Florida Supreme Court Issues MAJOR New Ruling on PRR Law: What to Know

May 18, 2026 Don Pumphrey, Jr. Criminal Defense, Violent Crimes Social Share

Florida’s Supreme Court held that sentences under the state’s Prisoner Releasee Reoffender (PRR) statute generally cannot be challenged as illegal, even if a trial judge rather than a jury determined facts that lengthened a defendant’s sentence. However, one justice disagreed.

CASE: Maye v. State, 2026 WL 1346031 (Fla. 2026)

Charge(s): Robbery with a Deadly Weapon

Outcome: Conviction and sentence AFFIRMED, as Maye could not challenge his PRR sentence as illegal under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800.

Prisoner Releasee Reoffender in Florida

In Florida, the Prisoner Releasee Reoffender (PRR) statute is the “Big Nasty” of sentencing laws. The PRR law was enacted to ensure that repeat felony offenders serve the MAXIMUM sentence for the offenses they are convicted of without the possibility of a reduced prison term. 

If someone is convicted of certain crimes in Florida within THREE YEARS of their release from a Florida correctional institution or correctional institution of another state for a crime qualifying as a felony in Florida, they may be charged as a Prisoner Releasee Reoffender.

PRR may kick in if a defendant is convicted of any of the following offenses:

• Treason
• Murder and manslaughter
• Sexual battery
• Carjacking, home-invasion robbery, and robbery
• Arson
• Kidnapping
• Aggravated assault with deadly weapon, aggravated battery, aggravated stalking 
• Aircraft piracy, unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb 
• Any felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual 
• Armed burglary, burglary of a dwelling or burglary of an occupied structure

Note: Someone is not AUTOMATICALLY considered PRR simply because they are eligible. A prosecutor has discretion on the issue of whether to charge a qualifying defendant under the PRR statute (e.g. seek the sentencing enhancement) or not. For more, click here.

PRR may also apply to convictions for offenses covered by any of the following Florida statutes, if the State seeks a PRR enhancement:

• F.S.S. 790.07 (Persons engaged in criminal offenses, having weapons) 
• F.S.S. 800.04 (Lewd or lascivious offenses committed upon or in the presence of persons less than 16 years of age) 
• F.S.S. 827.03 (Abuse, aggravated abuse, and neglect of a child) 
• F.S.S. 827.071 (Sexual performance by a child) 
• F.S.S. 847.0135(5) (Computer pornography offenses)

The constitutionality of Florida’s PRR statute has been the subject of significant debate since its passage. This is because under the PRR law, a trial judge rather than a jury is tasked with finding facts that enhance a defendant’s sentence. 

As previously noted, if someone is charged under the PRR law (and convicted), their minimum sentence is automatically the statutory maximum if they are found to qualify. The problem with this is that the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated, on multiple occasions, that the facts to support any such enhancement must be determined by a jury rather than a judge.

The SOLE exception to this is the “mere existence” of a prior conviction. This was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). There, the majority held that ANY fact other than the existence of a prior conviction, no matter how “obvious,” must be found by a jury. This is part of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right.

This presents a problem for Florida’s PRR statute, because it seems to EXPRESSLY CONFLICT with Erlinger. The PRR law allows a judge, by a preponderance of the evidence, to determine all of the following facts in finding a defendant PRR-eligible (and sentencing them accordingly):

• The existence of a qualifying prior felony conviction (permissible according to Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024) and its jurisprudential ancestors)
• The amount of time that elapsed between the old offense and new offense
• The DATE OF RELEASE from the correctional institution (e.g. whether this was 3 years or less before the commission of the new offense)
• Whether the defendant was housed in an institution that is covered by the PRR law

Although these determinations are relatively “straightforward” in most cases, Erlinger made it clear that this does not matter. Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, concluded that there is NO exception to the rule that only the existence of a prior conviction can be found by a judge if a defendant’s sentence is being enhanced. All remaining facts must be found by A JURY.

Since Florida’s PRR law allows the judge (not a jury) to find two or three other facts that make a defendant eligible for an enhanced sentence, many defendants have launched challenges to the PRR law, arguing that it was UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED in their sentencing hearings. 

Even before Erlinger was decided, this argument was made – but it usually relied upon Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). There, the “prior convictions exception” was first discussed in detail by the U.S. Supreme Court. 

However, Florida’s courts generally rejected challenges to the state’s PRR law in the years after Apprendi. In Calloway v. State, 914 So.2d 12, 14 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), for example, the 2nd DCA found that the dates of release and place of incarceration were “direct derivatives” of the prior conviction. 

Put simply, because the remaining facts determined by the judge were “outgrowths” of the prior conviction (which the judge was allowed to determine), the 2nd DCA allowed the PRR law to stand – as it substantively complied with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The 2nd DCA’s reasoning was adopted by other courts in the following years.

But that analysis was seemingly rendered obsolete when Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024) emphasized, repeatedly, that the prior convictions exception CANNOT be extended in any way, shape, or form. As a result, a spate of new challenges to Florida’s PRR law occurred. These were initiated by:

• Defendants who were already in custody and challenging their PRR sentence
• Defendants currently charged with an offense who demanded a separate jury to determine their PRR eligibility (rather than a judge)

One of these made it all the way to the Florida Supreme Court. The appellant, Marcus Roland Maye, was convicted of armed robbery with a deadly weapon in 2002. He was sentenced to LIFE in prison under the PRR law (e.g. the trial judge, rather than a jury, found Maye qualified for the enhancement).

Maye initially challenged his PRR sentence to Florida’s Sixth District Court of Appeal. But the 6th DCA REJECTED it, AFFIRMING the constitutionality of the PRR law (and by extension, the legality of Maye’s life sentence). The 6th DCA cited Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and its progeny.

A year later, however, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). This revelation created shockwaves in the criminal law community, which led the Florida Supreme Court to take Maye’s case. 

Oral arguments were held in 2025. Maye urged the Florida Supreme Court to strike down the PRR law (and rule his sentence illegal), arguing that PRR is incompatible with Apprendi and Erlinger. The State countered by making two claims:

• The PRR law is constitutional, as finding the facts accompanying the prior conviction is “ministerial” in nature (e.g. they are “direct derivatives” of the prior conviction)
• Maye could not challenge the PRR law’s constitutionality of challenging his sentence as illegal under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a)

The Florida Supreme Court AGREED with the State on its second claim and ruled against Maye, finding that a 3.800 claim was not the “proper procedural vehicle.” Notably, the majority did not rule on the issue of the PRR law’s constitutionality in the wake of Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). Only a dissenting judge, Justice Labarga, opined on that topic.

Let’s take a look at this major case – Maye v. State, 2026 WL 1346031 (Fla. 2026) – and discuss what it means for defendants in Florida concerned about sentencing under the PRR law.

KEY CASE: Maye v. State, 2026 WL 1346031 (Fla. 2026)

In Maye, the defendant (Maye) was charged with and convicted of armed robbery with a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to life in prison under Florida’s PRR statute.

In the 2020s, over a decade after he was sentenced, Maye launched a new appeal arguing that his sentence was ILLEGAL under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800. The 6th District Court of Appeal ruled against Maye – and cited Calloway v. State, 914 So.2d 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) and its progeny in upholding the PRR law.

Then Erlinger was decided. As a result, Florida’s Supreme Court took Maye’s appeal. Before the Florida Supreme Court, Maye argued his sentence was ILLEGAL because a judge, rather than a jury, determined he qualified for PRR (despite multiple facts other than the existence of a prior conviction needing to be found for the enhancement to apply).

Confronted with this claim, the Florida Supreme Court… did not squarely address it. Instead, the majority ruled that the “procedural vehicle” (Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800) that Maye used to challenge his sentence was IMPROPER. As a result, there was no need to address the constitutionality of the PRR statute. 

In doing so, the Florida Supreme Court OVERRULED its prior decision in Plott v. State, 148 So. 3d 90 (Fla. 2014), which held that an “Apprendi claim” (e.g. the defendant arguing their sentence was improperly enhanced by a judge rather than a jury) COULD be brought under Rule 3.800:

“Because Apprendi claims are subject to harmless error review under both Florida and federal precedent, Apprendi errors are not the type of claims of “illegal sentence” contemplated by and cognizable under the first category (“illegal sentences”) in a rule 3.800(a)(1) motion, i.e., claims “involving ‘a court’s patent lack of authority or jurisdiction, a violation of the sentencing maximums provided by the Legislature, or a violation of some other fundamental right resulting in a person’s wrongful imprisonment.’ ” Id. at 991-92 (quoting Wright, 911 So. 2d at 84). Moreover, well before Plott was decided, we said that Apprendi errors must be preserved. McGregor v. State, 789 So. 2d 976, 977 (Fla. 2001); Galindez, 955 So. 2d at 521.”

“Plott does not address this issue or grapple with how an error that is subject to preservation could ever constitute an illegal sentence that, by the rule’s own text, is subject to correction at any time. See Carter, 786 So. 2d at 1176 (“[R]ule 3.800(a) vests trial courts with the broad authority to correct an illegal sentence without imposing a time limitation on the ability of defendants to seek relief.”) … Thus, we conclude that Plott is in tension with both Florida and federal precedent and must fall. … Because Apprendi claims are subject to harmless error review, they are not the type of “illegal sentence” claim cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion. We therefore recede from Plott, conclude that Maye’s Apprendi claim is not cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion, and approve the result of the Sixth District’s decision on this alternative basis.”

Note that the majority agreed with the 6th DCA’s decision on an ALTERNATIVE BASIS. This is the majority overtly signaling that they did not find the PRR statute to be Erlinger-compliant (as the 6th DCA did). Instead, they “punted” on the issue by instead ruling Maye could not challenge his PRR sentence as illegal under Rule 3.800.

Justice Labarga authored a fiery dissent. Labarga argued that the majority’s failure to strike down the PRR statute meant Florida law would continue to be in direct tension with the U.S. Supreme Court. Justice Labarga wrote:

“As noted by Justice Kavanaugh in his dissent in Erlinger, the harmless error rule serves a legitimate purpose of preventing retrials for trivial errors. However, in many instances—as in this case—the harmless error rule allows appellate courts to condone constitutional violations for the sake of judicial efficiency, or, to avoid making a tough call. Unfortunately, in doing so, rights specifically and unequivocally guaranteed by the Constitution to those accused and convicted of crimes are diluted. As Justice Gorsuch said in Erlinger, “there is no efficiency exception to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.” 

“Today, ignoring 24 years of unambiguous directives from the Supreme Court, with assistance from the harmless error rule, the majority disposes of this case by incorrectly concluding that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 is an improper procedural vehicle for Maye to challenge his sentence. Florida’s Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act was in effect in 2002 when Maye was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon and, inconceivably, it remains unchanged in 2026. In the two decades following the Apprendi decision, the Florida Legislature has not conformed the statute to constitutional standards, and the trial courts around the state continue to regularly sentence defendants pursuant to it. This Court, rather than addressing the threshold question of the statute’s constitutionality, chooses to sidestep it. Notwithstanding the widespread rhetorical emphasis on the importance of the rule of law, the State of Florida has a statute in place that violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States. 

“In each instance that a judge in this state enters an order enhancing a prisoner’s sentence pursuant to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act without a jury’s factual determination beyond a reasonable doubt, the rule of law is ignored. There is no greater rule of law in our country than the Constitution of the United States. This Court should (1) rule that Florida’s Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments both on its face and as applied to Maye, and (2) quash the portion of Maye’s sentence illegally enhanced by the trial court and remand this case for a new sentencing hearing. Because the majority chooses not to do so, I dissent.”

In essence, Justice Labarga condemned the majority for FAILING to recognize that the current PRR sentencing scheme is incompatible with Apprendi and Erlinger. For more, click here.

However, Justice Labarga’s opinion did NOT win the day. As a result, Maye’s PRR sentence was upheld, and the PRR law lives on (for now).

In sum, Maye v. State, 2026 WL 1346031 (Fla. 2026) marks a major development in Florida’s corpus of case law surrounding the PRR statute. The Florida Supreme Court held that:

• A sentence enhanced by PRR is not an “illegal sentence” and thus, cannot be challenged under Rule 3.800
• Because Maye used an “improper procedural vehicle” to challenge his sentence, it was affirmed
• The issue of the PRR law’s constitutionality was NOT directly addressed

Justice Labarga forcefully argued in a dissent that the majority should have struck down the PRR law and required resentencing in Maye’s case. Justice Labarga noted that the PRR statute allows a judge to find far more than “the mere existence” of a prior conviction, which directly conflicts with Apprendi and Erlinger. 

It is important to note that because the Florida Supreme Court “sidestepped” the PRR issue, the door remains open for FUTURE challenges to the law (just not under Rule 3.800). 

This is why it is CRITICAL for a defendant charged as a Prisoner Releasee Reoffender (PRR) in Florida to find an experienced and aggressive Florida criminal defense attorney to move for a separate jury to determine whether the defendant qualifies for PRR.

If someone has questions about the charges in a criminal case, it is critical to find experienced and trusted legal representation as soon as possible. This decision could make the difference in whether or not someone faces a lengthy prison term and hefty fines.

Criminal Defense Attorney in Tallahassee, FL

Don Pumphrey, Jr. is a Former Prosecutor, Former State Police Officer, Lifetime Member of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; for over 25 years as a private defense attorney who is Trusted, Experienced, Aggressive in Criminal Defense as a Trial Attorney, Criminal Lawyer, Criminal Defense Lawyer for the accused in Florida State Courts located in Tallahassee, Florida but handling cases throughout the State of Florida.

Don Pumphrey, Jr. and the Tallahassee criminal defense lawyers at Pumphrey Law have decades of experience fighting criminal charges on behalf of clients and winning. Call Pumphrey Law now at (850) 681-7777 to learn more about what we can do for you. Our lawyers will be happy to provide you with a free consultation.

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