA or fingerprints) tying the defendant to the illicit item(s) in question

If there are no admissions by the defendant, no DNA (or other scientific evidence) tying them to the item(s), and no statements from other witnesses tying the defendant to the item(s), the State generally cannot prove constructive possession on jointly occupied premises. Santiago v. State, 991 So. 2d 439, 442 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)

Depending on when a Florida criminal defense attorney first raises this issue (and what a trial judge decides), a lack of independent proof in a constructive possession case can result in either:

• The charges being dropped or dismissed before trial
• The conviction(s) (if the judge erroneously denied a motion to dismiss/motion for judgment of acquittal) being reversed on appeal

Occasionally, the question of whether there is “independent proof” that the contraband belonged to a defendant in a constructive possession case, is not so easy to answer. A defendant or another witness may make a remark/behave in a certain way indicating the contraband does belong to the defendant. 

But does this constitute the sort of “independent proof” courts require for someone to be found guilty under a theory of constructive possession as a matter of law? The answer – at least in the case we are about to discuss – is no (when the premises are occupied by more than one person).

Let’s take a look at a major case from Florida’s 2nd District Court of Appeal, Rangel v. State, 110 So.3d 41 (Fla. 2d. DCA 2013) and what it means for defendants facing prosecution on a theory of constructive possession in Florida.

KEY CASE: Rangel v. State, 110 So.3d 41 (Fla. 2d. DCA 2013)

In Rangel, the defendant (Rangel) was charged with trafficking cocaine. At trial, he moved for a judgment of acquittal (MJOA) – arguing the State did not offer independent proof the cocaine was his and it was found on jointly occupied premises. The trial judge denied the MJOA, and Rangel was convicted.

Before his arrest, Rangel’s vehicle was pulled over as part of an undercover operation in which law enforcement used a confidential informant (CI) to make a phone call to Rangel and arrange a drug sale. When Rangel arrived, there were three others in the vehicle.

Rangel sold cocaine to the confidential informant – and once officers verified Rangel had sold the drugs, they attempted to pull the vehicle over to arrest him (after he left). By the time police caught up to Rangel’s vehicle, there were three occupants: Rangel (in the front passenger seat), a driver, and one occupant in the back.

Law enforcement ordered everyone out of the car. Before Rangel exited, one officer observed him “rummaging” at his feet. When the vehicle was searched, a caddy (small storage container) was found on the passenger’s side floorboard (where Rangel’s feet were). The caddy contained what appeared to be a pint-sized container of car cleaning products.

An officer asked Rangel what was in the container (not yet knowing), to which Rangel replied that the officer should “drink it and find out.” Later, the contents were tested – and it contained a cocaine derivative (ecgonine, leading to a charge of cocaine trafficking).

Rangel was put on trial for two offenses:

• Sale of cocaine (to the confidential informant)
• Trafficking of cocaine (for the cocaine derivative found in the caddy)

The trafficking charge proceeded on a theory of constructive possession (since Rangel was out of the car/out of reach of the caddy when it was discovered). Rangel was convicted, and appealed, arguing that the judge should have granted his MJOA. 

Rangel asserted there was a lack of independent proof that the caddy was his and that he knew of its contents. Rangel did not confess to law enforcement – and no other occupants of the car at the time it was searched claimed the caddy was Rangel’s. 

The State countered that both of the following were independent proof of knowledge, dominion and control necessary to survive the MJOA on the trafficking charge:

• Rangel rummaging on the floor (near the caddy) before the search 
• Rangel’s flippant remark to the officer as to the container’s contents (“Try drinking it…”) 

However, the 2nd DCA disagreed and reversed Rangel’s conviction for trafficking (based on the caddy’s contents). The court found the “rummaging” was not independent proof of possession, writing:

“Mr. Rangel’s rummaging is not, in and of itself, an incriminating act and is subject to numerous, innocent explanations. While the State is not required to rebut every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt, it is required to submit facts inconsistent with the defendant’s hypothesis of innocence. Cordero–Artigas v. State, 75 So.3d 838, 841 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). Because Sergeant Sheffield could not see what Mr. Rangel was doing while rummaging and, consequently, could not see whether Mr. Rangel touched the container, the rummaging is arguably nothing more than a different form of proximity. Without additional evidence linking Mr. Rangel to the container, the State has not met its burden.”

As to Rangel’s comment, the 2nd DCA held that this did not constitute an admission as to his knowledge that contraband was inside the container:

“The State also highlights as evidence of Mr. Rangel’s dominion and control his flippant remark to Sergeant Sheffield when questioned about the contents of the container. Yet, Mr. Rangel’s remark is not incriminating and does not amount to an admission that he possessed the container. The remark could be viewed as rude, and it may suggest that Mr. Rangel had knowledge of the container’s illicit contents. However, a stacking of inferences is required to arrive at the conclusion that the remark indicated that Mr. Rangel had the ability to exercise dominion and control over the container.”

Because the State had to “stack inferences” to conclude that Rangel’s comment was actually an admission that the container had cocaine in it, the 2nd DCA held it was not “independent proof” required to support the charges as a matter of law.

Judge Black of the 2nd DCA dissented. Judge Black believed that the circumstantial evidence the State presented excluded every reasonable hypothesis of Rangel’s innocence:

“Sergeant Sheffield testified that Mr. Rangel bent forward toward the floorboard where the drugs were located and described Mr. Rangel’s movements as “furtive” and as though he was “trying to conceal something.” Further, when the officer inquired about the contents of the bottle containing the cocaine, Mr. Rangel replied, “Why don’t you open it up and drink it and see what’s in it?” Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, as we must, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to survive a motion for judgment of acquittal and respectfully dissent.”

“[T]he statement coupled with the undisputed testimony of Mr. Rangel’s furtive movements is enough independent evidence to survive a motion for judgment of acquittal, particularly because Mr. Rangel failed to present any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Accordingly, the State met its threshold burden and it was the “jury’s duty to determine whether the evidence [was] sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Judge Black saw things differently from the majority – he interpreted Rangel’s conduct (the rummaging and rude remark) as independent evidence of guilt. Because of this, according to Judge Black, the evidence in the case was sufficient to support Rangel’s conviction.

However, Judge Black’s opinion did not win the day. As a result, Rangel’s cocaine trafficking conviction was tossed (though his sale conviction stemming from the transaction with the CI was affirmed). 

In sum, Rangel v. State, 110 So.3d 41 (Fla. 2d. DCA 2013) is an intriguing development in Florida’s case law surrounding constructive possession. The 2nd DCA found:

• The State did not have independent proof that Rangel had knowledge and exercised dominion and control over the cocaine in the caddy
• Rangel’s “rummaging” and rude remark to the officer were entirely circumstantial evidence (e.g. not “independent proof” required to survive a MJOA)
• Because the circumstantial evidence did not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence (the jury had to “infer” the drugs were Rangell’s), the conviction required reversal 

Florida defense attorneys and defendants in constructive possession cases should take note, as Rangel is a fascinating exploration of what rises to the level of “independent proof” in cases where constructive possession charges stem from contraband discovered on jointly occupied premises. 

If someone is concerned about a charge of possession of drug paraphernalia, it is crucial to find experienced and aggressive legal representation as soon as possible. This vital decision could make the difference in whether or not a person is subject to a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting drug charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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