North FL’s Highest Court Discusses ‘Corroboration’ Needed to Admit Child Hearsay

February 9, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense Social Share

Florida’s 1st District Court of Appeal held that a defendant’s post-arrest statements served as the ‘corroboration’ necessary to admit an alleged child victim’s hearsay statement about abuse at the hands of the defendant.

In Florida, hearsay is an out of court statement offered in court for the purpose of proving that statement is true. Hearsay is generally inadmissible in a court of law – however, there are various exceptions to this rule. For more on hearsay, click here.

Hearsay exceptions in Florida are covered by two statutes – Fla. Stat. 90.803 (hearsay admissible regardless of availability of declarant) and Fla. Stat. 90.804 (hearsay admissible only if declarant is not available to testify). A hearsay declarant is the speaker or writer of the hearsay statement, document or record that is sought to be introduced.

Examples of hearsay exceptions under Fla. Stat. 90.803 (regardless of whether the declarant is available to testify) include:

• Present Sense Impression: Statement describing or explaining an event made while perceiving it or immediately after.
• Excited Utterance: Statement relating to a startling event made while under stress or excitement from the event.
• Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition: Statement of current state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (e.g., intent, pain).
• Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment: Statement made for diagnosis/treatment describing medical history, symptoms, or cause.
• Recorded Recollection: A record made or adopted by the witness when memory was fresh, now insufficiently remembered.

On the other hand, examples of hearsay exceptions under Fla. Stat. 90.804 (e.g. admissible only when the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial) include:

• Former Testimony: Prior testimony given under oath in a proceeding or deposition where the opposing party had a similar motive and opportunity to develop it.
• Statement Under Belief of Imminent Death: Statement made while believing death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death. (Death must be so close that the declarant proverbially heard “the beating wings of the angel of death.” People v. Sarzano, 212 N.Y. 231 (1914))

Important: For a comprehensive breakdown of all hearsay exceptions under Florida law, click here.

In addition to complying with one of the exceptions above, there is an additional question Florida courts must ask when evaluating whether hearsay is admissible. That is – is the hearsay sought to be introduced testimonial or nontestimonial in nature?

This distinction was first discussed in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) ruling.

Per Crawford, hearsay is considered testimonial in nature if the hearsay was created with the primary purpose of facilitating a government investigation or prosecution. Examples may include:

• A child’s interview with a CPI (Child Protective Investigator) describing acts of physical or sexual abuse days after they have concluded
• A written affidavit created by an alleged crime victim at a police station after the offense has concluded
• A 911 call to report a crime that was made 5 days after the allegedly unlawful activity occurred

You may notice that at the time of testimonial hearsay’s creation, the “emergency” responsible for the creation of the hearsay was already over.

If a hearsay statement (or document/record) is made primarily for the purpose of responding to an ongoing emergency (e.g. while a crime is actively occurring), it is considered nontestimonial. Examples include:

• A 911 call while a crime is occurring (e.g. “John Smith is shooting at us right now!”)
• An alleged child victim’s initial disclosure of abuse to a parent, family member, or friend
• Statements made to medical personnel for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment (per Fla. Stat. 90.803(4))

To learn more about the differences between testimonial hearsay and nontestimonial hearsay in Florida courts, click here.

In practice, the difference between these is that testimonial hearsay cannot be admitted (even if it appears to satisfy one or more hearsay exceptions) in court unless one of the following occurs:

• The declarant is available to testify at trial, and the defendant is given the opportunity to cross-examine them 
• The declarant is unavailable to testify at trial – but the defendant had the opportunity before trial to cross-examine the declarant in a Crawford-compliant fashion (e.g. a 3.190(j) deposition)

Important: A discovery deposition under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220 does not satisfy confrontation requirements. Thus, if the declarant intends to offer testimonial hearsay into evidence but they are subsequently unavailable for trial, the hearsay is inadmissible unless the defendant wrongly made the declarant unavailable (e.g. through threats/killing). For more, click here.

One of the most frequently debated hearsay exceptions in Florida is the child hearsay exception, codified under Fla. Stat. 90.803(23). This allows for the admission of hearsay statements that do not comply with any other designated exception if all of the following are true of the hearsay:

• The child who made the statement (or authored the document/record) had a physical, emotional, or developmental age of 17 or less at the time the statement was made
• The statement describes any act of child abuse or neglect, sexual abuse against a child, the offense of child abuse or aggravated child abuse, or any unlawful sexual act, contact, intrusion or penetration performed on or in the presence of the child
• The statement and source through which it is reported are sufficiently trustworthy
• The time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards as to its reliability

Per State v. Townsend, 635 So.2d 949 (Fla. 1994), courts consider many factors when evaluating if child hearsay (e.g. a CPT interview or other post-abuse disclosure) is reliable and trustworthy enough to be admitted into evidence. These may include (among others):

• The mental and physical age and maturity of the child who made the statement
• Nature and duration of the abuse or offense
• Relationship of the child to the offender
• Spontaneity of the statement
• Whether physical evidence corroborates the account
• Vagueness or specificity of the accusation
• Contradictions (if any) in the accusation
• Whether the child uses terminology expected of someone of their age
• A child’s general demeanor and emotional state

Note: The introduction of child hearsay can significantly influence the outcome of a criminal trial in Florida involving charges stemming from alleged physical or sexual abuse. Because of this, it is important for defendants to have an experienced, aggressive Florida criminal defense attorney at their side who can challenge its admission.

If an alleged victim is unavailable to testify at trial, a nontestimonial child hearsay statement may be admitted pursuant to the exception only if there is other corroborative evidence of the offense (Fla. Stat. 90.803(23)(a)(2)(b)). 

But how much “corroborative evidence” is required? The answer is – even a single post-arrest statement by the accused can suffice, according to one decision by North Florida’s highest court.

Let’s take a look at that case – Reyner v. State, 745 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) – and what it means for defendants in cases involving the potential introduction of child hearsay in Florida.

KEY CASE: Reyner v. State, 745 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) 

In Reyner, the defendant (Reyner) was accused of a “lewd, lascivious or indecent assault” on his 4-year-old niece. Since Reyner, this offense has been relabeled as lewd or lascivious molestation, a second-degree felony punishable by up to 15 years in prison. 

At trial, it was revealed that the child disclosed the alleged abuse to her father before bedtime – leading to the police being contacted. Reyner was arrested and charged. Upon being questioned by law enforcement, Reyner made a statement indicating that he had committed the abuse that the child alleged.

The child was found incompetent to testify at trial, and Reyner remained silent. Moreover, there was no physical evidence of the abuse – just the child’s disclosure to her father. Because of this, the State moved to admit the child’s allegation through the testimony of her father (e.g. the father would testify at trial as to what his daughter told him).

Reyner objected to this, arguing that as a matter of law, there was no “corroborating evidence” of the allegations. In the absence of this, Reyner asserted that admitting the testimony of the child’s father violated his confrontation rights under the 6th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 

However, the trial judge denied Reyner’s motion and allowed the father’s testimony. The judge held that since Reyner made an inculpatory statement to law enforcement after he was arrested, this was by itself “corroborating evidence” sufficient to allow the admission of the child hearsay (even though the child could not testify).

Reyner was convicted of the lesser-included offense of attempted lewd or lascivious assault. On appeal to Florida’s 1st DCA (Tallahassee and North Florida’s highest court), he claimed that the judge erred by permitting the father of the alleged victim to testify as to the child’s accusation. 

Reyner asserted that his single statement to law enforcement was not “corroborating evidence” sufficient to permit the introduction of the child hearsay under Fla. Stat. 90.803(23)(a)(2)(b)) through the alleged victim’s father. According to Reyner, this required reversal of his conviction.

However, the 1st DCA disagreed and affirmed Reyner’s conviction. Citing its recent ruling in Delacruz v. State, 734 So.2d 1116, 1119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), the 1st DCA held that a single statement of the accused that appears to confirm the alleged abuse is “corroborating evidence”:

“In Delacruz, this court addressed the following issue: [W]hether the statement made by [Delacruz] when he was arrested, admitting that he could have accidentally touched the child’s vagina “a lot of times” while playing with her, may constitute “other corroborative evidence” for purposes of section 90.803(23)(a)2b. Id. at 1122. Delacruz held that such a statement “may qualify as ‘other corroborative evidence of the abuse or offense’ for purposes of section 90.803(23)(a)2b,” but because the case was being remanded for a new trial, we expressly left open the question whether the trial court could find “sufficient corroboration in [Delacruz’s] statement, alone, to satisfy the requirement of section 90.803(23)(a)2b.” Id. at 1122. … The question left unanswered in Delacruz is squarely presented in the instant case. We are asked to decide whether a statement made by Reyner to a police officer after his arrest, by itself, can constitute sufficient corroborative evidence of the act alleged to satisfy section 90.803(23)

“In the order admitting the child’s hearsay statement, the trial court ruled that Reyner’s statement was sufficient corroboration, explaining as follows: Since the child is unavailable to testify there is also sufficient corroborative evidence of the abuse to allow its admissibility. The Court has reviewed the defendant’s statement [made to police after he was arrested] which, although denying the abuse took place, contains very similar descriptions of the “nap incident” related by the child … Based upon our standard of review, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the appellant’s statement was sufficient, alone, to satisfy the corroboration requirement of section 90.803(23)(a) 2 b, and admitting into evidence the child’s hearsay statement.”

In essence, because Reyner’s statements to police described the alleged incident in a manner similar to how the child did (when she disclosed the abuse to her father), the 1st DCA held that the child hearsay was properly admitted at Reyner’s trial. Thus, his conviction was affirmed.

In sum, Reyner v. State, 745 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) is a significant development in Florida’s corpus of case law on child hearsay – and specifically, what constitutes “corroborative evidence” sufficient to admit nontestimonial child hearsay if the alleged victim is unavailable at trial. The 1st DCA held:

• The child victim’s abuse disclosure could not be admitted through her father’s testimony unless corroborating evidence supported this 
• Reyner’s statements to law enforcement constituted corroborating evidence of the abuse
• Since Reyner’s post-arrest statements were sufficiently similar to the father’s testimony as to what the alleged victim disclosed, the judge properly allowed the father to testify as to his daughter’s statements (Fla. Stat. 90.803(23)(a)(2)(b))
• Since the father’s testimony was not erroneously (e.g. wrongly) introduced, Reyner’s conviction was affirmed

Though Reyner was decided prior to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the victim’s spontaneous disclosure to her father in Reyner would be considered nontestimonial hearsay. Thus, the analysis in Reyner still applies if the child hearsay is nontestimonial in nature.

However, if a law enforcement officer or CPT interviewer had been the one to testify as to the victim’s statements, Reyner’s “confession” would not automatically allow the admission of the child hearsay. This is because post-Crawford, Reyner’s rule only applies to nontestimonial child hearsay statements (and statements to police/CPT are generally considered testimonial).

Florida’s criminal defense community should take note, as prosecutors may argue Reyner v. State, 745 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) is more broadly applicable (e.g. covers all child hearsay) than it actually is. 

If a child hearsay statement is testimonial, the alleged victim must be available to testify at trial (or made available for a 3.190(j) deposition) – and the defendant must be given the opportunity to cross-examine them. Otherwise, the testimonial child hearsay is inadmissible regardless of if “corroborating evidence” exists.

If someone is arrested and formally charged in Florida in a case involving child hearsay, it is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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