When Can Victim Conduct Can Be Defense to Vehicular and Vessel Homicide Charges?

April 20, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense, Violent Crimes Social Share

Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal ruled that the conduct of a victim or third party cannot be used as a defense to vehicular homicide charges, except under very limited circumstances.

CASE: Reaves v. State, 979 So.2d 1066 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)

Charge(s): Vehicular Homicide

Outcome: Guilty plea AFFIRMED, as the conduct of a victim and/or a third party were not the cause of the victim’s death as a matter of law.

Vehicular Homicide in Florida

In Florida, vehicular homicide (Fla. Stat. 782.071) is a very serious felony offense. Vehicular homicide is typically punishable by up to 15 years in prison and a $10,000 fine. However, it is considered a first-degree felony (up to 30 years in prison and a $10,000 fine) if either (or both) of the following are true:

• The defendant has a prior conviction for DUI manslaughter, BUI manslaughter, vehicular homicide or vessel homicide (Trenton’s Law, 2025)
• The defendant fails to give information to authorities, render aid to the victim(s), or leaves the scene of the accident (e.g. fails to stop)

For someone to be guilty of vehicular homicide, the State must prove all of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

• The defendant operated a vehicle
• The defendant RECKLESSLY operated that vehicle
• The defendant’s reckless operation of the vehicle was the CAUSE of the victim’s death

Typically, operation in a vehicular homicide case is not in dispute. As long as the defendant was the one behind the wheel at the time of a fatal collision, the element of operation is satisfied. For more on this, click here.

The two most common disputes in a Florida vehicular homicide case are whether the defendant was RECKLESS, and whether they were the CAUSE of the victim’s death. The first of these – recklessness – is frequently debated in vehicular homicide prosecutions. But what does the term “reckless” mean for vehicular homicide purposes?

 For a driver to have been reckless (sufficient to sustain a vehicular homicide conviction), both of the following must have been true:

• The defendant operated their vehicle in a manner they knew or should have known was likely to cause death or great bodily harm (House v. State, 831 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002))
• The defendant did more than simply exceed the speed limit, as this is negligence – not recklessness (Luzardo v. State, 147 So.3d 1083 (Fla. 3d. DCA 2014))

On this second point, Florida’s courts have been clear that “speeding” alone – in the absence of any aggravating factors that make violating the speed limit especially hazardous – is insufficient as a matter of law to support a vehicular homicide conviction. State v. Del Rio, 854 So.2d 692 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)

But even though “speed alone” does NOT establish that someone drove recklessly for vehicular homicide purposes as a matter of law, it can be considered alongside other “aggravating factors” typically used to determine whether someone drove recklessly, not just carelessly. Per House v. State, 831 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), these include:

• Whether visibility was good or poor at the time of the accident
• Whether the defendant was staying “in their lane” or swerving out of it
• Whether there was signage indicating drivers should pay particular attention or slow down (e.g. school zones)Whether the defendant was traveling in an area with heavy foot traffic (e.g. residential)
• Whether the defendant was familiar with the area in which they were traveling
• Whether the cause of the death (e.g. the hazard that caused it) was foreseeable/perceived by others 
• Whether the defendant exercised “any degree of care” to avoid collision

If someone’s speed was clearly excessive and one or more of the above were also true, a person may permissibly be found guilty of vehicular homicide if the remaining elements are satisfied. 

Note: Under Florida law, vehicular homicide and vessel homicide (Fla. Stat. 782.072) have the same jury instructions. Moreover, recklessness has the same definition in vehicular and vessel homicide cases. For more, click here.

The second most common point of dispute in a vehicular (or vessel) homicide case is whether a defendant was the cause of the victim’s death. Cases in which courts have found a defendant is not guilty of vehicular homicide because they did not primarily cause the death of the victim(s) include:

• The victim grabbing the steering wheel from the defendant and causing the vehicle to lose control, resulting in a crash that caused their death (J.A.C. v. State, 374 So.2d 606 (Fla. 3d. DCA 1979))
• The victim was consensually involved in a street race with the defendant – and in the process lost control of their own vehicle and crashed (Velazquez v. State, 561 So.2d 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990))

It is commonly said that a victim’s conduct can never be used as a defense UNLESS the victim was entirely responsible for their death (e.g. were the sole proximate cause). This is, as a general rule, true. However, the rules slightly change if a THIRD PARTY (e.g. not the victim and not the defendant) was allegedly the cause.

This was made clear by Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal (Tallahassee and North Florida’s highest court) in a major case. There, the defendant entered a guilty plea to vehicular homicide, then attempted to withdraw the plea on the basis that there was an insufficient factual basis for it. 

Specifically, the defendant argued that because he was not primarily responsible for the victim’s death, causation for purposes of sustaining his adjudication of guilt for vehicular homicide could not be proven. Thus, he claimed his plea did not have an adequate factual basis. The motion was DENIED by the trial judge.

The defendant appealed this ruling to the 1st DCA, arguing the absence of a factual basis for an adjudication of guilt of vehicular homicide in his case. However, the 1st DCA REJECTED the defendant’s argument and ruled that he could not use either the victim’s conduct or the conduct of a third party (the driver of the car the victim was in) as a defense to vehicular homicide?

But why? Let’s take a look at that case – Reaves v. State, 979 So.2d 1066 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) – and discuss what it means for defendants in Florida charged with vehicular (or vessel) homicide.

KEY CASE: Reaves v. State, 979 So.2d 1066 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)

In Reaves, the defendant (Reaves) entered a guilty plea to vehicular homicide. The judge found a factual basis for the plea – and sentenced him accordingly. Shortly after the plea hearing, Reaves filed a MOTION TO WITHDRAW his guilty plea, arguing there was NO FACTUAL BASIS for it (rendering it invalid). The following facts were considered during the motion hearing:

• Reaves was driving at approximately 1 a.m. when he and another driver (Street) agreed to engage in a drag race
• Street had a passenger in his vehicle, who died in the subsequent collision
• During the race, Street attempted to pass Reaves in a “no passing zone”
• Reaves increased his speed, causing the two cars to come side by side as they approached a median
• Immediately before reaching the median, Street increased his speed in an attempt to try to cut in front of Reaves’s vehicle
• Street struck the median and spun out of control – crashing and killing the victim (who was in the passenger’s seat of his car)

Reaves was charged with vehicular homicide and racing on a highway. His motion to withdraw his guilty plea to both offenses was DENIED, as the judge found there was a sufficient factual basis to support a conclusion that Reaves was the cause of the victim’s death.

Reaves reiterated his argument to the 1st DCA. Citing Velazquez v. State, 561 So.2d 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), Reaves contended that he was not the proximate cause of the victim’s death. Reaves claimed that the victim caused her own death – or, in the alternative, that Street (the third party in the car with the victim) caused her death when he crashed into the median.

The 1st DCA REJECTED both claims and AFFIRMED Reaves’s guilty plea (e.g. did not allow him to withdraw it). Finding first that the victim (Byer) did not cause her own death – unlike the victim in Velazquez v. State, 561 So.2d 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) – the 1st DCA wrote:

“In Velazquez v. State, 561 So.2d 347, 353 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1990), the decedent was found responsible after inexplicably driving his car through a guardrail following a drag race with the defendant. Since the decedent volitionally drove his car off the embankment after the race had ended, it was found “unjust to hold the defendant criminally responsible for the deceased’s unexpected and near-suicidal conduct.” Id.; see also Union, 642 So.2d at 94. Here, there is no evidence Byer attempted to grab the steering wheel or was in control of the car when it struck the median. Similarly, there is no evidence she played an active role in the race, or that she even acquiesced to Street’s decision to participate in the race. However, there is evidence that Appellant was at least partially responsible for Byer’s death as he refused to let Street’s car merge as they approached the median. Since there is no evidence that Byer’s conduct was the sole cause of the accident, she cannot be considered the proximate cause of her own death.”

Next, the 1st DCA refuted Reaves’s argument that STREET was the “sole cause” of the victim’s death. Finding Street’s conduct that led him to crash into the median was a “natural, foreseeable” response to Reaves’s actions during the drag race, the 1st DCA concluded:

“Similarly unpersuasive is Appellant’s argument that Street was the sole cause of Byer’s death. When a party creates a condition of peril by his wrongful conduct, his actions can be found the proximate cause of the resulting injury, even if later events combined to cause such injury, so long as the later acts reasonably followed in the natural sequence of events. See State v. Gensler, 929 So.2d 27, 31 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2006); M.C.J. v. State, 444 So.2d 1001, 1005 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (stating an intervening cause cannot be foreseeable).”

“Here, Street’s refusal to slow his vehicle and merge as the cars approached the median does not excuse Appellant’s liability in Byer’s death. It was natural, and thus foreseeable, for Street to increase his speed and attempt to pass Appellant as they were engaged in a high speed race. Arguably, Appellant alone created the condition of peril by increasing his speed to match that of Street’s car, instead of allowing Street to safely pass by. Regardless, since Street’s actions were a foreseeable response to Appellant’s conduct, both Appellant and Street may be held liable for Byer’s death. See Jacobs v. State, 184 So.2d 711, 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966) (finding “[t]he deaths which proximately resulted from the activities of the three persons engaged in the unlawful activity of drag racing made each of the active participants equally guilty of the criminal act which caused the death of the innocent party”). Given the foregoing, the charge of vehicular homicide had adequate factual support and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.”

In sum, Reaves v. State, 979 So.2d 1066 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) marks a significant development in Florida’s corpus of case law surrounding vehicular (and vessel) homicide. The 1st DCA (North FL’s highest court) held that:

• The victim’s conduct was not a defense to Reaves causing the victim’s death, as she was not SOLELY RESPONSIBLE for her own demise
• Street’s conduct was also not a defense, because Street’s conduct (which led to the crash that killed the victim) was a “natural and foreseeable response” to Reaves’s “challenge”
• Reaves arguably created the “peril” by increasing his speed to match that of Street’s car, resulting in Street performing the maneuver that led to the crash
• Because a factual basis existed to conclude Reaves was the cause of the victim’s death, his guilty plea was AFFIRMED

Florida’s criminal defense community should take note of Reaves v. State, 979 So.2d 1066 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), as it explains when victim/third party conduct CAN AND CANNOT be used as a defense in a vehicular or vessel homicide case.

It is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible if someone is charged with vehicular homicide, DUI manslaughter, BUI manslaughter or vessel homicide. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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