North FL’s Highest Court Reverses Conviction Over Potentially Biased Juror: Here’s Why
March 5, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense Social Share
Case Summary
Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal ruled that the defendant, whose charges stemmed from a prison riot, was required to receive a new trial after a juror failed to disclose her nephew was a local correctional officer.
In Florida, jury selection (also known as voir dire) is a critical aspect of any criminal trial. At jury selection, the State and defense have the opportunity to question potential jurors to ensure that they are able to be fair and impartial if chosen to hear a case – and identify which potential jurors will likely not be able to set aside their bias.
At a Florida criminal trial, a prosecutor and defense attorney will each ask potential jurors (the venire) various questions designed to assess whether they are the “right juror” for the case. If a potential juror gives one or more responses indicating they are likely to be biased for or against a defendant, a party to the case is likely to “cause challenge” that potential juror.
A cause challenge occurs when a party to the case believes there is a legally valid basis to excuse the potential juror due to concerns they will not be fair and impartial. Examples of cases in which an experienced and aggressive Florida criminal defense attorney is likely to cause challenge a potential juror include:
- A potential juror says they will believe a law enforcement officer’s testimony over the testimony of other witnesses
- A potential juror says they have a personal connection to the alleged victim(s) in the case or have been a victim of a similar crime and can’t be unbiased
- A potential juror says they believe the defendant is likely “guilty of something” because they are sitting in the courtroom
In the event that a cause challenge (which are unlimited in number) of a potential juror is made, the judge has two options:
- Grant the cause challenge, excusing the potential juror from service (e.g. sending them home)
- Deny the cause challenge, finding insufficient evidence that the juror is too biased or that they cannot be rehabilitated
Important: Just because a potential juror “comes in” to jury selection with bias, does not make them automatically ineligible for service. Any party may attempt to “rehabilitate” the potential juror (including the judge) by asking questions to evaluate if that potential juror can totally set aside possible biases and follow the law if instructed. For more on this, click here.
In the event that a cause challenge is denied, either side to the case may elect to use a peremptory strike (if they have any remaining). A peremptory strike (or peremptory challenge) occurs when a party to the proceeding (e.g. the State or defense) unilaterally excuses a potential juror from service, without having to get the judge’s approval first.
Unlike cause challenges, peremptory strikes are limited. Florida allows for a “starting number” of peremptory strikes – 3 in misdemeanor cases, 6 in non-capital/life felony cases, and 10 in capital/life felony cases. The trial judge has discretion to award more peremptory strikes to a party, if requested. Peters v. State, 874 So.2d 677 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
Note: A peremptory strike can be used for any reason (can even be the juror’s hairstyle) other than on the basis of a potential juror’s race, sex, or ethnicity. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994)
It is useful while jury selection is ongoing for an experienced and aggressive Florida criminal defense attorney to “prioritize” which jurors are important to strike. It may be helpful to put “objectionable” potential jurors into two buckets:
- Group A jurors: Potential jurors for which a cause challenge is likely to succeed (e.g. they have made one or more comments that indicate clear bias)
- Group B jurors: Potential jurors that give off a “bad vibe,” but have not necessarily said anything so objectionable that a cause challenge will succeed
Keeping the number of “Group B” jurors limited is critical, as the number of peremptory strikes is also limited (and the trial judge may deny a request for more).
Sometimes, the defense in a Florida criminal case will end jury selection and have one or more of their peremptory strikes “left over.” It is not a requirement that all of these be used. If a group of potential jurors appears largely “unobjectionable,” it is quite common that one or both parties to the case will not use all their peremptory strikes.
Much of the time, if the defense does not exhaust all of their peremptory strikes, it will be due to the fact that potential jurors did not raise any “red flags.” But sometimes, a potential juror will not disclose something that was relevant and material to their jury service in the case – even if they are asked a question relating to it during voir dire.
When a defendant in Florida appeals their conviction on these grounds (e.g. the jury was biased by the juror due to their failure to disclose), courts use a three-pronged test established in De La Rosa v. Zequeria, 659 So.2d 239 (Fla. 1995) to examine whether the appeal has merit:
- Prong #1: The complaining party must establish that the information was relevant and material to jury service in the case
- Prong #2: The juror concealed that information during questioning (jury selection)
- Prong #3: The failure to disclose the information was not attributable to the complaining party’s lack of diligence
Though De La Rosa formally established this analysis, De La Rosa’s predecessors used a similar “test” before it was decided in 1995. If a potential juror conceals information that is relevant and material to their jury service and the failure of that information to come to light was not due to a lack of “due diligence” by the defense, this entitles a defendant to a new trial.
A decade before De La Rosa, Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal (Tallahassee and North FL’s highest court) heard a major case involving jury bias. There, a juror who heard the defendant’s case – involving charges stemming from a prison riot – did not disclose that her nephew was a correctional officer at the local prison.
When this was brought to light after the verdict, the defendant moved for a new trial – arguing that he was deprived of his right to a fair and impartial jury by this juror’s omission. However, the trial judge denied the defendant’s order and affirmed his convictions.
On appeal, the 1st DCA found that the defendant was indeed entitled to a new trial. The 1st DCA found that the juror should have disclosed the information – and that a peremptory strike held by the defense would have likely been used on her if she did.
Let’s take a look at that case, Mitchell v. State, 458 So.2d 819 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), and discuss what it means for defendants concerned about jury selection in Florida.
In Mitchell, the defendant (Mitchell) was charged with and convicted of three offenses stemming from a prison riot. He appealed to the 1st DCA, arguing his jury was biased by a juror that didn’t disclose her nephew was a correctional officer. According to the 1st DCA:
“Prior to allowing the attorneys to address questions directly to the prospective jurors, the trial court asked the jurors a number of questions. One of the questions was whether any of the jurors had any family member, relative or friend who was employed at the Cross City Correctional Institution. All of the jurors, including a Mrs. Newman, responded in the negative. After the trial judge completed his questioning of the jurors, he turned the voir dire over to counsel admonishing them against repetition of the areas already covered by the court. No further inquiry or comment was made during jury selection regarding any relationship between the jurors and employees at the correctional facility. After the verdict, it was discovered by defense counsel that Mrs. Newman was the aunt of a Cross City correctional officer. In fact, her nephew had been present in the courtroom during the trial assisting in security.”
As soon as the defense (Mitchell) learned of this information, Mitchell moved for a new trial, arguing that he had several peremptory challenges remaining at the time the question was asked. Mitchell asserted that he would have used a peremptory strike on Newman immediately, given her nephew was a correctional officer who was in the courtroom during the case.
The State replied that Newman’s “omission” was unintentional (according to her) – and thus, it could not be said that she “concealed” information that was relevant and material to her service on the jury. The following then occurred:
“The trial court took testimony from Mrs. Newman who stated that she recalled being asked the subject question but responded as she did because she thought the question was limited to her immediate family. She said that she was aware that her nephew was present in the courtroom during the trial but that her relationship to him and his presence in the courtroom had no effect on her deliberations.”
After hearing this from Newman, the trial judge agreed and denied Mitchell’s motion for a new trial. Mitchell appealed to Florida’s 1st DCA, arguing that the fact he could not prove Newman intentionally withheld the information did not change that he would have peremptorily stricken her from the venire if he was aware her nephew was a correctional officer.
The 1st DCA agreed with Mitchell – reversing his convictions and remanding the matter for a new trial. The 1st DCA wrote:
“The examination of a juror on voir dire has a dual purpose, namely, to ascertain whether a legal cause for challenge exists and also to determine whether prudence and good judgment suggest the exercise of a peremptory challenge. The right of peremptory challenge implies the right to make an intelligent judgment as to whether a juror should be excused. Counsel have the right to truthful information in making that judgment.”
“The state argues that the defendant should be denied relief because the juror’s untruthful response was not intentional. We might abide that argument if, for example, the juror was not aware of her nephew’s employment or the question were reasonably susceptible to being interpreted as an inquiry about the juror’s immediate family. … No such reason appears in the instant case for the juror’s untruthful response. Even assuming, as the trial court found, that the juror had no intent to deceive, nevertheless relief will be afforded where (1) the question propounded is straightforward and not reasonable susceptible to misinterpretation; (2) the juror gives an untruthful answer; (3) the inquiry concerns material and relevant matter to which counsel may reasonably be expected to give substantial weight in the exercise of his peremptory challenges; (4) there were peremptory challenges remaining which counsel would have exercised at the time the question was asked; and (5) counsel represents that he would have peremptorily excused the juror had the juror truthfully responded. Failure to enforce the right to elicit from prospective jurors truthful answers to material questions renders hollow the right of peremptory challenge.”
In essence, the 1st DCA found Mitchell’s question to potential jurors regarding family members employed by the correctional institution, was “straightforward and not reasonably susceptible to misinterpretation.” Because Newman did not answer the question truthfully and Mitchell would have stricken her if she did, this was reversible error, requiring a new trial for Mitchell.
In sum, Mitchell v. State, 458 So.2d 819 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) marks a significant development in Florida’s corpus of case law surrounding jury selection and when a juror’s failure to disclose relevant information is reversible error. The 1st DCA found that:
- Mitchell’s attorney asked a clear question to potential jurors attempting to identify if any of them had family employed at the prison where the alleged riot took place
- The potential juror (Newman) did not answer the question truthfully
- The inquiry was “relevant and material” to the content of the trial and the evidence
- Mitchell had peremptory strikes remaining at the time the untruthful, relevant response was given – and says he would’ve used one on Newman if she disclosed the information
- Because of this, Mitchell’s right to a fair and unbiased jury was violated – requiring the reversal of his convictions
Florida’s criminal defense community should take note of Mitchell v. State, 458 So.2d 819 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), as it makes clear that in North Florida, jurors concealing relevant and material information during voir dire can be grounds to reverse a guilty verdict (and for a defendant to receive a new trial).
If someone is arrested and formally charged in Florida and concerned about jury selection, it is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.
Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL
Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.
Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.
Social Share