North FL’s Highest Court: Police Misrepresenting Law During Interrogation Violates Miranda Rights

March 5, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense Social Share

Case Summary

Though officers can generally lie to suspects during interrogation, Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal ruled that officers cannot affirmatively misstate the law in an effort to get them to confess to what the suspect believes is a “less serious” crime.

• CASE: Baptiste v. State, 179 So.3d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) 
• Charge(s): Armed Robbery, Conspiracy to Commit Robbery
• Outcome: Convictions reversed, as law enforcement lied about the law to the defendant to get him to confess.

In Florida and throughout the U.S., Miranda rights are a key constitutional protection for those subject to custodial interrogation by law enforcement. Per the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), your Miranda rights include:

• The right to remain silent
• The fact that anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law
• The right to an attorney, including to have one present during questioning
• The fact that if you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you

If someone is read their Miranda rights, the SMART next move is to exercise them! Make sure to tell law enforcement that you will be remaining silent and are requesting an attorney. If this is not done and someone simply sits there quietly (e.g. does not invoke their rights aloud), officers have legal permission to continue questioning them. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010)

It is commonly believed that any time law enforcement has an encounter with someone or puts handcuffs on them, they must read their Miranda rights. However, this is not the case. Miranda rights must only be read if police have a suspect in custody, before they subject that suspect to interrogation. Moore v. State, 798 So.2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)

For Miranda purposes, custody occurs when someone’s freedom of movement is restricted by law enforcement consistent with an actual arrest and a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would not feel free to leave. To learn more about custody, click here.

Interrogation for Miranda purposes occurs when law enforcement engages in questioning (or its functional equivalent) that is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from a suspect. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) For more on interrogation, click here.

If someone is read their Miranda rights, they are at a “fork in the road” (e.g. have two possible decisions they can make). These are:

• Invoke their rights by remaining silent and/or requesting an attorney (DO THIS!)
• Waiving their rights and agreeing to speak with law enforcement, without an attorney present

In the event that someone waives their Miranda rights, their post-Miranda statements (including confessions) are admissible in a court of law (e.g. at trial) if their Miranda waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. To learn more about when a legally valid Miranda waiver does (and does not) occur, click here.

A Miranda waiver is considered valid (e.g. knowing, intelligent, and voluntary) when a suspect both understands the nature of their rights and the potential consequences of not invoking them. Examples of situations where law enforcement acts in a manner that renders a Miranda waiver (and subsequent confession) involuntary include:

• Law enforcement does not read someone their full Miranda rights (e.g. omits one or more rights when notifying a suspect of them, such as not disclosing the right to an attorney)
• Law enforcement minimizes Miranda (e.g. “This is just a formality…”)
• Law enforcement reads someone their rights in a language that is not their own (e.g. reads a clear Spanish-speaker their rights in English)
• Law enforcement uses threats, coercion, or trickery to get someone to waive their rights – even once they have chosen to exercise them

Sometimes, a suspect will waive their Miranda rights and begin to discuss the alleged offenses with law enforcement. It is generally the case that law enforcement is permitted to lie during an interrogation to extract “information” from a suspect that may be relevant to their investigation of the underlying crime(s). Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969)

But sometimes, an officer misleading a suspect can cross the line from “permissible” deception into conduct that renders the confession involuntary. One example of such “line-crossing” was noted by Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal (North FL’s highest court) in a 2015 decision.

In that case, law enforcement brought in a suspect in an armed robbery case and subjected him to custodial interrogation. After that suspect waived his Miranda rights, an officer told him that he would only be charged with robbery – not armed robbery – if he used a BB gun rather than a real gun to commit the offense.

Relying on the officer’s misrepresentation of the law, the suspect confessed to what he thought was “simple” robbery. However, because a BB gun can also be considered a deadly weapon, the defendant’s statements were used to prove him guilty at trial of armed robbery.

The defendant challenged his conviction to the 1st DCA after a pretrial motion to suppress his post-Miranda statements was denied by the trial judge (allowing the jury to hear his confession). Agreeing that the defendant’s confession was involuntary (in violation of his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination), the 1st DCA reversed his conviction in a major ruling. 

Let’s look at that case – Baptiste v. State, 179 So.3d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) – and discuss what it means for defendants whose confessions in Florida may have been involuntary.

KEY CASE: Baptiste v. State, 179 So.3d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) 

In Baptiste, the defendant (Baptiste) was charged with and convicted of armed robbery of a store and conspiracy to rob another store. He appealed his convictions to Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal.

The State’s case largely relied upon Baptiste’s post-arrest statements. When Baptiste was taken into custody and brought in to be interrogated, he signed a Miranda waiver and began to speak with officers. The following occurred, according to the 1st DCA:

“Officers repeatedly encouraged appellant to confess to involvement in both incidents, but he refused. Appellant then stated, “I need to make a phone call and see if I can get contact with my people so I can get an attorney for some kind of reason. Don’t you feel like I have that kind of right?” The officer responded, “You have the right to talk to an attorney, but like I said, it’s one of those things where once you request an attorney, then I can’t talk to you anymore…. [L]ike I said, I don’t want you to throw away an opportunity, okay?” The officers continued to question appellant.”

Eventually, interrogating officers began to question Baptiste about the type of weapon allegedly used to commit the robbery. The following exchange occurred:

“Appellant asked if he was being charged with armed robbery for the first jewelry store and attempted armed robbery for the second jewelry store. The officer stated, “That’s what you’re looking at right now.” Appellant asked, “What do you consider attempted armed robbery? BB guns?” The officer responded that if BB guns were used, “[i]t’s attempted robbery. It’s not armed robbery …. there’s a difference when you carry a gun to a robbery and when you don’t carry a gun to a robbery.” A second officer stated that “BB guns are along the lines of having a sling shot, okay? Technically it is a weapon. Is it likely to kill someone? That’s the big difference. A firearm is likely to kill somebody.” The first officer similarly stated, “BB gun is not considered a deadly weapon; firearm is.” Appellant asked, “But the BB gun is still going to be considered an armed robbery ?” The officer stated, “No, it’s considered a robbery.”

Baptiste immediately confessed to the robbery, relying on the officer’s misinformation. Before trial, Baptiste filed a motion to suppress his post-Miranda statements, making two arguments:

• Baptiste’s Miranda rights were violated when he said he “needed to make a phone call” to get in contact with an attorney – and officers talked him out of doing it (e.g. they did not disengage when he attempted to exercise his rights)
• Baptiste’s confession was rendered involuntary by the fact that the officer lied about how the law applied to BB guns 

The trial judge denied Baptiste’s motion, and his inculpatory statements were shown to the jury at his trial. He was convicted.

On appeal to Florida’s 1st DCA, Baptiste renewed his arguments – with particular emphasis on the fact that the interrogating officer misrepresented the law (directly leading to the confession). Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal agreed Baptiste’s rights were violated, reversing his armed robbery conviction and remanding for a new trial:

“Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to police because his statements were made after officers misrepresented the law by promising that he could not be charged with armed robbery with a deadly weapon if he confessed to committing the robbery using BB guns. We agree.”

“Both federal and Florida case law distinguish between a police officer’s misrepresentation of fact versus a misrepresentation of law. Generally, “misrepresentation[s] of fact …. are not enough to render a suspect’s ensuing confession involuntary, nor does it undermine the waiver of the defendant’s Miranda rights. Police misrepresentations of law, on the other hand, are much more likely to render a suspect’s confession involuntary.”

Finding that the interrogating officer “misrepresented the law” while questioning Baptiste, the 1st DCA concluded:

“Here, police made a promise to appellant that he could only be charged with robbery, not armed robbery or armed robbery with a deadly weapon, if he used a BB gun. That promise was a misrepresentation of the law. A BB gun can support a conviction for armed robbery with a deadly weapon. … It is clear from the interview transcript that there was a “causal connection between the improper conduct and the statement.” 

“Although appellant had repeatedly refused to confess during the interview, when the officers told appellant he could not be charged with armed robbery with a deadly weapon if they used BB guns, he confessed almost immediately and specified they used BB guns. Thus, we find the officers’ promise that appellant could not be charged with armed robbery with a deadly weapon was a misrepresentation of the law that rendered involuntary appellant’s statements that followed. Finally, the error in admitting appellant’s statements was not harmless. As such, we REVERSE.”

In sum, Baptiste v. State, 179 So.3d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) marks a significant development in Florida’s corpus of case law on the issue of Miranda rights and the voluntariness of post-arrest confessions. Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal found that:

• Officers misrepresented the law during their interrogation of Baptiste, by claiming that a BB gun could not support an armed robbery charge
• Unlike misrepresentations of fact (e.g. “John saw you at the scene”), misrepresentations of law are not permitted during interrogations 
• The misrepresentation of the law led directly to Baptiste’s confession to the offense – making it involuntary (violates Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution)
• As his involuntary confession was admitted at trial and this was not “harmless error” (e.g. may have influenced the verdict), Baptiste’s convictions required reversal

Florida’s criminal defense community should take note of Baptiste v. State, 179 So.3d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), as it makes clear officers may not misrepresent the law during an interrogation. If this occurs, a suspect’s post-Miranda confession that stems from the misrepresentation of law is considered involuntary and inadmissible against them in a court of law.

If someone is arrested and formally charged in Florida in a case involving a Miranda waiver that was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary, it is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

  Social Share