Supreme Court’s Evolving Attitude Towards Miranda v. Arizona: How Is Florida Responding?

October 9, 2025 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense Social Share

A 2022 U.S. Supreme Court is having a subtle yet visible influence on how Florida’s courts are looking at Miranda rights.

In Florida and throughout the United States, someone must be read their Miranda rights by law enforcement before they are subject to custodial interrogation. These include:

• The right to remain silent
• The fact that anything they say can and will be used against them in court
• The right to an attorney
• The fact that if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for them

This has been the law of the land since Miranda v. Arizona was decided in 1966. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). For a post-Miranda confession (or any other post-Miranda statement) to be admissible in court against a defendant, they must knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive their Miranda rights before speaking with law enforcement.

Miranda was grounded in the idea that if someone has the right to remain silent and to an attorney (Fifth and Sixth Amendments), but is unaware of these rights when they are taken into custody and subject to police interrogation, the purpose of these rights has essentially been defeated. 

This is because without Miranda warnings, law enforcement would be able to elicit a confession from a suspect (or other potentially incriminating statements) without them ever knowing that they did not have to tell the police anything.

Under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, someone is protected against compelled self-incrimination. This means that the government cannot force or coerce someone to act as “a witness against himself” in a criminal proceeding. This was one of the key aspects of the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Miranda v. Arizona. 

In some cases, police may not read Miranda when required – or someone may invalidly waive their Miranda rights. If either of these occur, any post-Miranda statements given by the suspect must be suppressed – meaning they cannot be used against them in court

But some have claimed that not every Miranda violation is a violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This is a more recent argument that is gaining popularity among jurists, including members of the U.S. Supreme Court.

The argument claims that a Miranda violation does not mean that the Fifth Amendment was violated. This is because the Fifth Amendment simply prohibits compelled self-incrimination. 

The argument reasons that even if a suspect’s voluntary self-incriminating statements cannot be used against them in court due to an invalid Miranda waiver (e.g. not being read their rights or not understanding them), the suspect was not compelled (forced) to make those statements. As a result, the Fifth Amendment was not violated.

This is the precise line of reasoning embraced by the U.S. Supreme Court in a 2022 ruling, Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134 (2022). In Vega, the defendant (Tekoh) was at a hospital when an officer (Vega) spoke to him without first reading Tekoh his Miranda rights. Tekoh provided a voluntary written statement to Vega that was later used against him in court.

As a result of Tekoh’s statement, a flurry of criminal charges resulted (stemming from an alleged sexual assault). Though Tekoh was eventually acquitted, he then sued Officer Vega for violating his constitutional (Fifth and Sixth Amendment) rights by taking an unwarned statement from him at the hospital.

Tekoh used a federal law (42 U.S.C. § 1983) allowing for lawsuits against government agents, including law enforcement officers, for violating someone’s civil rights. At the U.S. Supreme Court, Tekoh reiterated his argument that the use of his written statement in the absence of Miranda warnings (which should have occurred) violated his rights.

But the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against Tekoh, holding that a Miranda violation cannot alone serve as the basis for such a suit unless the incriminating statements were compelled (forced). The Court characterized Miranda as a “court-created prophylactic rule,” rather than a direct extension of the Fifth Amendment.

Notably, the Court did not actually recede from Miranda itself. The Court affirmed that Miranda prevented Tekoh’s unwarned statements from being used against him at trial. However, the use of those statements did not automatically give rise to a “cause of action” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, so as to sue Vega for a violation of Tekoh’s constitutional rights.

In the context of Florida criminal cases, Vega v. Tekoh appears (on its face) to change… nothing. This is because the U.S. Supreme Court only ruled on the civil rights lawsuit issue – it did not officially recede from Miranda v. Arizona at all.

But in the wake of the Vega decision, some of Florida’s courts have latched on to this distinction between the Fifth Amendment itself and Miranda as a “court-created prophylactic rule.” Prior to Vega, many saw a Miranda violation as a Fifth Amendment violation. Now, there is a difference between the two (if post-Miranda statements were not technically “compelled”).

Since Vega, some of Florida’s top courts have shown a willingness to reconsider what was previously a strong deference to Miranda as (effectively) an extension of the Fifth Amendment. This first became clear in Judge Robert Long’s Freeman v. State, 373 So. 3d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) concurrence, authored a year after Vega was decided.

In that concurrence, Judge Long of the First District Court of Appeal dovetailed off the Supreme Court’s “court-created prophylactic rule” language to argue that some post-Miranda confessions should be admissible if the confession was not “compelled” and the costs of exclusion outweigh  the benefits. He wrote:

“If a Miranda-based suppression would not protect against government compelled self-incrimination, it should no longer be used. But even when a court finds the possibility of a coercion-deterrent benefit, that benefit alone is not enough to support suppression. Courts must also determine that the costs of evidence exclusion are outweighed by the prospective benefits.”

Judge Long cited Vega v. Tekoh, arguing that because the Supreme Court recognized Miranda as a “court-created rule” rather than a core constitutional protection (the Fifth Amendment itself), automatically suppressing post-arrest statements due to a Miranda violation (currently the law) is a mistake. He argued:

“Miranda is also unique among the Court’s prophylactic rules in that its application can involve the suppression of lawfully obtained evidence and the reversal of lawful convictions without a basis in substantive law. Suppression of a confession on Miranda noncompliance grounds, but without an underlying violation of the Fifth Amendment, is an extraordinary judicial act.”

Judge Long also called Vega the U.S. Supreme Court’s “recent zenith” in limiting Miranda. Though his opinion was ultimately a concurrence (not the majority, so it does not bind trial courts in Tallahassee and North Florida), it provided remarkable new insight into the subtle evolution of Miranda jurisprudence in Florida post-Vega v. Tekoh.

However, this subtle recession from strong deference to Miranda by Florida courts in the wake of Vega did not end there. One such case came from the Florida Supreme Court in 2024: State v. Penna, 385 So.3d 595 (Fla. 2024). 

In Penna, the Florida Supreme Court reversed its previous requirement for police officers to “remind and rewarn” suspects of their Miranda rights before reinitiating communication with them (which had been the case since the Court’s 2018 ruling in Shelly). 

The Florida Supreme Court remanded Penna’s case to the 4th District Court of Appeal, which previously ruled Penna’s statements could not be admitted in the prosecution against him. This was due to the officer’s failure to “remind and rewarn” Penna of his Miranda rights before conversing with him repeatedly in the hospital over weeks (as Shelly required at the time).

In line with the Florida Supreme Court’s change of heart, the 4th DCA ruled in Penna v. State, 410 So.3d 581 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025) that the admission of Penna’s statements did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights. Florida’s 4th DCA cited Vega in distinguishing Miranda from the Fifth Amendment itself, voicing agreement with the Florida Supreme Court:

“The Fifth Amendment provides that ‘[n]o person shall be … compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’ The Supreme Court of the United States has held that “the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 

“But Miranda rights “are prophylactic rules” that, while ‘constitutionally based,’ are not found in the text of the Constitution or the historical, common law right against self-incrimination. Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134, 142, 142 S.Ct. 2095, 213 L.Ed.2d 479 (2022).” 

As Penna’s statements confessing to the murders he was accused of were not compelled (forced) by the officer – but occurred in conversation that came after the officer’s failure to “readvise and rewarn” – Vega was used as support. Echoing Vega, the 4th DCA ruled that there is a difference between a Miranda violation and a Fifth Amendment violation.

Other Florida cases affirm this trend. For example, the 5th DCA’s recent decision in Pastor v. State (August 2025) cites favorably to Justice Alito’s Vega majority opinion with the following footnote:

“As Justice Alito noted, Miranda “stated quite clearly that the Constitution did not itself require adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process and that its decision in no way create[d] a constitutional straitjacket.”

In line with Justice Long’s concurrence in Freeman, there appears to be a subtle yet clear trend in Florida’s courts towards narrowing Miranda’s application in the wake of Vega. At the moment, this is not rising to the level of outright skepticism towards Miranda v. Arizona itself. 

But there is no doubt the U.S. Supreme Court’s evolving Miranda jurisprudence (especially its Vega v. Tekoh decision) is having an influence. Rather than interpreting Miranda and the Fifth Amendment in a manner where the two are inextricably tied, Florida’s courts have begun to draw a line between the two in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in Vega.

This may manifest in ways that do not represent an attack on Miranda itself, such as the reversal of the “remind and rewarn” requirement in Shelly. Since an “uncompelled” confession is now considered to not violate the Fifth Amendment itself, the potential “stigma” around reversing decisions like Shelly is weaker post-Vega, as it is not seen as an erosion of the Fifth Amendment.

Because Miranda has now been declared a “court-created prophylactic rule” as opposed to an extension of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, there has been a gradual reframing of Miranda’s role within Florida’s constitutional jurisprudence.

In sum, Florida’s courts are treating Miranda less as a constitutional guarantee, and more as a judicially crafted procedural safeguard in the aftermath of Vega v. Tekoh. How Florida’s Miranda jurisprudence will continue to evolve is yet to be seen.

If someone is ever subject to custodial interrogation and read their Miranda rights, they should exercise them. Tell the police you will be remaining silent and want an attorney. It makes the process easier, as you won’t give the police incriminating statements they can use against you!

If someone is arrested and formally charged in Florida in a case involving a Miranda waiver that was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary, or has questions about their rights, it is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting drug charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

  Social Share