North FL’s Highest Court Dismisses Theft Charges In Foundational Entrapment Law Case

February 9, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense, Theft/Property Crimes Social Share

Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of charges against a defendant for grand theft, finding that he was entrapped as a matter of law because he simply ‘succumbed to temptation’ and was not predisposed to commit the underlying offense.

In Florida, entrapment serves as a “total defense” to criminal charges. If someone successfully argues that they were entrapped, they may not be found guilty of the charge(s) that stemmed from the entrapment. 

Entrapment occurs when the government impermissibly induces someone to commit a crime that would not have otherwise occurred. There are two forms of entrapment in Florida: objective and subjective. The distinction between these is important to understand if someone is exploring an entrapment defense to criminal charges.

The first of these, which is typically “harder” to establish, is objective entrapment. Objective entrapment occurs when law enforcement conduct that produces a defendant’s charge(s) is so egregious, unethical or illegal, that proceeding with a prosecution violates a defendant’s due process rights (under the Florida and U.S. Constitutions). 

In an objective entrapment analysis, a defendant’s “predisposition” (e.g. readiness/willingness to commit the underlying offense before the government inducement) is irrelevant. This is entirely an evaluation of whether government misconduct was so objectionable, that the defendant can’t be prosecuted without their rights being violated.

Since undercover police operations (e.g. sting operations) are legal, Florida’s courts are usually reluctant to dismiss charges on objective entrapment grounds.

However, examples of cases in which charges have been dismissed (or convictions overturned) due to objective entrapment include:

• Law enforcement manufactures drugs to sell to people on the street while undercover, only to arrest people when they try to buy them (State v. Williams, 623 So.2d 462, 466 (Fla. 1993))
• A police task force sends child pornography through the mail to arrest someone for possessing it (Farley v. State, 848 So.2d 393, 397-98 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003))
• A law enforcement officer or informant enters a sexual relationship with the defendant to get them to act criminally (Madera v. State, 943 So.2d 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006))

The next type of entrapment is subjective entrapment. This is the more frequently argued of the two entrapment defenses, and is codified by Munoz v. State, 629 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1993) and Fla. Stat. 777.201. 

Subjective entrapment occurs when the government induces a non-predisposed defendant to act unlawfully. This definition implies the “two prongs” of Florida’s subjective entrapment defense: inducement and predisposition.

Note: An entrapment defense can be raised in the form of a pretrial motion to dismiss, at trial itself, or both. For more on this, click here.

The first of these, inducement, must be proven by the defendant by a preponderance (majority) of the evidence. Critically, inducement is not proven by the fact that law enforcement officers or informants were “involved” in making the underlying crime happen (a common misconception).

Inducement occurs when law enforcement relies upon impermissible tactics that risk a crime will be committed even by someone who was not initially “ready and willing, without persuasion” to act unlawfully.

Inducement methods may include any of the following (Gennette v. State, 124 So.3d 273 (Fla 1st DCA 2013)):

• Coaxing, cajoling, or harassment (e.g. police repeatedly texting someone in an effort to “rope them in” to criminal activity when they have shown no interest)
• Promises of friendship with the defendant (e.g. “I know you’re lonely, but I’ll hang out with you all the time if you…”)
• Promises of monetary reward (e.g. “I’ll give you $1,000 if…”)
• Impugning the defendant’s manhood (e.g. “You’re not a real man, you’re scared…”)

If the defendant establishes inducement by a preponderance of the evidence, the State must then prove the defendant was predisposed to commit the underlying offense(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. Examples of evidence the State may rely upon to prove predisposition include someone’s criminal record or their “eagerness” to act unlawfully immediately after the inducement.

If the evidence clearly supports that the defendant was induced and not predisposed, a trial judge may dismiss the underlying charge(s) on subjective entrapment grounds. However, if the judge believes a reasonable jury could conclude the defendant was not entrapped, a pretrial motion to dismiss on entrapment grounds is likely to be denied.

In the event that a pretrial motion to dismiss on subjective entrapment grounds is denied, a defendant can still argue this at trial. There, a jury will decide if the defendant was entrapped or not (using the Munoz/Fla. Stat. 777.201 test, if subjective entrapment is argued).

Note: To learn more about inducement for entrapment purposes, click here. For more on what qualifies as “predisposition,” click here.

Though Munoz v. State, 629 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1993) is the case responsible for codifying Florida’s current “subjective entrapment” test, Munoz is not the first case to evaluate entrapment through this framework. 

Over a decade earlier, Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal (Tallahassee and North Florida’s highest court) utilized a similar framework to reverse a theft conviction on entrapment grounds. Let’s take a look at that case – State v. Casper, 417 So.2d 263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) – and how it shaped entrapment law in Florida.

KEY CASE: State v. Casper, 417 So.2d 263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)

In Casper, the defendant (Casper) was charged with theft. The “victim” of the theft was a police officer who was working undercover in Duval County.

At trial, it was revealed that the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office sent an undercover officer, dressed in old clothes and smelling of alcohol, to lay on a sidewalk on the street. Sticking out of his back pocket was $150 in cash.

While the officer laid there (pretending to be homeless), Casper was walking down Duval Street and observed him, apparently sleeping. Casper reached down and removed the money from the undercover officer’s pocket. Casper continued walking down the street – but a few minutes later, nearby police jumped out and arrested him.

Casper was charged with larceny (grand theft under modern law). However, Casper successfully moved before trial to dismiss the charge on entrapment grounds. The State appealed the trial judge’s ruling to the 1st DCA.

On appeal to the 1st DCA, Casper argued that he was not predisposed to commit the crime – as he had no record and was simply “minding his business” until he was tempted (e.g. induced) to act unlawfully. Because of this, Casper urged the 1st DCA to affirm the pretrial dismissal of the charge, as there no reasonable jury could conclude that he was not entrapped.

The 1st DCA agreed with Casper and affirmed the judge’s dismissal of the charge. The 1st DCA first began by discussing the case law surrounding the entrapment defense (as of 1982):

“The precise issue presented by this appeal is whether the evidence in a light most favorable to the State demonstrates that, at a time when the defendant had no intention to steal the decoy’s money, the police, acting through the decoy, induced the defendant to commit grand larceny. We note that entrapment is normally a question for the jury unless the evidence is so clear and convincing that the trial judge can pass on the issue as a matter of law. State v. Rouse, 239 So.2d 79 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). A high degree of government participation in the crime scenario is not necessarily impermissible. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973); State v. Dickinson, 370 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1979). Moreover, the police are not precluded from acting in good faith for the purpose of detecting a crime and merely furnishing an opportunity for the commission of the crime by one who had the required criminal intent. Lashley v. State, 67 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1953).”

Applying the law to the facts of the case, the 1st DCA concluded there was no evidence Casper was predisposed to commit grand larceny, and simply succumbed to “temptation.” As a result, the charge required dismissal:

“The State may demonstrate predisposition by proof of the defendant’s prior criminal activities, his reputation for such activities, reasonable suspicion of his involvement in such activity, or his ready acquiescence in the commission of the crime. Story v. State, 355 So.2d 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Moreover, evidence of prior unlawful acts, similar to the one with which the defendant is charged, is ordinarily admissible to rebut a defense of entrapment…”

“There is no evidence that he was engaging in criminal activity before he took the money from the decoy. … No ready acquiescence is shown; on the contrary, the defendant’s acts, as stated in the motion, demonstrate only that he succumbed to temptation. The record, as such, reveals that the decoy did not detect or discover, nor could he reasonably be intended to discover, the type of crime the police were attempting to prevent by the use of the decoy, i.e., robberies and purse snatchings. Indeed, lifting some money protruding from the pocket of a seemingly unconscious, drunken bum is just not sufficiently similar to either robbery or purse snatchings. Upon these facts, the decoy simply provided the opportunity to commit a crime to anyone who succumbed to the lure of the bait. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court’s ruling that, as a matter of law, the defendant was entrapped.”

In sum, State v. Casper, 417 So.2d 263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) is a landmark decision in Florida’s corpus of case law surrounding entrapment. In a case that laid part of the foundation for modern entrapment law in the state, the 1st DCA found:

• Casper was not predisposed to act unlawfully (no criminal record and no evidence that he intended to engage in criminality before he was induced)
• The undercover officer’s position/cash sticking out of his pocket risked that even a person who had no plans to act criminally would “succumb to temptation”
• As a result, Casper was entrapped as a matter of law – requiring pretrial dismissal of the grand larceny charge

Florida’s criminal defense community should take note of State v. Casper, 417 So.2d 263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), as it is a defendant-friendly case on the issue of entrapment. If it is clear that law enforcement induced someone to act unlawfully – and they were not predisposed to do so – dismissal of the resulting charge(s) is required if no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise.

If someone is arrested and formally charged in Florida in a case and has a potential entrapment defense, it is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation

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