Major Florida Court Rules Drug Arrest Alone Doesn’t Justify Vehicle Search

November 11, 2025 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense, Drug Charges Social Share

A top Florida court ruled that the fact someone is being arrested on a drug warrant does not give law enforcement permission to search their vehicle without a warrant. 

In Florida and throughout the U.S., a person has the right to be free of “unreasonable” searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Law enforcement is not permitted to search or seize you or your property without legal justification.

Police cannot simply grab someone off the street and search them, their belongings, or their home without a warrant or probable cause. But in some cases, when probable cause exists of a crime or officers secure a warrant (when required, such as to search a home), law enforcement may conduct a search of a person or their property and seize evidence of criminal activity.

The right of law enforcement to search and seize defendants or their property is limited due to the Fourth Amendment – and that includes when someone is being arrested. Even when a person has a warrant issued for their arrest and police place them in handcuffs, officers are not permitted to simply go through that suspect’s property (e.g. their home) to try to recover evidence.

One key “exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for searches and seizures is a search incident to arrest. Police may lawfully search a suspect or the area in their immediate reach to ensure officer safety (e.g. confirming the suspect does not have or is not going to reach for a weapon or other item that presents danger to the officer). 

In some cases, the area that law enforcement is permitted to search extends beyond a suspect’s immediate reach. Most notably, officers can sometimes search a suspect’s vehicle upon arresting them even after they have been removed from it, as well as any containers inside. This is called the “vehicle of the arrestee exception.” Harris v. State, 238 So. 3d 396, 403 (Fla. 3d. DCA 2018)

But this exception is not unlimited. For law enforcement to search the interior of a vehicle upon arresting a suspect, one of the following two things must be true under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343-344 (2009):

• The arrestee must have access to the vehicle (unsecured and within reaching distance)
• There must be a reasonable belief developed by officers that there is evidence relevant to the offense of arrest (the crime someone is accused of committing) in the vehicle

Occasionally, the police will search a vehicle following an arrest and claim this is justified by the second of these exceptions – a reasonable belief that the vehicle contained contraband or other evidence relating to the offense of arrest. However, this argument is subject to serious scrutiny when it is made.

This is because Arizona v. Gant narrowed the U.S. Supreme Court’s former rule in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). If a suspect was pulled from a vehicle and arrested, Belton allowed officers to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle and any containers inside without a warrant.

But since Gant, any search of the vehicle (or compartments therein) once the suspect is outside reaching distance must be supported by a reasonable belief that evidence of criminal activity related to the offense of arrest will be found. This raises a key question – when is such a belief considered “reasonable”?

This issue was squarely addressed by Florida’s 2nd District Court of Appeal (Greater Tampa area) in a major case: State v. McCullough, 76 So.3d 399 (Fla. 2d. DCA 2011). Let’s discuss it.

KEY CASE: State v. McCullough, 76 So.3d 399 (Fla. 2d. DCA 2011) 

In McCullough, the defendant (McCullough) was the suspect in a narcotics investigation. Tampa police issued a warrant for her arrest. Eventually, law enforcement went to McCullough’s home to execute the warrant and take her into custody.

Officers waited in their cruiser outside of McCullough’s residence before she finally returned and parked her car. Upon her exit, law enforcement announced their presence and indicated that they were there to arrest McCullough. McCullough tossed her car keys to her son, who was standing in the doorway, before she was placed in handcuffs and seated in the police cruiser.

Moments after she was taken into custody, one of the arresting officers asked McCullough’s son for the key to her vehicle – intending to perform a search. Her son surrendered the keys, and the officer went through the vehicle. He discovered drugs, including marijuana, leading to additional charges against McCullough.

Before trial, McCullough filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the vehicle. She argued that the police had unlawfully searched it, as they did not have a search warrant and she was out of reach of the vehicle (in the police cruiser) when the search occurred. 

McCullough also asserted that the police did not have a “reasonable belief” (under Gant) that evidence relating to the offense of arrest would be discovered. The State countered by claiming law enforcement properly searched the car under the “reasonable belief” exception. However, the trial judge disagreed and ruled in McCullough’s favor – suppressing the evidence.

The State appealed to the 2nd DCA and reiterated the argument that Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343-344 (2009) allowed McCullough’s vehicle to be searched (under the reasonable belief exception). But the 2nd DCA disagreed, affirming the trial court’s ruling and fatally wounding the State’s case against McCullough.

The 2nd DCA reasoned that the mere fact McCullough was being arrested on a drug offense did not mean that the police had the right to search her car without a warrant. The court disagreed with the State’s broad reading of the “reasonable belief” exception, writing:

“If this reasoning is accurate, then an arrest warrant for a single sale of perishable contraband would authorize a search of the arrestee’s vehicle at any time, whether days, months, or even years later, despite the fact that it may not be reasonable to believe any evidence of the original illegal act remained. We do not believe this is what the Supreme Court envisioned when it explicitly conditioned the search of a secured arrestee’s vehicle on a reasonable belief that evidence of the underlying offense exists inside.”

The 2nd DCA observed that there was no information linking McCullough’s vehicle to any of the offenses of arrest, and that officers did not observe the presence of any contraband (or indicators of its presence) before conducting the search. The McCullough majority wrote:

“McCullough’s warrant was issued four to five months prior to her arrest, and the record is devoid of any evidence whatsoever suggesting that the sale of cocaine she allegedly committed months before her arrest was still taking place or that the car was involved in that sale.”

“Further, from his lawful standpoint outside the vehicle, the officer observed no contraband, weapons, or any other evidence which would support a reasonable belief that evidence from an offense committed at least four months prior—at an unknown location—would exist inside McCullough’s vehicle at the time of her arrest.”

Though the State attempted to analogize McCullough’s case to one decided by the 5th DCA, Brown v. State, 24 So.3d 671 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009), the 2nd DCA resisted this comparison because the two were distinguishable: 

“This lack of any information, beyond the mere existence of a warrant issued months prior, also distinguishes these facts from Brown, where the officer immediately observed a woman’s wallet on the seat of the car that the defendant, a male with two outstanding warrants for theft, had just been driving. 

“If, as in Brown, the officer who arrested McCullough had observed something during the encounter making it reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle, the outcome would be different. But because no such evidence was presented, the search was unreasonable under Gant.”

In essence, the 2nd DCA ruled that the fact someone is being arrested with a drug offense does not negate their Fourth Amendment right to be free of an unreasonable search of their vehicle. 

Given the lack of any connection between McCullough’s vehicle and the charged offenses, as well as the time between the issuance of the warrant and McCullough’s arrest, the court found no facts to support the allegedly “reasonable belief” officers developed that contraband would be inside. Because of this, suppression of the evidence was the only proper remedy.

Critics of McCullough are likely to believe that it reads Arizona v. Gant too narrowly. However, supporters would likely counter that by noting that if the 2nd DCA did not rule for McCullough, effectively all arrestees for drug offenses could have their cars searched at the time of arrest. This would effectively disregard Gant’s narrowing of Belton, as the 2nd DCA pointed out.

In sum, State v. McCullough, 76 So.3d 399 (Fla. 2d. DCA 2011) is a significant development in Florida’s corpus of case law regarding when searches of vehicles and the containers therein are (and are not) permitted by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

McCullough holds that the existence of a drug arrest warrant, without any other evidence of unlawful activity, does not give officers carte blanche to search a suspect’s vehicle. 

This is key for Florida defense attorneys and defendants to understand, as the “nature of the offense” alone does not permit a search of a suspect’s vehicle at the time of arrest – without additional proof that the vehicle was tied to the underlying criminal activity.

If someone is arrested and formally charged in Florida with an offense involving evidence seized from a vehicle, it is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting drug charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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