When Does “Grossly Excessive Speed” Constitute Reckless Driving?

March 5, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense Social Share

Case Summary

Florida’s 4th District Court of Appeal ruled that a defendant’s “grossly excessive speed” was sufficient to support a finding that he recklessly drove, despite the oft-cited maxim that speed alone is insufficient to prove recklessness. Here’s why.

• CASE: Natal v. State, 278 So.3d 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) 
• Charge(s): Vehicular Homicide (Convicted of Reckless Driving)
• Outcome: Conviction AFFIRMED, as the defendant’s “grossly excessive” speed in a residential neighborhood and failure to try to avoid the fatal collision constituted reckless driving.

Vehicular Homicide Charges in Florida

In Florida, vehicular homicide (Fla. Stat. 782.071) is a very serious offense.

For someone to be convicted, the State must prove all of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

• The defendant operated a vehicle
• The defendant’s operation of the vehicle caused the death(s) of one or more other people
• The defendant’s operation of the vehicle (which caused the death) was reckless

Vehicular homicide is typically a second-degree felony, punishable by up to 15 years in prison and a $10,000 fine.

However, it becomes a first-degree felony (up to 30 years in prison) if either (or both) of the following are true:

• The defendant failed to stop at the scene, give information to law enforcement, or render aid to the victim(s)
• The defendant has one or more prior convictions for vehicular homicide, vessel homicide, DUI manslaughter or BUI manslaughter (Trenton’s Law, 2025)

If someone operates a vehicle recklessly but it does not result in a victim’s death, they are guilty of the “lesser included offense” of reckless driving.

For a defendant to be convicted of reckless driving in Florida, the State must prove all of the following beyond a reasonable doubt (Fla. Stat. 316.192):

• The defendant operated a vehicle
• The nature of the operation of the vehicle exhibited a willful and wanton disregard for the safety or persons or property.

Important: “Willful” means intentionally, knowingly, and purposely. “Wanton” means with a conscious and intentional indifference to consequences and with knowledge that damage is likely to be done to persons or property. W.E.B. v. State, 553 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)

If someone is found to have recklessly driven, the following penalty scheme applies under state law:

• For a first offense that does not involve injury to persons or property, up to 90 days in jail and a fine between $25 and $500
• For a second or subsequent conviction that does not involve injury to persons or property, up to 6 months in jail and a fine between $50 and $1,000
• If someone causes property damage or non-serious bodily injury due to reckless driving, it is a first-degree misdemeanor (up to 1 year in jail and a $1,000 fine)
• If someone causes serious bodily harm (“an injury to another person, which consists of a physical condition that creates a substantial risk of death, serious personal disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ”), it is a third-degree felony (up to 5 years in prison and a $5,000 fine)

It is an “oft-cited” maxim in Florida law that “speeding alone” cannot support a conviction for reckless driving (or vehicular homicide) as a matter of law. Luzardo v. State, 147 So.3d 1083 (Fla. 3d. DCA 2014)

If a defendant “did everything right” with the exception of exceeding the speed limit, courts have consistently held they are not guilty of vehicular homicide (or vessel homicide) – nor can they be guilty of reckless operation of a vehicle (or vessel). A defendant’s speed is typically considered with other factors such as (Hamilton v. State, 439 So.2d 238 (Fla. 2d. DCA 1983)):

• Whether visibility was good or poor at the time of the accident
• Whether the defendant was staying “in their lane” or swerving out of it
• Whether the cause of the death (e.g. the hazard that caused it) was foreseeable/perceived by others 
• Whether the defendant exercised “any degree of care” to avoid collision
• Whether the defendant was traveling in an area with heavy foot traffic (e.g. residential)
• Whether the defendant was familiar with the area in which they were traveling

But under rare circumstances, a defendant’s grossly excessive speed may be enough to support a finding that they are guilty of reckless driving (or vehicular homicide if their reckless operation of a vehicle caused a victim’s death). 

If prevailing conditions made someone’s grossly excessive speed highly dangerous (e.g. active school zone), someone may still be guilty of reckless driving and/or vehicular homicide as a matter of law. Again, this is the “exception to the rule” – but exceptional cases have been heard and decided by Florida courts.

In one case heard by Florida’s 4th District Court of Appeal (Southeast Florida’s highest court), a defendant did not do anything except travel at a “grossly excessive” speed. Nevertheless, the 4th DCA found the evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding him guilty of reckless driving – because the conditions at the time the offense took place made his speed particularly hazardous.

Let’s take a look at that case – Natal v. State, 278 So.3d 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) – and what it means for defendants charged with reckless driving or vehicular homicide (or vessel homicide) in Florida.

KEY CASE: Natal v. State, 278 So.3d 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) 

In Natal, the defendant (Natal) was found guilty of reckless driving (e.g. lesser-included offense) after initially being charged with vehicular homicide. He was sentenced to 3 years in prison and appealed to the 4th DCA – arguing he did not drive recklessly as a matter of law because he was “only” speeding at the time of the fatal collision.

At trial, it was revealed that the victim’s husband attempted to make a left turn in an area where the speed limit was 40 miles per hour after seeing the defendant’s vehicle far in the distance. But it turned out that vehicle (e.g. Natal) was traveling between 82 and 85 miles per hour – and the driver had his foot on the gas.

Natal slammed into the side of the van – having traveled approximately “two football fields” in mere seconds. The driver’s wife was ejected from the vehicle (as she was not wearing a seatbelt) and it rolled on top of her, killing her.

Natal moved for a judgment of acquittal (MJOA) on the vehicular homicide charge after the State’s case concluded – arguing “speed alone” was insufficient to establish his guilt. The trial judge denied the motion. Then, according to the 4th DCA:

“Appellant testified in his defense, stating that he and his cousin were traveling east on Sheridan in the left-hand lane, when he saw the van making the left-hand turn across Sheridan and moved to the middle lane to try to avoid the accident. At the time he saw the van, he said he was sixty or seventy-five feet away. He attempted to dodge the van by changing lanes, but it kept going and he hit it. After his testimony, appellant renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal, which the trial court denied. The case was submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict finding appellant guilty of the lesser-included offense of reckless driving. The court sentenced appellant to three years in prison. This appeal followed.”

On appeal to the 4th DCA, Natal renewed his claim that his speed at the time of the accident was insufficient to sustain a reckless driving conviction. However, the 4th DCA rejected his argument and affirmed the conviction. The 4th DCA wrote:

“While we have stated that speed alone can justify the denial of a judgment of acquittal, each case always turns on its own specific facts. In particular, the area in which the speeding occurs is a significant factor. A vehicle travelling 100 miles per hour on an interstate highway does not pose the same level of wanton conduct as does a vehicle travelling ninety miles an hour on a street with various side streets, driveways entering the street, and overall additional congestion.”

“In this case, appellant was driving more than twice the speed limit in a mixed residential/commercial neighborhood. Pedestrians were standing by the roadway waiting for a bus. A homeowner pulled into his driveway which fronts on Sheridan. While appellant says that he saw the van only sixty to seventy-five feet prior to impact, the victim stated that he saw appellant 200 yards away, and the expert agreed that the victim started the turn when appellant was 200 yards away, not the short distance described by appellant. Appellant continued to accelerate until two seconds before the crash, and there was very little braking. Thus, we conclude that the State’s evidence was sufficient to overcome a judgment of acquittal.”

Put simply, the 4th DCA ruled that while driving over the speed limit is facially insufficient for a reckless driving (or vehicular homicide) conviction, operating a vehicle at a “grossly excessive” speed (e.g. 80 miles per hour) in a mixed-use neighborhood was inherently reckless in Natal’s case. Thus, according to the 4th DCA, the trial judge properly denied Natal’s MJOA.

Rejecting Natal’s argument that Luzardo v. State, 147 So.3d 1083 (Fla. 3d. DCA 2014) required the reversal of his conviction, the 4th DCA wrote:

“Appellant most strongly relies on Luzardo v. State, 147 So. 3d 1083 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014), in which the Third District reversed the defendant’s conviction for vehicular homicide, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to show the required reckless conduct for the charge. However, that case is distinguishable on its facts.”

“In contrast, in this case, appellant was speeding (and accelerating) at more than twice the posted speed limit in a residential/commercial neighborhood and failed to take any evasive action until the last moment even though the victim commenced his turn when the appellant was the length of two football fields away. We find that his grossly excessive speed alone, given the area where he was driving, was sufficiently reckless that the court properly denied the motion for judgment of acquittal.”

In sum, Natal v. State, 278 So.3d 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) marks a significant development in Florida’s corpus of case law regarding recklessness for purposes of proving vehicular homicide and/or reckless driving charges in the state. The 4th DCA found that:

• Natal’s “grossly excessive” speed (double the speed limit) in a mixed-use neighborhood could reasonably be considered reckless as a matter of law
• Natal did not take any evasive action until the final moment before the collision even though the victim began turning his vehicle when Natal was roughly 200 yards away (making his case distinguishable from Luzardo v. State, 147 So.3d 1083 (Fla. 3d. DCA 2014))
• Since the jury reasonably concluded Natal was reckless behind the wheel, his conviction was affirmed

Florida’s criminal defense community should take note of Natal v. State, 278 So.3d 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019), as it shows that in rare cases, “grossly excessive” speed can constitute recklessness as a matter of law. 

However, if a driver does “everything right” except for speeding, it is unlikely Florida courts will find a defendant was reckless. In Natal’s case, he doubled the speed limit in a heavily residential area and did not take evasive action until the moment before the crash that killed the victim. This made his case distinguishable from Luzardo, as the 4th DCA observed.

It is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible if someone is charged with vehicular homicide, DUI manslaughter, BUI manslaughter or vessel homicide. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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