Major Florida Court Reverses Juvenile Conviction Due to Miranda Rights Violation

October 23, 2025 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense, Juvenile Offenses Social Share

A top Florida court reversed a juvenile’s conviction for attempted armed robbery after finding his Miranda rights were violated by law enforcement.

In Florida, suspects of all ages must be notified of their Miranda rights before they are subject to custodial interrogation. Miranda rights are named for Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case that created the requirement for officers to read them. These include:

• The right to remain silent
• The fact that anything they say can and will be used against them in court
• The right to an attorney, including having an attorney present during questioning
• The fact that if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for them

Custody for Miranda purposes occurs when a reasonable person in a suspect’s position would not feel free to end police questioning and leave. Interrogation occurs when police engage in questioning (or its functional equivalent) that is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from a suspect. For more on custodial interrogation, click here.

In some cases, a suspect may knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive their Miranda rights (choose not to remain silent and/or request an attorney) and speak with police. This is an unwise decision, as law enforcement is specifically trained to extract information from suspects that can be used against them at trial.

The issue of whether a Miranda waiver was valid (knowing, intelligent and voluntary) can be key in a criminal case. This is because an invalid Miranda waiver prohibits a defendant’s post-arrest statements to law enforcement (including confessions) from being used against them in court.

In cases where the legal validity of a Miranda waiver is disputed, the State must prove by a preponderance (majority) of the evidence that a suspect validly waived their rights. According to Miranda v. Arizona, this means they must have both understood their rights and the potential consequences of not exercising them, but freely decided to waive them anyway.

The State has an “especially high burden” in cases where a juvenile (minor) is a suspect. If someone is under the age of 18, courts consider additional factors in evaluating whether a juvenile’s waiver was legally valid – allowing their statements to be used against them at trial. These include:

• The juvenile’s age, experience, background, and intelligence 
• The way in which the Miranda warnings were administered (spoken, read, or both)
• Whether the juvenile had the opportunity to consult with their parent or guardian
• The location of the interrogation
• Whether a written waiver was obtained before interrogation commenced 

This framework was created by the Florida Supreme Court in Ramirez v. State, 739 So.2d 568 (Fla. 1999). For more on Ramirez and juvenile Miranda waivers in Florida, click here.

A key case where a top Florida court recently applied the Ramirez framework is N.J.O. v. State, 331 So. 3d 493 (Fla. 2d. DCA 2020). Let’s break this case down and discuss its impact on how Florida’s courts view Miranda rights violations.

Key Case: N.J.O. v. State, 292 So. 3d 491 (Fla. 2d. DCA 2020)

In N.J.O., the juvenile defendant (N.J.O.) was arrested for pointing a gun at a former classmate and attempting to rob him. When N.J.O. arrived at the police station, an officer informed him of his Miranda rights. N.J.O. initially indicated he understood what he was being read.

However, when officers asked him to sign a written form waiving his Miranda rights, N.J.O. said the following: 

“I don’t know what all these legal questions mean, so I want to, like have somebody with me. I’m not trying to be difficult or anything. Like, I just don’t know, because you guys word stuff funny sometimes… Not funny, but you guys just use big words sometimes, that I don’t understand.”

Officers assured N.J.O that they were not trying to “trick” him or force him to talk. They then asked him if he wished to answer questions, to which he gave a conditional response (“Not answer every question – because, I mean…”).

An officer assured N.J.O. that he could “pick and choose” what he wanted to answer, and that if he decided he did not want to talk, he could do so. Officers then asked N.J.O. if he’d been forced or coerced at any point during the interrogation so far (“Nobody’s made a threat to you; nobody’s made any promises… Nobody has tricked you; coerced you to make a statement right now.”).

When N.J.O. agreed he had not been “tricked” or “coerced,” officers then told him they “needed him to” sign the Miranda form waiving his rights. Officers then began interrogating N.J.O., and he confessed to the attempted armed robbery.

N.J.O.’s statements were used against him at trial, where he was adjudicated delinquent (a guilty finding by a judge at a juvenile trial). N.J.O. appealed to Florida’s 2nd District Court of Appeal (Greater Tampa area), arguing his confession was improperly admitted in court, as his Miranda rights had been violated.

The 2nd DCA agreed with N.J.O., reversing the trial judge’s adjudication of delinquency and remanding the matter to the lower court for a new trial. The 2nd DCA found that by asking for “someone” to be with him during questioning, N.J.O. had invoked his Miranda right to have an attorney present, requiring officers to end interrogation. The court wrote:

“Here, the record shows that after being informed of his Miranda rights, N.J.O. invoked his right to have counsel present with him. When the detective asked N.J.O. whether he wanted to waive his rights and speak with the officers, N.J.O. clearly stated that he did not understand the legal questions that were being asked and clearly stated that he wanted somebody to be with him.”

“N.J.O. also indicated that he was concerned that questions would be ‘worded funny,’ he expressed his concern that the detective was using “big words” that N.J.O. did not understand, and he apologized for being difficult. This statement was sufficiently clear to inform the officers that N.J.O. wanted to invoke—not waive—his Miranda rights.”

“At that point, the officers should have stopped questioning N.J.O. because once a suspect has invoked his or her rights, it is improper for officers to attempt to coax or cajole a suspect into waiving those rights.”

To support this finding, the 2nd DCA analyzed the Ramirez factors, concluding that N.J.O. was especially vulnerable to potential law enforcement manipulation due to his age, intelligence, background and lack of experience with police. The court observed:

“Here, the record shows that N.J.O. was sixteen years old, had a 0.9 G.P.A., and had no prior experience at all with law enforcement. He was not given an opportunity to speak with his mother, even after he asked for ‘someone’ to be present with him during the interview.”

“The questioning took place at the police station, and when N.J.O. expressed an intent to invoke his rights, the officers attempted to cajole N.J.O. into speaking with them … All of these factors militate against a finding that the subsequent waiver of N.J.O.’s rights was knowing and voluntary and that his confession was voluntarily given.”

Next, as Florida’s courts do in all cases where a Miranda violation is found, the 2nd DCA conducted a “harmless error” analysis. The court found there was a reasonable probability that the admission of N.J.O.’s statements at trial impacted the outcome, as his confession was a key piece of evidence. The court wrote:

“The only evidence in the record of any type of premeditation—that N.J.O. may have targeted the victim and ‘lured’ him to the location—came from N.J.O.’s statement to the officers. In this case, the record shows that the error did, in point of fact, contribute to the sentence.”

“The DJJ recommended that N.J.O. be sentenced to probation because he had no prior record, no diversions, and no other incidents in the past. Nevertheless, based solely on the content of N.J.O.’s statement to the officers, the court determined that a harsher sentence was necessary.”

“Without that statement, the trial court would have had no factual basis for departing from the DJJ recommendation concerning the sentence to be imposed. Therefore, because there is a reasonable probability that the error in considering and admitting N.J.O.’s statement contributed to the sentence imposed, the error was not harmless.”

Put simply, because N.J.O.’s post-Miranda statements likely led to a “harsher” sentence than he would have otherwise received, he was harmed by the erroneous admission of those unlawfully obtained statements. As a result, a new trial was required.

N.J.O. is likely to be viewed as a key case in Florida’s Miranda jurisprudence for a few reasons. These include:

• The 2nd DCA found N.J.O.’s request that “someone” be present during interrogation was an invocation of the right to counsel (he didn’t have to say the word “lawyer”)
• The fact that harmless error is not just limited to whether someone is found delinquent (or guilty) because of the improper admission of a defendant’s post-Miranda statements – if their sentence increases, this is also considered “harm”

In sum, N.J.O. v. State, 292 So. 3d 491 (Fla. 2d. DCA 2020) marks a significant development in Florida’s case law surrounding Miranda rights. It recognizes a broad and context-sensitive view of invoking the right to counsel, and reinforces enhanced legal safeguards for juvenile suspects during custodial interrogation. 

N.J.O. v. State also broadly interprets “harmless error” to encompass sentencing harms caused by improper admission of statements (rather than simply asking if the verdict itself would have changed). Florida defense attorneys should take note, as improper admission of post-Miranda statements may constitute reversible error in more cases than initially thought.

If someone is arrested and formally charged in Florida in a case involving a Miranda waiver that was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary, it is CRITICAL to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This decision could make the difference in whether someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting drug charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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