Major Florida Court: Murder Conviction Affirmed, Miranda Rights Violation Was ‘Harmless Error’

November 11, 2025 Criminal Defense, Violent Crimes

Florida’s 2nd District Court of Appeal affirmed a defendant’s second-degree murder conviction, even though his Miranda rights were violated and his confession was wrongly used against him at trial.

In Florida and throughout the United States, someone must be advised of their Miranda rights before they are subject to custodial interrogation. Per the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), these include:

  • The right to remain silent
  • The fact that anything they say can and will be used against them in court
  • The right to an attorney, including to have one present during police questioning
  • The fact that if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for them

Though many believe that law enforcement must notify someone of their rights any time they are detained, this is only required if they are in custody and being subject to interrogation (“custodial interrogation”). State v. Martissa, 18 So. 3d 49, 51 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)

For Miranda purposes, custody occurs when someone’s “freedom of action” is restricted by police consistent with an arrest. Interrogation occurs when police engage in questioning or its “functional equivalent” that is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from a suspect.

To find out more about when custodial interrogation occurs (and does not occur) for purposes of requiring police to read someone their Miranda rights, click here.

If someone is read their Miranda rights, the smart next move is to exercise them! Tell officers that you wish to remain silent and request an attorney. Do not say anything else, but make sure to say that. Not invoking your Miranda rights out loud gives police permission to keep questioning you! Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010)

Sometimes, a suspect’s Miranda rights will be violated due to officers failing to read these rights when required, failing to read Miranda at all, or giving them a “deficient” Miranda warning (e.g. not specific enough about the rights the suspect has). Any of these can be grounds for a pretrial motion to suppress the defendant’s post-arrest statements, including a confession.

If such a motion is granted, the defendant’s statements (including confessions) are unusable at trial. Since the State cannot introduce these into evidence, this may significantly improve the odds of a defendant being found not guilty, especially if there is a lack of other proof that they committed the offense,

But what happens if an appeals court finds the trial judge wrongly denied a pretrial motion to suppress a defendant’s post-Miranda statements, and they were introduced at trial? Does this mean that the verdict against them (if they are found guilty) must be automatically reversed?

The answer, according to one decision by a major Florida court, is no. Let’s take a look at a major case involving a Miranda rights violation that did not result in the guilty verdict against a defendant being reversed on appeal – Horne v. State, 57 So. 3d 927 (Fla. 2d. DCA 2011).

KEY CASE: Horne v. State, 57 So. 3d 927 (Fla. 2d. DCA 2011)

In Horne, the defendant (Horne) was charged with and convicted of second-degree murder. After being arrested, Horne was not immediately advised of his Miranda rights. He was handcuffed and taken to the police station, before being sat in an interrogation room.

Before detectives read Horne his Miranda rights, they showed Horne key pieces of evidence in the case. These included:

  • A picture of the victim (deceased)
  • The audio of a recorded statement by Horne’s brother indicating Horne admitted to the crime
  • An image of a recovered firearm (presumably the one used in the murder)

Immediately after being confronted with these, Horne confessed that he shot the victim. Officers then read Horne his Miranda rights, and Horne reiterated his confession after hearing these. 

Horne filed a pretrial motion to suppress his confession, arguing he was subject to custodial interrogation without first being notified of his rights. But the trial judge denied the motion and allowed Horne’s confession to be played for the jury at trial. 

The judge ruled that because Horne’s confession was not made in response to questioning from the detectives, they did not “interrogate” Horne. Thus, even though he was in custody, officers were not legally required to read Horne his rights at any time before he confessed.

Following his conviction, Horne appealed to Florida’s 2nd District Court of Appeal (Greater Tampa area). He argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, as it used too narrow a definition of “interrogation.” Horne asserted that the guilty verdict against him must be reversed, as this was contaminated by the wrongful admission of his confession.

The 2nd DCA agreed with Horne that the judge should have granted his motion to suppress. But the 2nd DCA nevertheless affirmed Horne’s conviction. The court found that even though Horne’s confession was erroneously heard by the jury at trial, this was “harmless error” beyond a reasonable doubt (did not change the outcome).

Concluding Horne was subject to custodial interrogation by detectives before he confessed to shooting the victim, the 2nd DCA wrote:

“Although Horne was not subjected to express questioning before he was given Miranda warnings, we conclude that the detectives’ course of action amounted to the functional equivalent of questioning. The detectives should have known that their actions of showing Horne the victim’s picture, playing the recorded statement by Horne’s brother, and showing Horne the recovered firearm, were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from Horne. And because Horne was not given Miranda warnings before this course of action, we conclude the trial court erred in denying Horne’s motion to suppress.”

Citing Cuervo v. State, 967 So.2d 155, 161 (Fla. 2007) and Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, (1980), the 2nd DCA noted that interrogation occurs any time officers engage in conduct that is “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” from a suspect – even if this is not direct questioning.

But despite ruling for Horne on this point, the 2nd DCA affirmed his murder conviction. The court reasoned that because the evidence of Horne’s guilt was so overwhelming, the outcome would not have changed even if his confession was never heard by the jury. The court wrote:

“Despite this conclusion, the admission of Horne’s pre-Miranda statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the overwhelming evidence of guilt … At trial, several eyewitnesses testified in detail about the shooting. Each witness gave consistent testimony that he or she saw Horne and the victim engaged in a verbal confrontation. And their testimony established that Horne removed a gun from his pocket, shot it in the air, and then shot the victim. We therefore hold there is no reasonable possibility that the error in admitting Horne’s pre-Miranda statements contributed to the guilty verdict. … Accordingly, we affirm Horne’s judgment and sentence.”

In sum, Horne v. State, 57 So. 3d 927 (Fla. 2d. DCA 2011) marks an intriguing development in Florida’s corpus of case law surrounding when Miranda warnings must be read, and when the erroneous admission of a defendant’s post-arrest statements at trial is a sufficient basis to reverse a guilty verdict.

The 2nd DCA reiterated that “interrogation” for Miranda purposes is not limited to express police questioning. If law enforcement takes a suspect into custody and intends to confront them with clear evidence of their guilt, they must first read them their Miranda rights. This is the “functional equivalent” of interrogation, even if no actual questions are asked.

But just because a defendant’s confession is wrongly admitted at trial, does not mean that the guilty verdict against them must be reversed. Horne clarifies that a violation of a defendant’s Miranda rights does not require a new trial if it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the guilty verdict.

If someone is arrested and formally charged in Florida in a case involving a Miranda waiver that was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary, it is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting drug charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.


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