North Florida’s Highest Court Reverses Juvenile’s Vehicular Homicide Conviction: Here’s Why

December 4, 2025 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense, Juvenile Offenses Social Share

Florida’s 1st District of Appeal ruled that even though a juvenile drove a vehicle after he had been drinking, exceeded the speed limit, and swerved off the road, he could not be found guilty of vehicular homicide.

In Florida, vehicular homicide is a very serious offense. For someone to be found guilty, the State must prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

• The defendant was operating a motor vehicle
• The operation of the motor vehicle was reckless (in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another person)
• The operation of the motor vehicle caused the death of another person or their unborn child

Under Fla. Stat. 782.071, vehicular homicide is typically charged as a second-degree felony (up to 15 years in prison and a $10,000 fine). However, it becomes a first-degree felony (up to 30 years in prison and a $10,000 fine) if either of the following are true:

• The defendant failed to stop (e.g. fled the scene), give information to authorities, or render aid to the victim(s)
• The defendant has a prior conviction for vehicular homicide, vessel homicide, DUI manslaughter or BUI manslaughter (Trenton’s Law)

As noted above, a key element of vehicular homicide is that the defendant must have operated a vehicle recklessly – and this must have caused the death of one or more people. Without reckless operation, someone is not guilty of vehicular homicide as a matter of law.

Important: Recklessness occurs (for vehicular homicide purposes) when someone drives a vehicle in a manner that they know or should have known was likely to cause death or great bodily harm to others. It goes beyond a failure to use ordinary care (negligence). Berube v. State, 6 So.3d 624 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)

The question of whether the defendant was “reckless” is often one of the most important, if not the most important, to answer if someone is accused of vehicular homicide. Historically, courts have held that speeding alone is insufficient to establish recklessness. Luzardo v. State, 147 So.3d 1083 (Fla. 3d. DCA 2014)

However, aggravating factors courts have historically considered (in addition to speeding) to evaluate whether someone recklessly operated their vehicle include:

• Whether the defendant disregarded traffic signals, such as stop signs, prior to the accident
• Time of day (or night)
• Whether the defendant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs
• Whether visibility was poor or good
• Whether the roads were crowded or empty
• Whether a defendant was looking continuously at a device for a long period of time (Andriotis v. State, 399 So.3d 1235 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025))

Note: The legal standard for recklessness is the same in vehicular homicide and vessel homicide cases. For more on the similarities between Florida’s law on these offenses, click here.

Given that recklessness is a “totality of the circumstances” determination, it can be hard to draw a firm line as to the type of driving that satisfies this standard (allowing someone to be lawfully convicted of vehicular homicide). However, one Florida case makes clear that proving “reckless operation” is significantly harder than many may initially believe.

Let’s take a look at how Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal ruled in a landmark case on this issue, W.E.B. v. State, 553 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), and what it means for vehicular and vessel homicide cases in Florida.

KEY CASE: W.E.B. v. State, 553 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)

In W.E.B., the juvenile defendant (W.E.B.) had just consumed three to five beers while on the beach with one of his friends. He was 16 and had received his driver’s license a short time before the accident that led him to be charged with (and found delinquent of) vehicular homicide.

W.E.B. and his friend, Tad Lindsay, hopped into W.E.B’s father’s car and began to drive on an unfamiliar highway. There was little to no traffic. At some point, W.E.B’s car swerved out of its lane, though witnesses conflicted as to how erratic its movements actually were.

Just after W.E.B. had “corrected” and returned to his lane, his car (with Tad Lindsay in it) struck another driver (James Houghton) head-on, killing him. As a result, W.E.B. was charged with vehicular homicide.

At trial, some testimony indicated that the driver in the opposite lane, James Houghton (who was drunk), had crossed into W.E.B.’s lane as W.E.B. readjusted his vehicle. Other testimony claimed that W.E.B. may have “over-corrected” after not staying firmly within his lane when rounding a curve, resulting in him crossing slightly into Houghton’s lane before the cars crashed.

The trial judge found W.E.B. delinquent of vehicular homicide. The judge ruled that W.E.B. was the cause of Houghton’s death and found that because W.E.B. had been drinking and speeding, there was enough evidence to determine that he had committed the offense. The trial judge also indicated a belief that W.E.B. had crossed the “center line” before the crash.

W.E.B. appealed to the 1st DCA, arguing that despite the trial judge’s findings, his driving was negligent (not reckless). As a result, he asserted that he could not be found delinquent (juvenile version of “guilty”) of vehicular homicide. The 1st DCA agreed with W.E.B. and reversed his finding of delinquency:

“We hold that the above set forth facts, though sufficient perhaps for a finding of simple negligence, do not amount to the operation of a motor vehicle in a reckless manner likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another. In doing so, we are mindful of the trial court’s prerogative as the fact-finder in this case, as well as the concomitant problem of analyzing any set of facts in light of the statutory language in order to arrive at a conclusion of vehicular homicide.”

The 1st DCA reasoned that even though W.E.B. had not driven responsibly, his operation of the vehicle must have been of a nature that made injury or death to another a reasonably foreseeable consequence – but it was not:

“To that end, we disagree with the trial court—which reviewed the jury instructions on reckless driving in reaching its conclusion—that the facts adduced by the state were sufficient to show that appellant embarked upon his homeward journey aware that the driving conditions would be such as to likely cause the death of or great bodily injury to another.”

The court analyzed the “totality of the circumstances,” including W.E.B.’s drinking before getting behind the wheel, the weather, and how erratically he drove, in finding that he was not “reckless”:

“The facts do show that although appellant had been drinking—a factor the trial court was entitled to consider—there was no indication that his faculties were impaired to any degree. Indeed, prior to getting into the Blazer, in response to Tad’s inquiry, appellant assured Tad that he was in a condition to drive, and Tad later affirmed in his testimony that he observed nothing about appellant’s behavior indicating that he was in any way impaired.”

“Although it was nighttime, the weather conditions were clear. … he was not ‘speeding’ in the sense that other defendants in other vehicular homicide cases were speeding wherein the conviction was affirmed. Further, notwithstanding the fact that appellant’s Blazer did drive off the shoulder of the road, there is no suggestion that such incident occurred because of any impaired judgment on appellant’s part from his having imbibed the beer. At most, as recognized by the trial court, appellant was in the victim’s lane of traffic because he was overcorrecting from having driven off the shoulder of the road. That is evidence only of simple negligence and not of willful or wanton conduct.”

As the 1st DCA concluded the judge could not have determined W.E.B.’s driving was reckless as a matter of law, Tallahassee and North Florida’s highest court reversed W.E.B.’s adjudication of delinquency and ordered W.E.B. released from custody.

In sum, W.E.B. v. State, 553 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) is a landmark case in Florida’s corpus of case law surrounding recklessness for purposes of supporting vehicular (and vessel) homicide charges. 

Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal (Tallahassee and North Florida’s highest court) ruled that despite W.E.B. swerving out of his lane, drinking beer immediately before driving, and speeding, his driving was only “negligent” – not reckless.

Notably, if W.E.B. had more to drink, the weather was poor, or he was speeding by more than he was prior to the accident, the outcome could have been different. The 1st DCA may have found based on the “totality of the circumstances” that his conduct crossed over from negligence into recklessness.

However, the court made no such finding. As a result, Florida defendants and defense attorneys should take note of the 1st DCA’s relatively “defendant-friendly” evaluation of recklessness – setting a high bar for proving this in vehicular homicide cases.

For a full breakdown of recklessness in Florida vehicular and vessel homicide cases (including more recent case law), click here.

It is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible if someone is charged with vehicular homicide, DUI manslaughter, BUI manslaughter or vessel homicide. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting drug charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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